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Introduction.
Mentalités on the edge. Some reflections on 
‘anthropological history’ in Poland
Can a dialogue between Natalie Zemon Davis and three women born 
nearly 400 years ago, revolutionise Polish historiography?1 Can Peter 
Burke’s short book What Is Cultural History2, translated to and pub­
lished by a prestigious academic publishing house and bearing the 
status of ‘a university textbook subsidised by the Minister of Science 
and Higher Education’ introduce Polish ‘anthropological history’ into 
the mainstream of historiography? Can the new journal “Rocznik An­
tropologii Historii”3, devised as a meeting place for anthropologists and 
historians, turn the margins to the centre?4
1 N.Z. Davis, Kobiety na marginesach. Trzy siedemnastowieczne życiory­
sy [Women on the Margins. Three seventeenth-century lives], translated by 
B. Hlebowicz, Warszawa 2012.
2 P. Burke, Historia kulturowa, translated by J. Hunia, Kraków 2012. The edi­
ting house, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, also published Peter 
Burke’s book on visual resources: c.f.: P. Burke, Naoczność. Materiały wizualne 
jako świadectwa historyczne [Eyewitnessing. Uses of Images as Historical Evi­
dence], translated by J. Hunia, Kraków 2012.
3 “Rocznik Antropologi Historii” has been published since 2011 as a scienti­
fic journal affiliated with the Polish Historical Society.
4 Additionally, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe [PWN] simultaneously 
published a classical collection of essays by Robert Darnton, c.f.: R. Darnton, 
Wielka masakra kotów i inne epizody francuskiej historii kultury [The Great Cat 
Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History], translated by D. Gu- 
zowska, Warszawa 2012. PWN has thus launched a publishing series entitled 
“Mikrohistoria”. Books published in 2011 also included Return of Martin Guerre 
by N.Z. Davis, with a foreword by Ewa Domańska, an acclaimed non-classical 
historiography researcher, c.f.: N.Z. Davis, Powrót Martina Guerre’a [Return of 
Martin Guerre], translated by P. Szulgit, Poznań 2011. Symptomatically enou­
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Even if not, these and other publications, with the inclusion of ‘an­
thropological history’ in the curricula of historical studies5 or the emer­
gence of new research groups, come as an evident sign of transforma­
tion in the Polish historiography in the recent decade. Some consider it 
as evidence of historiographical progress and development, for others 
it is just a fad sure to pass quickly. These co-existing and conflicting 
opinions reflects the necessity of discussion about anthropological his­
tory: its actual and required status in the discipline, the problems with 
self-identity of researchers interested in, sympathising with or even 
defining themselves with the anthropological approach. This collection 
of studies highlighting some of these questions is, in our opinion, an 
invitation for historians and anthropologists to discuss them. Our brief 
reflection presented here is the subjective and personal voice of the two 
historians involved in the process of legitimisation and mainstreaming 
anthropological history.
Polish ‘anthropological historians’, as we identify ourselves, do not 
make up a stable community integrated under the banner of emancipa­
tion. In this case it is rather a group of individual researchers sharing 
a sense of “being on the margins” of a historiographical mainstream 
and — less frequently — a strong sense of being a member of cur­
rent historiographical schools, than a close-knit academic community 
at all. More often anthropological historians tend to identify themselves 
with specific paradigms or research trends such as oral history, semiot­
ics, gender studies, microhistory and, last but not least, cultural history. 
Sometimes, a researcher’s position in the community refers to their in­
tellectual development due to of eminent researchers, who had influ­
enced and enthused them with the ‘history from cultural perspective’ 
approach, those including: Jacek Banaszkiewicz, Andrzej Chwalba, 
Bogdan Rok or Ewa Domańska.
gh, these books have been published nearly 30 years after their first edition. 
The only exception is Kobiety na marginesach... originally published in 1995.
5 The first university programme in historical anthropology in Poland was 
launched in 2009 at the Institute of History of the Jagiellonian University upon 
the initiative of a team of historians: Andrzej Chwalba, Dobrochna Kałwa, Bar­
bara Klich-Kluczewska. In 2012 the Pedagogical University in Kraków followed 
this idea and introduced a similar programme.
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The specificity of anthropological history in Poland is being torn be­
tween its craving for originality, i.e. for creativity of new qualities in his­
torical studies, and its sense of a being epigones, imitative with respect 
to the already classical historiographical models that had emerged 
many years ago. On the one hand, anthropological historians are 
aware of the great achievements and value of Polish scholarship, on 
the other hand, they see the need to catch up world historiography, 
to fill the gap through research on such issues as mentality, everyday 
life, cultural patterns etc.References to the world scholarship in these 
fields arouse an increasing annoyance for some historians and bring 
about accusations of being imitative. However references, for example 
to the French Annales School, the American theory of history, and, to 
a lesser degree, German Altegeschichte or Italian microhistory (known 
almost exclusively via the works of Carlo Ginzburg), serve quite practi­
cal purposes, as they are, with their canonical status, quite frequently 
employed to legitimise innovative concepts in historical research. Re­
gardless of historians’ actual reasons, we should ask about the use of 
the universal canon of ‘anthropological history’ in terms of peripheral 
areas of historical research.
We belong to a generation of researchers in their 30s and 40s who 
still call themselves ‘historians’, regardless of their theoretical and 
methodological approach. Perhaps this sense of belonging is deter­
mined by our intellectual development in the framework of the disci­
plinary structure of the Academy. We realise that our academic train­
ing was much more ‘disciplined’ than it is in the case with the younger 
generation of enthusiasts of ‘anthropological history’, with their inter- or 
trans-disciplinary educational background. They might not necessarily 
consider themselves as ‘historians’ but rather ‘anthropological histori­
ans1, or ‘historical anthropologists’.
The terminology concerning ,anthropological history‘ seems to be 
semantically ambiguous and complex, which makes it difficult for histo­
rians to identify themselves with the discipline. The most common term 
is ‘historical anthropology’, successfully adopted and spontaneously 
used by Polish historians, including its critics. However, as historians 
we tend to use another, more accurate term of ‘anthropological his­
tory’ emphasising history as a primary field of research, accommodat­
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ing anthropological theories, methods, and interpretative tools. A term 
semantically pretty close to such a sub-field is also ‘cultural history’, 
an equivalent of ,anthropological history‘ used in American and British 
historiography6.
‘Anthropological history’/ ’historical anthropology’ covers clearly 
defined research areas and methodological trends in world historiog­
raphy or is associated directly with the use of anthropological meth­
ods in researching the past. In Poland however this concept has been 
much more extended, so in consequence its boundaries are now hard 
to precisely define. ‘Anthropological history’ takes in all outcasts and 
misfits in historiography, whether they like it or not. This concept has 
become the name for a method of historical research deviating through 
their themes or methods from the historiographical mainstream, which 
are subsequently cultural and anthropological studies using history, as 
well as a number of popular publications for the general public. The 
last ones have nothing in common with ‘anthropological history’ except 
for controversial, shared themes, such as family, sexuality, intimacy to 
mention the most ,catchy‘.
Is this correct? Should we accept this confusing mix, or rather should 
we sift out the representatives of cultural history from enthnohistorians 
(ethnographers of history), methodologists (anthropological historians) 
and cultural researchers analysing historical phenomena? And should 
we not resign from the disciplinary multi-kulti, paradoxically, for the puri­
ty of the multi-disciplinary ,anthropological history‘? In practice it seems 
neither possible to achieve nor necessary. Or maybe should we at least 
exclude the pop-history, and throw it out on its ear? Popularity of issues 
linked to or connected with the area of ‘anthropological history’ is, on 
the one hand, a developmental stimulus, and, on the other, a reason for 
disregard by some historians, suspicious of any use of history in culture 
in general, and pop-culture in particular.
Actually, semantic ambiguity may be give a hard time only to aca­
demic teachers creating new fields of study (which we have experienced 
ourselves) and methodologists seeking to put togrther a distinctive pic­
ture out of scattered pieces. Methodologists and theorists of history not
6 Cf. E. Domańska, Posłowie, in: N.Z. Davis, Powrót Martina..., pp. 197— 
200.
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only do set the directions for an academic debate on this sub-discipline. 
They do much more. And in this sense, the situation has not changed 
for years. Like Wojciech Wrzosek and Ewa Domańska, who have been 
explaining the meaning of anthropological history or microhistory, today 
the younger generation of methodologists and historians are emphasis­
ing the role of anthropology in the development of historical research. 
They call for dissemination of the so-called ‘Western’ canon as well as 
the current of cultural and social anthropology. They also call for the 
dissemination of theoretical reflection among Polish historians, appear­
ing to still be paralysed by the post-communist, or rather post-Marxist, 
fear of theory.
There is much to talk about considering the paradox of the co­
existence of different paradigms and research fields that did not occur 
at the same time, such as the history of mentalité, the history of sexu­
ality, the history of discourse, ‘post-humanities’ (post-colonial studies, 
animal studies), the history of the second degree etc. Despite such 
diversity and thematic richness, ‘anthropological history’ is still, and too 
very often associated by Polish historians with the history of mental­
ité. This specific example of mis-identification perfectly illustrates the 
dilemma faced by Polish anthropological historians. Years ago the his­
tory of mentalité had been deconstructed by Western historians, and 
consequently rejected as an unclear and simplifying criterion, though 
extensive fundamental studies based on this paradigm brought about 
a concrete outcome whose significance is still incontrovertible.
If we do not know the answers to many important questions posed 
once as part of the history of mentalité, should we catch up (and, hence, 
accept the status of backward historiography) or reject the epigone at­
titude and participate in a contemporary global historical discourse? Or 
should we find our own way, based on the return to ‘traditional’ issues 
of anthropological history, though analysed in terms of contemporary 
historical and humanistic discourses. Of equal importance is the need 
to break with the traditional forms of the historiographical narrative and 
propose a new narrative that will not be just a straightforward reception 
of Western models but a narrative accounting for the specificity of local 
history and research traditions.
12 Barbara Klich-Kluczewska, Dobrochna Kałwa
The future of anthropological history is still unsettled. New ideas are 
yet to come, and hopefully they will provide answers to many of our 
questions inspired by the articles presented in the volume. They ana­
lyse not only the contemporary Polish historiography, but also propose 
new research areas and categories of historical analysis. To a certain 
extent, they reflect both the present state and, hopefully the future of 
anthropological history in Poland.
Barbara Klich-Kluczewska, 
Dobrochna Kałwa
Dobrochna Kałwa
The split identity. The role of a historian’s 
autobiographical memory in the research 
of contemporary history
Debate
In 1996, during a meeting of the Polish Historical Society in Krakow, 
a young historian presented the results of his studies on students’ pro­
tests in Krakow in 1968. Among the historians gathered in the lecture 
hall there were also representatives of the generation which had taken 
part in these events (mostly active participants in the rallies and mani­
festations). Having listened to their comments and remarks provided 
during the lecture and the discussion which followed, I realised that 
some of the listeners assumed the double role of both witnesses and 
historians: their judgements and statements were not representative of 
the attitude of a historian, who makes conclusions according to gen­
erally accepted professional principles; they conveyed the attitude of 
an eyewitness. For these historians, at that particular time, their own 
autobiographical memory of past experiences constituted the basic, if 
not the only instrument used to verify the research paper produced by 
a historian who — contrary to a witness of the discussed events — 
could ‘access’ the past of 1968 only through ‘reliable’ sources (i.e. the 
documents of state provenance in this case). Therefore, the meeting in 
Krakow saw an encounter, as well as a form of confrontation, of the two 
perspectives from which the past is looked at: the historical reconstruc­
tion of events and the memory of a personal experience.
I have often witnessed similar situations when professional histori­
ans abandon the rules of historical cognition for a moment and give way
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to their personal experience; the majority of such cases took place dur­
ing seminars, lectures, conferences, but also in the statements deliv­
ered in the media, as well as in research papers, though the instances 
of the latter are relatively rare, while authors’ experiences are usually 
hidden between the lines. The coexistence of the two perspectives — 
the experimental and the cognitive — is a phenomenon typical for the 
environment of researchers dealing with recent history which deserves 
more attention, since it touches upon the significant issue of the influ­
ence of historians’ memory and, in a wider perspective, their cultural 
background in the form of the studies of recent history, as well as the 
question of the sense of their faith in maintaining transcendence and 
objectivism with regard to the subject of the research.
‘The time o f m em ory’
The above questions correspond to the issue of the studies of the phe­
nomenon (or phenomena) of memory — a field of the humanities which 
has been developing rapidly since the 1980s. The area of interest to 
‘memory discipline’1 covers such diverse and disparate matters as the 
forms of commemoration, the activity of public institutions (such as the 
state, schools, museums), public discourse on the past, historical con­
sciousness, autobiographical memory and narration of the past experi­
ence, collective memory and the identity of memory communities, to 
mention only a few. In the face of this diversity of themes and interdisci­
plinarity, particular attention is attributable to theoretical reflection2, con­
1 K.L. Klein, On the emergence of memory in historical discourse, “Repre­
sentations”, 69 (2000), p. 1.
2 M.in. P. Nora, Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoir, “Rep­
resentations”, 26: Memory and Counter-Memory (1989), pp. 7-24; idem, Czas 
pamięci, translated by W. Dłuski, „Res Publica Nowa”, 7 (2001), pp. 37-43; 
J. Assmann, Collective Memory and Cultural Identity, translated by J. Cza­
plicka, “New German Critique”, 65 (1995), pp. 125-133; idem, Pamięć zbio­
rowa i tożsamość kulturowa, “Borussia”, 29 (2003), pp. 11-16; A. Assmann, 
History, Memory, and the Genre of Testimony, “Poetics Today” vol. 27, 2 (2006), 
pp. 261-273; S. Friedländer, History, Memory, and the Historian: Dilemmas 
and Responsibilities, “New German Critique”, 80 (2000), pp. 3-15; B. Sza- 
cka, Czas przeszły — pamięć — mit, Warszawa 2006; States of Memory. 
Constinuities, Conflicts, and Transformation in National Retrospection, ed. by 
J.K. Olick, Durham and London 2003; Witness and Memory. The discourse of 
trauma, ed. by A. Douglass, T.A. Vogler, New York, London 2003; J.K. Olick,
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centrated on the following two issues: the manner of defining the term 
itself (as wide-ranging as unspecified3) and working out the instruments 
which would enable analysing social and cultural phenomena from the 
angle of memory. In other words, the points of interest here are the two 
fundamental though seemingly trivial questions: what is memory and 
what is the function of memory defined as such?
In this article, I shall focus on two categories of memory — autobio­
graphical memory and collective memory — which refer differently to 
the relations between the individual on the one hand and his or her past 
experience and background on the other. Autobiographical memory is 
seemingly equivalent with the common understanding of memory as 
a compilation of reminiscences. Although it does mean the individual 
ability to record and reconstruct all experiences in life, i.e. to remember, 
recollect and reminisce, the range of the term is much wider. Autobio­
graphical memory is not only the register of what happened and what 
was remembered, but also, if not above all, the psychological process
J. Robbins, Social Memory Studies: From “Collective Memory" to the Histori­
cal Sociology of Mnemonic Practices, “Annual Review of Sociology” vol. 24,
1 (1998), pp. 105-140; R. Traba, Historia — przestrzeń dialogu, Warszawa 
2006; Pamięć i polityka historyczna. Doświadczenia Polski i je j sąsiadów, ed.
by S.M. Nowinowski, J. Pomorski, R. Stobiecki, Łódź 2008; P.T. Kwiatkowski, 
Pamięć zbiorowa społeczeństwa polskiego w okresie transformacji, Warszawa 
2008; B. Skarga, Tożsamość ja  i pamięć, „Znak”, 5 (1995), pp. 4-18; M. Kula, 
Między przeszłością a przyszłością. O pamięci, zapominaniu i przewidywaniu, 
Poznań 2004; J. Filipowicz, Pojęcie pamięci społecznej w nauce polskiej, “Kul­
tura i Historia”, 2 (2002); Przemiany pamięci społecznej a teoria kultury, ed. 
by B. Korzeniewski, Poznań 2007; T. Maruszewski, Pamięć autobiograficzna, 
Gdańsk 2005; J. Kordys, Pamięć i opowiadanie, in: Praktyki opowiadania, 
ed. by B. Owczarek, Z. Mitosek, W. Grajewski, Kraków 2001, pp. 127-173; 
K. Kaniowska, Antropologia i problem pamięci, “Konteksty. Polska Sztuka Lu­
dowa” vol. 57, 3/4 (2003), pp. 57-65.
3 The broadness of the term is evidenced by the practice of researchers 
who usually use a range of auxiliary terms next to the references to the theo­
retical concepts in order to specify the intended understanding of memory. For 
this reason in the literature on the subject the term memory is replaced by the 
collective memory, the autobiographical memory, the cultural memory, the com­
municative memory, the semantic memory, the sensoric memory, the long- and 
short-term memories, as well as the post-memory. Cf. T. Maruszewski, op. cit.; 
K. Kaniowska, Postpamięć indywidualna — postpamięć zbiorowa jako katego­
rie poznania w antropologii, in: Pamięć i polityka historyczna..., pp. 65-76.
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of the on-going revision and reinterpretation of the ‘archive of memo­
ries’, through which a given individual provides meaning to his or her 
experience and, at the same time, maintains a sense of continuity and 
integrity of his or her identity4. The changeability and evolution of au­
tobiographical memory is a common argument in order to question the 
reliability of information contained in memory-based sources. However, 
which is particularly evident to researchers on memory, the value of 
autobiographical material lies in the axiological sphere, the cognitive 
structures, the ways of arranging experiences into the history of one’s 
life, the sphere of mentality, the psychological mechanisms and the in­
dividual identity.
Collective memory is a broader term, understood in more general 
terms as “something left of the past, or group activity about the past”5. 
Such a vast definition reflects researchers’ efforts to conceptualise col­
lective memory as a total and omnipresent phenomenon6 on the one 
hand and coveys its complexity and multidimensionality on the other. 
For the purposes of the analysis contained in this paper, I shall focus on 
two particular aspects concerning the relations between autobiographi­
cal memory and a critical reflection by a professional historian7. Firstly, 
collective memory is an amalgam of three types of components, namely 
the individuals’ autobiographical memory of their own experience, the 
collective memory of the events and experiences established as shared 
by the group and the official memory, shaped within the framework of 
the memory policy put in practice8. These three spheres of memory 
— the individual, the collective and the official — merge and undergo
4 T. Maruszewski, op. cit., p. 10; I. Knez, Autobiographical memories for 
places, “Memory”, 14 (2006), pp. 359-377.
5 P. Nora, Mémoire collective, in: La nouvel histoire, ed. by J. Le Goff, 
R. Chartier, J. Revel, Paris 1987, quoted in: J. Le Goff, Historia i pamięć, tans- 
lated by A. Gronowska, J. Stryjczyk, Warszawa 2007, p. 152.
6 In a sense, the collective memory can be treated as the Foucault’s dis­
course, with its omnipresence, complementarity of dispersed statements, dis­
cursive practices, the function of power-knowledge.
7 See more on the direct reflection and the critical reflection in K. Zamorski, 
Nostalgia i wzniosłość a refleksja krytyczna o dziejach. Kiedy „polityka history­
czna” ma sens?, in: Pamięć i polityka historyczna..., pp. 60-61.
8 B. Szacka, op.cit., pp. 44-45.
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constant negotiation as the determinants of both individual integrity and 
that individual’s sense of being a member of the community.
Another equally significant issue is refers to the relations between 
memory and history. From Nora’s classical perspective, memory seems 
to be the antithesis of history, i.e. anti-history9. The antinomy of the two 
categories is based not only on the differentiation between what consti­
tutes knowledge and what constitutes memory; it also emphasises the 
diversity of the channels of distributing knowledge and memory and, 
above all, points to different attitudes to history within these two dis­
courses. History is characterised by institutionalisation, professional­
ism and distance, contrary to memory, which is subjective, selective 
and which ‘contains substantial emotional load and involves definite 
emphatic evaluation’10. Moreover, the two discourses are based on the 
disparate conventions of narration: the language of history is analyti­
cal and report-like, while the language of memory is poetic and figura­
tive11.
The thesis of the dichotomous relation between collective memory 
and history corresponds to the critical statements made by professional 
researchers with regard to common knowledge or historical myths, yet 
it is legitimate only as long as we speak of history as studied/described 
under the positivist or modernist paradigm, or of the selected linguis­
tic aspects or the forms of institutionalisation or research practice. At 
present, after the linguistic turn, which undermined the status of history 
as an objective science, the dichotomy between history and memory 
was abolished, since the both are characterised by subjectivism, the 
selective nature of research problems and subjection to the functions 
which legitimise the common identity. As Krzysztof Pomian observed, 
history turned out to be ‘only’ one of the fields of the discourse of mem­
ory, while a historian is but one of the participants in the social game 
for memory:
9 P. Nora, Between memory.... More on the concept of the anti-history in 
E. Domańska, Historie niekonwencjonalne. Refleksja o przeszłości w nowej 
humanistyce, Poznań 2006.
10 P.T. Kwiatkowski, op. cit., p. 27.
11 A. Szpociński, P.T. Kwiatkowski, Przeszłość jako przedmiot przekazu, 
Warszawa 2006, pp. 21-22.
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Ideally, a critical historian cannot identify with any o f the sides to 
a [memory] conflict, or with any o f the protagonists he or she writes 
about, which does not mean that his or her history is objective. ... 
The problem is that academic history is convinced that it is critical 
history, while in fact it adopts an identity-based attitude (i.e. it identi­
fies itself with either o f the conflicting sides). Therefore, one can say 
that history reflects the wars fought in politics and in the sphere of 
memory12.
Therefore, historiography, the same as collective memory, appears 
subjective, local and present-oriented, which is particularly evident with 
regard to the studies of contemporary history. Due to the absence of 
any distance over time between the subject and the object of the stud­
ies, a historian dealing with recent history “can be in contact with the 
participants and witnesses of events, and the results of his or her work 
are subject to their judgement and confronted with their experiences, 
as well as with the remembered image of the past reconstructed by 
that historian”13, thus opening up new areas for further study. Yet at 
the same time, it means the requirement to challenge methodological 
problems which are closer to sociology and anthropology than history. 
A historian plays a double role here, namely that of a researcher and 
a witness-participant with his or her accumulated experience, though 
the historian may not necessarily realise this, as evidenced by the 
above remark by Tomasz Szarota, who in his account of the specificity 
of recent history excluded the researcher from the circle of potential 
witnesses of history.
As a consequence, we cannot speak of transcendence and distance 
from the subject of the study, and therefore historians’ debate on the 
history of People’s Republic of Poland (both official and unofficial, unre­
corded discussions, comments, etc.), when analysed in greater detail, 
reveals the significance of personal experience of the past over the his­
12 E. Domańska, op. cit., p. 58. More on the conflicts between history and 
memory in K. Pomian, Historia. Nauka wobec pamięci, Lublin 2006, pp. 188­
198.
13 T. Szarota, Baza źródłowa, wiedza pozaźródłowa i literatura przedmiotu 
w warsztacie historyka, „Polska 1944/45-1989. Studia i Materiały”, 6 (2004), 
p. 7.
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toriographical scholarship14. There is no agreement over the interpre­
tation, and even over the level of reconstructing the course of events, 
while the witness historians often refer to their own autobiographical 
memory as the decisive and non-negotiable determinant of the truth­
fulness of their judgements. Arguments of this type are rare in aca­
demic writing and appear much more frequently in spoken statements, 
formulated in line with the principles of oral culture15, e.g. in press in­
terviews16 or public debates17, as well as in essayistic writing18, when 
the convention of the genre imposes a different type of communicative 
behaviour on a historian. In such cases, one can have the impression 
that digressive references to personal experience become a substitute 
for footnotes.
Autobiographical memory is also present and — apparently — par­
ticularly useful with regard to the adversaries living later (or elsewhere) 
who base collective memory on ‘classical’ source material analysed 
according to the art of historical discipline. Therefore, we are dealing 
here with a situation when the historians, being professionally distrust­
ful towards the accounts provided by eyewitnesses, often unwittingly 
recognise the primacy of their own testimony, which they believe to be
14 Cf. R. Stobiecki, Historiografia PRL. Ani dobra, ani mądra, ani piękna... 
ale skomplikowana. Studia i szkice, Warszawa 2007.
15 Cf. W. Ong, Oralność i piśmienność. Słowo poddane technologi, trans­
lated by J. Japola, Lublin 1992.
16 Examples of such statements are provided in some interviews with his­
torians published in the bulletin of the Institute of National Remembrance. Cf. 
“Socjalizmu będziemy bronić jak niepodległości" O propagandzie PRL z Jerzym 
Eislerem rozmawia Barbara Polak, “Biuletyn IPN”, 11 (2001), pp. 4-12; O ob­
szarach wolności w PRL. Z Januszem Kotańskim, Janem Żarynem i Jackiem 
Teofilem Żurkiem rozmawia Barbara Polak, “Biuletyn IPN”, 10 (2002), pp. 4-27; 
Polski miesiąc grudzień. Z Włodzimierzem Suleją rozmawia Barbara Polak, 
“Biuletyn IPN”, 11-12 (2006), pp. 10-20.
17 Such as the lecture by Jan Prokop on ‘national remembrance and his­
torian’s knowledge’ (‘Pamięć narodowa a wiedza historyka’) and the follow­
ing discussion during the seminar at Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences in 
Krakow, June 11, 2007, or the discussion between historians in Czym innym 
jest pamięć, czym innym historia. Debata „Rzeczypospolitej" — oblicza PRL, 
“Rzeczpospolita”, Plus-Minus, 26-27. 04. 2008.
18 M. Kula, Wybór tradycji, Warszawa 2003; A. Paczkowski, Od sfałszo­
wanego zwycięstwa do prawdziwej klęski. Szkice do portretu, Kraków 1999.
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reliable, over the results of historical studies which are different from 
their own memory of the past. As a result, it occurs that the historians, 
similarly to the rest of society, prefer the memory of an eyewitness of 
the past to knowledge based on scientific research19, although it refers 
to the specific situation in which a witness to history and a historian are 
one.
Split personality
Therefore, a time-witness historian sees history from two different 
perspectives: from individual, autobiographical memory and historical 
knowledge. The first perspective means direct involvement, emotional 
commitment, individual experience, and the message it conveys has 
the character of a testimony, a personal and subjective account. The 
latter perspective is based on source materials and critical analysis and 
is expressed in the form of a conventionalised narrative, compliant with 
the principles of the scientific discourse, and hence seemingly objec­
tive and transcendent with regard to the subject of the research. Time- 
-witness historians practice a peculiar ‘dialectic of the past’ by combin­
ing the art of remembering and ordering the directly experienced reality 
in line together with the cognitive and interpretative patterns established 
and applied in the historical profession. They are also convinced that 
their own memory is more stable and reliable than in the case of other 
time-witnesses, as they have been taught to distance themselves from 
the observed events and objectivise that experience by way of placing it 
in a historical context. Therefore, time-witness historians would consid­
er themselves as those who know better owing to their memories, and 
who remember better owing to their historical knowledge at hand. This 
double competence is the grounds on which time-witness historians are 
considered privileged in cognitive terms. Time-witness historians have 
wider insight into the subject of the study, since they have a subjec­
tive, though not indirectly rendered, and personal memories of the past, 
verified systematically against the historical knowledge, which makes it 
a reliable instrument for verifying the sources and academic literature.
The situation of being both a time-witness to historical events and 
a researcher dealing with remembered past creates inner tensions be-
19 A. Szpociński, P.T. Kwiatkowski, op. cit., p. 14.
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tween the memory of a personal experience and the intellectual predis­
position, knowledge and practice as a historian. As a result, I could turn 
to self-mockery and speak of a time-witness historian’s split personal­
ity, which would, by analogy to basic psychological definitions, mean 
the coexistence of two identities that experience and conceptualise 
the past in different terms. Due to the inability to compromise, the two 
identities function separately; moreover, they also deny the information 
of their coexistence. It is not the purpose of my metaphor to underes­
timate or put to question the legitimacy of historical research of the 
present. I consider it basically as a starting point for a reflection about 
the historian’s attitude (i.e. mine as well) to the recent, experienced past 
and about that historian’s status as a researcher.
Despite diverse approaches to or opinions about the People’s Re­
public of Poland, time-witness historians constitute a specific liminal 
‘communitas’. I am referring here to the concept developed by Victor 
Turner, who drew attention to the role of the liminal phase in the transi­
tion ritual. At the time between losing one’s old social status and gaining 
a new one (Turner’s ‘betwixt and between’), an individual enters the 
liminal phase, i.e. the temporary exclusion and suspension of rules and 
standards which apply ‘on the outside’. The liminal ‘communitas’ is the 
opposite of social order instead of stable continuity; the hierarchy is re­
placed by equality, while the traditional rules substitute for the potential 
acceptability of any standard20.
Time-witness historians are stuck in the liminal sphere of the split 
personality. On the one hand, they cease to question the values of the 
memory-based sources, and on the other hand, they have exaggerated 
trust in their personal memories, thus applying the principle of distrust 
to anyone’s memory but their own. The ambivalence of this attitude, 
mostly ignored by time-witness historians, is nothing unusual, since it 
results directly from the processual character of the autobiographical 
memory, integral components of which are the mechanisms of remem­
bering, denial, reinterpretation, through which an individual renders his 
or her memory to maintain the sense of continuity of the identity and in-
20 V. Turner, Liminalność i communitas, in: Badanie kultury. Elementy teorii 
antropologicznej. Kontynuacje, ed. by M. Kempny, E. Nowicka, Warszawa 2004, 
pp. 240-266; idem, Frame, Flow and Reflection. Ritual and Drama as Public 
Liminality, “Japanese Journal of Religion Studies”, 4 (1979), pp. 465-499.
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tegrity of the Self21. Another reason why historians easily trust the imag­
es, feelings, impressions perceived as unchangeable, reliable and non- 
-negotiable, which emerge from autobiographical memory, results from 
the teleological character of the historical discipline and the convention 
of the researcher’s objectivism and transcendence22. Thus professional 
historians are usually convinced of being distanced and interpreting the 
surrounding reality (both past and future) in an accurate way, i.e. with 
regard to scientific principles. Therefore, time-witness historians con­
sider their memories as a source of knowledge verified according to the 
rules of the art of studying history, and hence they are reliable.
A symptom of a historian’s split personality is confusing not only the 
cognitive patterns, but also the narrative orders used to speak about 
the past. Historians and social scientists have a special type of insti­
tutional competence that ‘provides for the instruments which make it 
possible to create subjective reality, organise emotional life, order expe­
rience into patterns and scenarios’23. As professional researchers, time- 
-witness historians have the ability to produce texts which are rendered 
objective by means of using a conventional historiographical narrative 
with a transparent narrator distanced from the subject of the description 
even when the narrator is the subject24. Such was the case of Janusz 
Goćkowski, the author of a work on the everyday life of scholars in the 
conditions of state socialism. His text was already an object to the an­
thropological criticism of rendering a personal experience objective25;
21 J. Kordys, Kategorie antropologiczne i tożsamość narracyjna. Szkice 
z pogranicza neurosemiotyki i historii kultury, Kraków 2006, p. 200. More on 
the disfunctions of memory which lead to the disintegration of personality in 
M. Nałęcka, Przeklęte błogosławieństwo. Nobilitacja zapomnienia, “Kontek­
sty. Polska Sztuka Ludowa”, vol. 57, 1-2 (2003), pp. 83-87; F.R. Ankersmit, 
Wzniosłe odłączenie się od przeszłości lub jak być/stać się tym kim się już 
nie jest, translated by J. Benedyktowicz, „Konteksty. Polska Sztuka Ludowa”, 
vol. 57, 3-4 (2003), pp. 25-41.
22 Cf. E. Domańska, op. cit.; W. Wrzosek, O trzech rodzajach stronniczości 
historii, in: Pamięć i polityka historyczna..., pp. 77-90.
23 J. Kordys, op. cit., p. 136.
24 J. Aurell, Autobiography as unconventional history: constructing the au­
thor, “Rethinking History”, vol. 10, 3 (2006), pp. 435-439.
25 Cz. Robotycki, Pamięć o PRL — antropolog wobec doświadczenia 
przeszłości własnej kultury, „Konteksty. Polska Sztuka Ludowa”, vol. 57, 3-4 
(2003), pp. 66-70.
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yet it is worthwhile to have a closer look at it again as an example of one 
of the strategies applied by a time-witness researcher with regard to the 
past. Goćkowski’s analysis of the game between scholars and the com­
munist authorities bears all the characteristics of an objective research 
text, typical for its predilection for classifications, comparisons, theoreti­
cal frameworks and emotionless description of the past:
The behaviour o f university scholars during state socialism meant 
engaging in the games for adaptation or the games for identity — 
taking part in the first did not exclude eo ipso participating in the 
other. Participants in games o f the first type considered them the 
most important value — settling down in the circles in which they 
existed and functioned.... As far as participants in the other type of 
games were concerned, the value they considered essential was to 
maintain harmony between their professional conduct and the prin­
ciples and commandments o f the ethos o f the game for the truth o f 
the research. 26
However, when analysed in greater detail, the text reveals a sphere of 
autobiographical experience. In the fragment quoted below, the same 
linguistic convention was used to present the researcher and his inner 
dilemmas:
It was not easy for a university scholar to live under real Leninism. 
Although it is an ecological sphere which offered education by ref­
erence to the condition o f common ingenuity and resourcefulness, 
people did not feel like being ingenuous and resourceful. They 
longed for a world in which money is money, a factory is a factory, 
a shop is a shop, a bank is a bank, a commodity is a commodity, 
a service is a service. In the meantime, they were living in a world 
full o f all types o f ration coupons, vouchers, wages in kind, material 
bonuses, etc. 27
This fragment, representative for the entire disquisition, complies with 
the convention of a scientific text that suggests the author’s transcend­
ence towards the object of the description, although in fact we are deal­
ing here with a text which refers to autobiographical memory, as it does 
not provide any reference to either the source materials or literature 
on the subject. Czesław Robotycki rightly observed that the alarming
26 J. Goćkowski, Życie codzienne uczonych w realnym leninizmie, in: PRL 
z pamięci, ed. by Cz. Robotycki, Kraków 2001, pp. 95-96.
27 Ibidem, p. 99.
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aspect of the text was the ‘false’ construction of the narrative, with an 
invisible and somewhat ‘transcendent’ narrator/researcher who views 
and judges the past with a detached eye28. One can therefore have an 
impression that Goćkowski was not a member of the scientific circle 
and that he did not participate in the described games with the au­
thorities. Yet the camouflage of scientific objectivism seems to be easily 
traceable in this autobiographical narrative.
The strategy of translating personal experience into an objective his­
toriographical description is one of the characteristic elements of a split 
historical personality, when the produced texts are apparently historical 
and are, in fact, written as a result of the work of memory. Paradoxically, 
the scientific camouflage, which is relatively easy to unveil, renders the 
text objectivised as such less reliable, since there emerges a ques­
tion about the author’s motives. Such was the case with Goćkowski’s 
text, which has led me to questions not necessarily intended by the 
author: what is the purpose behind his peculiar game with memory (or 
oblivion)? To what extent was he involved in the double game with the 
communist authorities? To what extent are diagnoses concerning the 
scholars a diagnosis concerning the author himself?
The transmission between knowledge and memory works in the 
other direction as well — by way of verifying the knowledge contained 
in research papers against the personal memories of the experienced 
past. Such was the status assigned by Tomasz Szarota to his memo­
ries; the author used autobiographical memory to challenge the image 
of the People’s Republic of Poland which prevailed in Polish historiog­
raphy:
Now it makes me wonder whether I, a man whose youth and career 
date back to the People’s Republic o f Poland, do not begin to look 
favourably on those who depict the period o f the People’s Republic 
o f Poland as not only a time o f the secret police, imprisonment, per­
secution o f the soldiers o f the Home Army, etc., for a different image 
o f that time has also been kept in my memory [underlined by D.K.]. 
Meanwhile, I hear statements made in public that all churches were 
shut in the People’s Republic o f Poland, and one could pray only at 
night-time, for it was only then that they were open. Only recently 
have I read that Christmas trees were available for sale only after
28 Cz. Robotycki, op.cit., p.69.
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Christmas, as a means to celebrate New Year’s Day. It is at odds 
with what I remember [underlined by D.K.], as I cannot recall that I 
would ever have any problems with buying a Christmas tree before 
Christmas. 29
I believe that a time-witness historian’s sense of dissonance due to the 
inadequacy of scientific description with personal experience is nothing 
rare or unusual; anyone who has ever observed a dispute between time 
witnesses and historians could see it on their own30. As can be conclud­
ed from my personal experience and results of participating observa­
tion of scientific discussions and conferences, historiographical works 
leave readers unsatisfied and discomforted due to the discrepancies 
between historical narrative and the memory of personal experience. 
Interestingly, the feeling of inadequacy has not raised any questions 
regarding the theory of historical cognition; instead, accusations have 
been levelled against a researcher dealing with the past about lacking 
distance, displaying subjectivity or, on the contrary, lacking any per­
sonal experience in ‘living in the People’s Republic of Poland’. One can 
only ask why the experience of the inability to faithfully translate the 
experienced reality into a scientific text has not been reflected upon by 
historians; why has it not become a starting point for undermining the 
modernist paradigm?
Integrated personality
How to reconcile one’s own entanglement in the past with the require­
ments of research work? How to distance oneself from one’s own mem­
ory? How to question a personal experience that constitutes the image 
of the past? Or the opposite: what to offer in return, when the meaning 
of objectivism and distance is effectively put to question? In a word, is 
there a remedy for a witness historian’s split personality and what inte­
grated personality means?
29 A statement by T. Szarota, Czym innym... op. cit.
30 An opportunity for such observations was provided by the lecture by Jan 
Prokop on ‘national remembrance and historian’s knowledge’ (‘Pamięć naro­
dowa a wiedza historyka’) delivered in Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences 
in Krakow on June 11, 2007. The lecture triggered a stormy discussion about 
the interpretation of the history of People’s Poland and the judgement of the 
historians’ involvement in shaping the memory of that period.
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In his analysis of the liminal ‘communitas’, Victor Turner concluded 
that some of them have the power to change social order. This is the 
case when the members of a community consider communitas as the 
value in itself, and instead of aiming at the end of the transition ritual, 
they decide to remain in the liminal sphere, which then loses the char­
acter of a temporary suspension. As a result, an alternative social order 
is established, and its values and standards spread to the outside and 
change, or transform, the prevalent system.
An example of such liminal group with the potential prime mover is 
that of the time-witness historians, or at least those of them who seek 
new quality in the form of the integrated personality of the two recon­
ciled identities. There may be, and there indeed are, numerous strate­
gies; after all, liminality means experimenting against the tradition, but 
doing so in the face of lacking any explicit and organised principles of 
objection. The shared feature of these strategies is the anthropology­
-related instrument of critical self-reflection about oneself as a subject 
of research, about the struggle with one’s memory, the restrictions due 
to one’s biography, intellectual development, social background, politi­
cal views, the ways in which to distance oneself from the experienced 
past, the function attributed to personal memories. Therefore, the cru­
cial point here is a specific form of participating observation, in which 
the researcher, identical to the object of the research, not only analyses 
the forms of ‘life experience’, but also takes into account the effect of 
social conditions on the final perception of the past. In this way, time- 
-witness historians change their status into that of participant historians, 
who gain the status of a reliable researchers owing to having deter­
mined their limitations. Yet the determinant of this process, shared by 
all liminal time-witness historians looking for a new status, is to include 
self-reflection with its particular practical elements in the historical nar­
rative in which they perform the triple role of a researcher, a witness 
and an author31.
One of the significant autobiographical topics included in the narra­
tives of participant historians is the determination of the areas of one’s 
own memory that played an important role in the research work. An 
example of this approach can be seen in a book by Padraic Kenney
31 Por. J. Aurell, op. cit., p. 440.
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devoted to the revolutions of 1989 in Central Europe. The author, who 
had lived in Poland since 1986, offered a testimony to his feelings at 
that time and their impact on him as a historian:
I would not come much closer to participation that year. Careful to 
the last, I never asked whhat my friends were doing, and they never 
asked me to help. Nevertheless, even I could see their attitude o f ut­
ter indifference toward the communist regime, and toward ideology.
I suppose that feeling has colored my writing [underlined by D.K.] on 
the Polish People’s Republic ever since.32
The experiences described by Kenney refer to the category of locality, 
which determines the relation between one’s position and the object 
of research. This is partly a description produced by an ethnographer, 
a representative of the Western civilization among the Trobriands, who 
can confront his images and theories with the reality of the People’s 
Republic of Poland, who is not engaged in the activities of the object of 
the study, but who is a diligent observer and who therefore can verify 
on his own the personal images and theories about the social relations, 
the political rules and the relations between the state and its citizens. 
The comparison to the ethnographer’s work seems to be even more 
legitimate considering the fact that Kenney often uses interviews as 
a source of information about the events from the period of the collapse 
of communism.
Andrzej Paczkowski used his autobiography otherwise, namely to 
explain the point of view adopted with regard to the historiography con­
cerning the People’s Republic of Poland, analysed in the quoted text:
As a participant, one finds it difficult to assume the role o f a ‘pure’ 
observer, even more so that the matter discussed here was (and still 
has been) strongly conditioned politically... I must also admit that 
I was its fully intentional participant, not as a party activist or a trade 
union leader (which was mainly the occupation o f medievalists), but 
as a professional historian: an author (published under a pseudo­
nym), an organiser o f gathering and processing documents, a lec­
turer who popularised knowledge. Therefore, it m ight be better if 
this paper was written by someone who waited somewhere on the
32 P. Kenney, A carnival of revolution — Central Europe 1989, Princeton
2002, p. 6.
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margin o f the dispute for those years to end. Still, who would admit 
it today?33
The reservation expressed above was conveyed in the opening lines of 
a classically formed scientific text, though this introduction can be treat­
ed as a recognition of the polylogic of scientific discourse, ‘condemned’ 
to the diversity of perspectives, interpretations and judgements due to 
the fact that, at that time (in 1992), the whole historical environment 
was deep-rooted in the studied past.
The third strategy is the autobiography in its genealogical function. 
Andrzej Friszke used his intellectual autobiography, or actually its ex­
cerpt about founding Krystyna Kersten’s seminar, to explain his attitude 
to the People’s Republic of Poland, the official historiography at that 
time and the genesis of his research. An interesting type of narration 
appears here: the author speaks about the intellectual formation of an 
entire environment concealed under the enigmatic pronoun ‘we’:
We were in opposition to the People’s Republic o f Poland as a politi­
cal system and a state subdued by the Soviets. A t the same time, 
we were the citizens o f that state, and it was not unimportant to us 
whether we lived in a Stalinist regime or in a country where cer­
tain elements o f law and order and some forms o f expressing true 
thoughts are applicable after all. Therefore, neither we nor other 
citizens o f that country felt indifferent about the range o f civil liber­
ties, lawfulness, opening or closing o f the country to the world, the 
degree o f censorship. The reasoning o f the opponents o f the Peo­
p le ’s Republic o f Poland was bidirectional —  in terms o f the principal 
objectives and values which could be implemented some day, prob­
ably not in our lifetime, and the hopes and efforts for an evolution 
which broadened the scope o f liberties and rights within the avail­
able framework. 34
Friszke also declared his outlook on the world when writing about the 
critical approach to the extreme social attitudes he saw at that time, 
namely the excessively uncompromising attitude and the far-reaching 
conformism; this opinion sets the prospects for his studies.
33 A. Paczkowski, Czarno-białe i biało-czarne, czyli o historii najnowszej his­
torii, in: idem, Od sfałszowanego zwycięstwa do prawdziwej klęski. Szkice do 
portretu, Kraków 1999, p. 189.
34 A. Friszke, Przystosowanie i opór. Studia z dziejów PRL, Warszawa 2007, 
pp. 5-6.
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Regardless of the differences due to the sources of restrictions given 
by the authors or their choice of the point of view, in all three examples, 
a reference to autobiographical memory is made only in the opening 
lines, and it vanishes later, along with the author, who becomes in­
visible in the narrative. A conclusion can be drawn that the authors, 
despite their ways of reaching for autobiographical themes, narrow it 
down to the very specific role of a preventive measure against possible 
accusations from the circles of historians. Therefore, they remain con­
vinced about the obligation to observe the principles of the art of writing 
accepted in the scientific environment. When discussing the essence 
of the matter, i.e. in this case political history, there is no room for per­
sonal reflections, references to one’s own experience, using memory 
as a cognitive and interpretative instrument. The historian’s identity de­
nies the witness’s identity again.
In the end, I would like to refer to a different and inspiring essay by 
Jacek Chrobaczyński published in the volume PRL z pamięci (lit. Peo­
ple’s Republic of Poland from memory) referred to above. The author 
wrote about everyday life in the town of Sanok in the 1960s and 1970s, 
which he analysed from two perspectives: that of a researcher dealing 
with recent history and that of a witness to history who had spent the 
first twenty years of his life in the town. The organising basis of the text 
is the dialogue, which confronts two diverse though equivalent ways of 
experiencing the past, two visions of reality, two orders of knowledge, 
two types of reflection.
Religion and the system from the perspective o f a small town. Oppo­
sition and hostility? Coexistence? Was it graspable on that socially 
local level? There is no doubt that, in general terms, the dichotomous 
image was real and not overdone. Yet the ideological hostility would 
become ‘blurred’ i f  the same people functioned on both sides. ...
It was the millennium and the peregrination o f a copy o f the mi­
raculous painting o f the Blessed Virgin Mary. As far as I remember, 
we did not hear much about the dispute between the state and the 
Church over the millennium anniversary o f the country’s statehood 
and the adoption o f Christianity. A sermon, parochial announce­
ments, classes in religion, occasionally the crackling broadcast of 
Radio Free Europe and an official newspaper.
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Yet we very well remembered the day o f the main celebrations o f the 
millennium anniversaries at school, and it was not because o f the 
celebration itself, but because an approval was given to organise 
an evening party that day, which was not something usual at the 
time... . A dance was announced to start already at 4 pm and to end 
at 8 pm. The problem was that the millennium mass was scheduled 
to begin at 6 pm. The result (or what is learnedly called ‘the duality 
o f education’): at 4 pm we began the party, at 5.55 pm we all showed 
up in the parish church, and at 7 pm we were back in school. I do not 
think that we considered it a battle or a resistant attitude towards the 
authorities or the system. The two parallel values worked there: the 
state and the Church. 35
The form of a dialogue, a record of the process of negotiations between 
a historian and his own memory and the description of individual re­
strictions, which are an integral component of the text, definitely result 
from adopting the ethnological methods for the purposes of a historical 
study. The outcome is a hybrid text. On the level of content, instead of 
an objectivised description in which a recollection would function as 
a final determination, excluding different interpretations, Chrobaczyński 
offers a vision of the studied and experienced past that is subjective, 
and therefore renegotiable and encouraging a different interpretation, 
and of the research method which the author submits for the readers’ 
evaluation. On the narrative level, the hybrid specificity of the text re­
sults from using the collage of easily identifiable genres, namely the his­
torical monograph, memoirs and methodological self-reflection, which 
coexist and interpenetrate there. At the same time, the text is a study 
of the process of the historian’s ‘work on memory’, in which the author 
regains personal integrity and becomes a participant historian owing 
to the incorporation of a dual perspective, introducing the dialoguing 
identities of a witness and a historian and a self-reflection about auto­
biographical memory as a historical source.
Texts of this type are rare in Polish historiography, which may also 
result from the field of the study. Chrobaczyński’s experiment was 
concerned with the categories of everyday life and microsocial stud­
ies which are closer to anthropologists than historians and which can
35 J. Chrobaczyński, Przyczynek do życia codziennego małego miasta 
w PRL-u (lata sześćdziesiąte i siedemdziesiąte), in: PRL z pamięci..., p. 91.
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hardly be considered the main, or at least a significant domain in Polish 
historiography concerning the post-war Poland. Though Chrobaczyński 
managed to deal with it, the matter of split personality remains a signifi­
cant though ignored problem of Polish historiography. There still prevails 
a conviction of the inevitable roles of objectivism and distancing one­
self, which can be achieved not only by means of the research methods 
applied, but above all with the use of formalised narratives. This trend 
rules out any negotiation between knowledge and memory; the more 
so that the researcher’s identity becomes camouflaged, while the time- 
-witness’s identity is excluded as a significant, if not equivalent and cog­
nitively valuable form of studying the past. The postulates put forth by 
methodologists and certain researchers in favour of a broad critical de­
bate over the predominant paradigms, introducing an interdisciplinary 
perspective or including new questions and areas (such as memory) 
in the study on recent history have remained largely unanswered. Yet 
if these issues are not addressed, further deterioration will be observ­
able in the condition of the split personality of time-witness historians, 
who reduce their research potential, avoid revealing the double role of 
the witness historian and coming to terms with it, bearing in mind their 
affiliation to the contemporary generation, withdraw from a discussion 
on the subject of autobiographical memory and the new phenomenon 
of post-memory and thus sentence themselves to becoming margin­
alised, if not excluded, from the continuous dispute over the People’s 
Republic of Poland, which in fact is a dispute over memory.
Tożsamość podzielona. Rola pamięci autobiograficznej 
w badaniach historii najnowszej
Historycy zajmujący się dziejami najnowszymi znajdują się w podwójnej 
sytuacji poznawczej wobec rzeczywistości historycznej: wiedzy nauko­
wej badacza i doświadczenia naocznego świadka przeszłości. Pojawia 
się zatem pytanie o rolę, jaką pełni druga z perspektyw w dyskursie 
historiograficznym, gdy doświadczenie świadka pozostaje w konflik­
cie z naukową interpretacją doświadczonej rzeczywistości historycz­
nej oraz o konsekwencje prymarności doświadczenia w stosunku do 
wiedzy. Artykuł analizuje charakter, korzyści i bariery związane z po­
dwójnym oglądem przeszłości. Druga część stanowi interpretację wy­
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branych tekstów historiograficznych autorstwa historyków-świadków, 
prezentujących odmienne rozwiązania narracyjne ukrywania/ujawania- 
ni swojego podwójnego statusu.
Geteilte Identität. Rolle des autobiografischen 
Gedächtnisses in den Forschungen neuester Geschichte
Die Historiker, die sich mit der neuen Geschichte beschäftigen, befinden 
sich in einer doppelten Erkenntnissituation der historischen Wirklichkeit. 
Einerseits werden sie mit dem Wissen des Forschers konfrontiert, an­
dererseits stehen sie den Erfahrungen des Augenzeugen der Vergan­
genheit gegenüber. Somit ergeben sich die folgenden Fragen: Welche 
Rolle in dem historiografischen Diskurs erfüllt die zweite Perspektive, 
wenn die Erfahrung des Zeugen in Konflikt mit der wissenschaftlichen 
Interpretation der erfahrenen historischen Wirklichkeit steht? Und was 
für Folgen hat der Vorrang der Erfahrung vor dem Wissen? In dem 
Beitrag werden der Charakter, die Nutzen und die Einschränkungen 
analysiert, die mit der Doppelinterpretation der Geschichte verbunden 
sind. Im zweiten Teil des Artikels werden ausgewählte historiografi- 
sche Texte Historiker-Zeugen interpretiert, die sich unterschiedlicher 
Narrationsstrategien-Verbergens bzw. Bekanntgebens ihres Doppel­
status — bedient haben.
Ewelina Szpak
Polish historians on the road to the history 
of mentality
Historians are more like pilgrims wandering around lost in a network 
o f intersecting paths, constantly asking for the way and usually re­
ceiving confusing information, while the target towards which they 
are heading has an ambiguous outline, dispersing and vanishing as 
the moving skyline. 1
That is how, in 1994, Jerzy Topolski described in a weekly, Polityka, the 
historians’ struggle with the postmodernist thought developing in their 
environment.
These words very aptly define historians studying mentality, para­
doxically combining the rebirth of their area of study with the postmod­
ernist defiance of the former historical thought and narration. Let me 
use these words as a central theme of the present article.
Yet it is not my intention to provide a systematised analyse of Polish 
scholarship in the history of mentality. I shall concentrate on the follow­
ing three issues of key importance from the point of view of a historian 
involved in studying mentality:
1. terminological unspecificity and its consequent openness
2. heterogeneity of sources and research methods and, consequently,
3. the matter of the postulated interdisciplinarity of studies.
The starting point for the statement quoted above is the context for 
Polish research on mentality and, importantly enough, I have based 
my conclusions mainly on that context. Still, it is difficult to discuss the 
situation in Poland without reference to the Western-European tradi­
tion, since the problem of studying the history of mentality was under­
1 J. Topolski, Wielka masakra kotów, “Polityka” 1994, nr 16, p. 25.
34 Ewelina Szpak
taken there much earlier and to a much wider extent as early as in 
the 1960s2. As long as the earliest attempts at studying the history of 
mentality in Poland date back to the 1970s, in France (where the his­
tory of mentality came into being), or in England and the USA (where 
it soon came through), one could observe a methodological discussion 
which was severely critical towards the history of mentality at that time. 
Actual interest in mentality arose in Poland only in the early 1990s. This 
was partly the result of the reopening towards Western-European re­
search trends and currents after 45 years of isolation during socialism. 
To a certain extent this interest in mentality was also a consequence of 
what was published at the end of the 1980s, often much delayed with 
regard to the originals, of Polish translations of the works of leading 
classics in studying the ‘mentalité’ (such as Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, 
Carlo Ginzburg, Phillippe Ariès, Aron Guriewicz, Norbert Elias and oth­
ers) 3. Although in the 1990s the main French ‘mentalists’, i.e. Jacques
2 The earliest interest in mentality dates back to the 1920s. The first re­
searcher to use the concept of mentality was Levy-Bruhl (mentalite primitive); 
later on, the interest in collective mentality was realized by Marc Bloch and Lu­
cien Febvre, and continued by Fernand Braudel and the historians from the An­
nales. A turning point, or a ‘shift’ in the study of mentality, as Peter Burke would 
rather call it, was the period of the 1960s and the activity of such historians as 
Philippe Ariès, Jacques Le Goff, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Michel Foucault, 
Roland Barthes etc., see e.g. E. Domańska, Montaillou — Arkadia „heretyck­
iego” historyka in: Historia, mity, interpretacje, ed. by A. Barszczewska-Krupa, 
Łódź 1996, pp. 96-97, Burke P., The French Historical Revolution. The An­
nales School 1929-1989, Polity Press 1991, P. Burke, What is Cultural His­
tory?, Polity Press 2004, P. Burke, Varieties of Cultural History, Polity Press 
2003, P.H. Hutton, Philippe Ariès and the politics of French cultural history, 
London 2004, P.H. Hutton, The history of mentalities. The new map of cultural 
history, “History and Theory”, vol. 20, (1981), pp. 237-259, R.E.G. Lloyd, De­
mystifying mentalities, Cambridge University Press 1990, G.G. Iggers, From 
Macro- to Microhistory: The History of Everyday Life, in: Historiography in 
the 20 century. Postmodern Challenge with a new epilogue, Wesleyan 1997, 
pp. 101-116, T. Wiślicz, Krótkie trwanie. Problemy historiografii francuskiej lat 
dziewięćdziesiątych XX  wieku, Warszawa 2004, E. Domańska, Historia an­
tropologiczna. Mikrohistoria, in: N. Zemon Davis, Powrót Martina Guerre’a, 
Poznań 2011 (Posłowie), pp. 195 -234.
3 E. Le Roy Ladurie, Montaillou: wioska heretyków 1294-1324, Warszawa 
1988; C. Ginzburg, Ser i robaki: wizja świata pewnego młynarza z XVI w., 
Warszawa 1989; P. Ariès, Człowiek i śmierć, Warszawa 1992; idem, Historia
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Le Goff or Georges Duby, claimed explicitly that the term ‘mental­
ity’ is not particularly accurate [and] we do not find it satisfactory any 
longer. Indeed, what does ‘mentality’ mean? ... it is but a background, 
a framework for the clear thought ...”4, thus aiming their research in­
terests towards an easier definable history of ideas and/or representa­
tions — at that time the study of mentality was becoming increasingly 
popular on the grounds of Polish historiography. Its adherents were 
mainly mediaevalists and researchers concerned with the early modern 
era and the 19th century5. In their studies they followed the patterns, in
dzieciństwa: dziecko i rodzina w dawnych czasach, Gdańsk 1995; J. Delumeau, 
Strach w kulturze Zachodu, Warszawa 1986; G. Duby, Bitwa pod Bouvines, 
niedziela 27 lipca 1214, Warszawa 1988; N. Elias, Przemian obyczajów w cy­
wilizacji Zachodu, Warszawa 1980; A. Guriewicz, Problemy średniowiecznej 
kultury ludowej, Warszawa 1987; Vigarello G. Czystość i brud. Higiena ciała od 
średniowiecza do XX  wieku, Warszawa 1996.
4 G. Duby, B. Geremek, Wspólne pasje, interview by Philippe Sainteny, 
Warszawa1995, p. 55.
5 Among the multiple examples of Polish (practical) studies of mental­
ity, those which are worth mentioning here include the following: B.Geremek, 
Ludzie marginesu w średniowiecznym Paryżu X IV-XV wiek, Wrocław 1971; 
idem, La potence ou la pitié: l ’Europe et les pauvres, du Moyen âge à nos 
jours, Paris 1987 [Polish edition.Litość i szubienica. Dzieje nędzy i miłosierdzia, 
Warszawa 1989]; M. Bogucka, Wkręgu mentalności mieszczaństwa gdańskiego 
w XVII wieku. Notatnik Michała Hancke, “Ars historica. Prace z dziejów 
powszechnych i Polski”, Poznań 1976, pp. 617-633; Biedni i bogaci. Studia 
z dziejów społeczeństwa i kultury ofiarowane B. Geremkowi w 60 rocznicę 
urodzin, ed. by M. Aymard [et al.], Warszawa 1992; U. Świderska-Włodarczyk, 
Mentalność szlachty polskiej XV  i XVI wieku, Poznań 2003; P. Kowalski, The­
atrum wszystkiego i poćciwy gospodarz. O wizji świata pewnego siedemnas­
towiecznego pisarza ziemiańskiego, Kraków 2000; M. Senkowska-Gluck, Żyć 
po Rewolucji. Przemiany mentalności i obyczaju w napoleońskiej Francji, 
Warszawa-Wrocław-Kraków, 1994; B. Baczko, Człowiek i światopoglądy, 
Warszawa 1965; H. Madurowicz-Urbańska, Mentalność chłopów polskich 
wXVIII wieku (w świetle suplik wsi królewskich i kościelnych), „Sobótka” vol. 37, 
3/4 (1982), pp. 259-269; J. Ronikier, Hetman Adam Sieniawski i jego regi- 
mentarze. Studium z mentalności szlachty polskiej 1706-1725, Kraków 1992; 
Studia z dziejów kultury i mentalności czasów nowożytnych, ed. by K. Mat- 
wijowski, B. Rok, Wrocław 1993; M. Bogucka, Historia gospodarcza a historia 
mentalności: jeden czy dwa kierunki historiografii, in: Między historią a teorią: 
refleksje nad problematyką dziejów i wiedzy historycznej, red. M. Drozdowski, 
Poznań-Warszawa 1988, pp. 442-446.
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many respects, of their French colleagues, and yet they devoted little 
attention to complex terminological and methodological problems, thus 
approaching the concept of mentality as understandable in itself.
Yet, as evidenced in discussions between the theorists and meth­
odologists of history, conceptualising mentality is not that simple. Al­
though, according to Michel Vovelle, precise specification of the term 
‘mentalité’ (if not using it at all) is not crucial6, every researcher should 
make an attempt to undertake the challenge out of pure professional 
honesty, or diligence. This, however, is not an easy task, considering 
the fact that ‘mentality’ has been “an open term ever since it was coined 
— flexible and extensive on the one hand and vague on the other — 
and stemming from various traditions and inspirations”7. Jacques Le 
Goff wrote in the 1970s:
the attractive thing about the history o f mentality is its vagueness, 
the determination to reveal this ‘deposit’ o f historical analysis, the 
peculiar ‘not knowing what’8.
Therefore, the starting point is the necessity of grasping the termino­
logical ways and paths plotted by the hitherto studies and making a de­
cision about the choice of one’s own direction. Yet the definition, prob­
ably redundant for the study itself, does in fact determine the choice of 
applied methods and, above all, the research questions to be asked.
‘M entality’ —  a problem atic term
Mentality was interpreted in different ways by the very founders of ‘an­
thropological history’ and history of mentalité. Starting from Marc Bloch 
and Lucien Febvre, Norbert Elias, Philippe Ariès, Jacques Le Goff and 
others, mentality was referred to a range of spheres and areas of life of 
the studied social groups analysed from different methodological per­
spective, depending on the author’s research interests; for instance, for 
some of the historians (such as Marc Bloch, Keith Thomas) the sphere 
of a particular manifestation of mentality were magic, customs and rites. 
Others saw mentality as the sphere of collective psychology, expressed
6 M. Vovelle, Ideologies and Mentalities, Blackwell 1990, p. 5.
7 W. Wrzosek, Historia, kultura, metafora: powstanie nieklasycznej historio­
grafii, Wrocław 1995, p. 134.
8 J. Le Goff, Les Mentalities: une histoire ambigue, in: Faire de l ’histoire, ed. 
by J. Le Goff, P. Nora, vol. 3, Paris 1974, p. 86, quoted in: ibidem, p. 134.
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mainly through feelings and emotions (Lucien Febvre), while still others 
considered mentality as embedded in a system of values, folklore and 
religiousness (Jacques Le Goff)9.
Different concepts of mentality can also be found in Polish studies, e.g. 
in some of them mentality is referred to as a sphere of attitudes and val­
ues, the mind, or ideology10. There are also cases where the frames of 
mentality are expanded to the extent in which it is equated with culture, 
if not civilisation11.
Different starting points, along with different research interests — simi­
larly to ‘the fathers of mentality’ — often determine the way mentality 
is defined. The researchers, inspired by ‘anthropological history’ and 
sensitive to theoretical and terminological reflection, usually refer to the 
shared and probably most widely accepted definition of mentality as 
proposed by Georges Duby, for whom mentality is:
a system o f images, ideas, unformulated judgements, ordered differ­
ently in different social classes as the systems in motion and there­
fore historical, but which do not always move in the same rhythm at 
the different levels o f culture, and which determine human behaviour 
and conduct without their being aware o f it. It is therefore something 
ungraspable, fluid12.
Yet it may also be the case that one’s manner, perceived by the above­
mentioned G. Duby as one of the effects of a specific mentality, is de­
fined by researchers as mentality itself. On the Polish grounds of these 
studies an example of such a researcher is Zenon Sikiewicz, who sees 
mentality as “a specific lifestyle, expressed in the complex of general
9 See J. Ronikier, Historia mentalności a metodologia nauk historycznych, 
„Historyka”, 26 (1996), p. 56.
10 Polish researchers of Russian culture very often use the term ‘mental­
ity’ interchangeably with the concept of ‘Russian soul’; see e.g. M. Broda, 
Mentalność, tradycja i bolszewicko-komunistyczne doświadczenie Rosji, Łódź 
2007.
11 See F. Braudel, Gramatyka cywilizacji, Warszawa 2006, pp. 55-56, 
A. Kalczyńska, Mentalność jako bariera rozwoju społeczeństwa cywilizacyjne­
go, ‘Gazeta It’ (2004), 4.
12 G. Duby, B. Geremek, Wspólne pasje, op. cit.
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social, socioeconomic, ethical stereotypes and, indirectly, in evaluative 
motives and orientations” 13.
In studies (not only historical) of everyday life mentality is also identi­
fied as a lifestyle. Although for most of them mentality is but one of the 
aspects of their analyses14, there are also scholars considering it as 
an inherent part of the final effect. In the latter case mentality emerges 
above the description of a specific, historical reality and manifests itself 
in diverse ways of comprehending and describing oneself and the sur­
rounding reality by its actors and creators15.
As part of the studies of everyday life, mentality also tends to be iden­
tified with the ‘innate yet unintentional’ and ‘pre-rational’16 knowledge 
which determines the form of one’s everyday life and which may go 
along well with the mental background, as described by Maria Solarska 
and formulated on the basis of Foucauldian ‘knowledge-truth-power’ 
triad17. This mental background, though conceptually tied to the idea of 
‘mental equipment’, as proposed by L. Febvre, was defined differently 
by Solarska as “a system of discourse practices regulating people’s ac­
tions and thoughts”. It refers the researcher to another extremely vast 
area (and methods) of research, i.e. discursive rules and practice, ab­
breviated into discourse for the sake of simplification, which determine 
and have an effect on the way of thinking, speaking, understanding 
and, therefore, also experiencing and acting in the surrounding reality.
Leaving aside psychological definitions of mentality, usually referred 
to the way of thinking, system of orientations, and the set of rules de­
13 Z. Sikiewicz, Mentalność radziecka w świadomości masowej Rosjan, pa­
per on the 9th Polish Congress of Sociology, 1994, quoted in: G. Krzyminiewska, 
Mentalność ekonomiczna mieszkańców wsi: studium na przykładzie wybranych 
kategorii społecznych, Poznań 2000, p. 21.
14 See in particular M.Bogucka, Życie codzienne — spory wokół profi­
lu badań i definicji, „Kwartalnik Historii Kultury Materialnej” vol. 44, 3 (1996) 
pp. 247-253; T. Szarota, Życie codzienne w Peerelu — propozycja badawcza, 
„Polska 1944/45-1989. Studia i materiały”, 1 (1995), pp. 201-215.
15 E. Szpak, „ Gra pojęć" a obrazy całości, czyli o konceptualizacji faktu his­
torycznego. „ Robotnik rolny" i „życie codzienne" pracowników PGR, in: „Histo­
ryka”, 25 (2005), pp. 119-134.
16 J. Mucha, Codzienność i odświętność: Polonia w South Bend, Warszawa 
1996, p. 39.
17 M. Solarska, Michel Foucault jako historyk, “Historyka”, 33 (2001), p. 26.
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termining perception of the surrounding world, it can be observed that, 
despite the whole variety of associations and connotations implied by 
the term ‘mentality’, it generally guides the researcher towards a widely 
understood ‘mental reality’ which leaves a considerable field for free 
interpretation and provides the researcher with a vast space to freely 
approach the subject in conceptual terms.
It is also due to the semantic capacity of ‘mentality’ that certain 
scholars studying the concept try to avoid the problem by not defin­
ing the term at all, and by describing it in their narratives by means of 
the key concepts that touch upon or merge with the area of the widely 
understood ‘mental reality’. Others come down merely to the colloquial 
or dictionary meaning of mentality, or a priori narrow down the term by 
supplementing it with an attributive expression. Such was the case with 
Grażyna Krzyminiewska, who studied the economic mentality of select­
ed groups of the rural community and who implemented sociological 
concpet of mentality defined as the “people’s way of thinking about and 
referring to the economic reality” 18. Although it could be assumed that 
this solution and the peculiar fragmentation of social reality is a limita­
tion imposed beforehand, it undoubtedly safeguards the researcher by 
enabling a clear-cut definition of the objectives and fields of the study.
Interdisciplinarity
The assumption of crucial significance for the study of mentality is the 
demand for interdisciplinarity, put forth in the area of ‘‘‘anthropological 
history’’’ in which interdisciplinarity would “allow and adapt different, of­
ten extreme research methods and theoretical inspirations”19. This con­
cept is meant here as the cooperation and mutual theoretical and meth­
odological inspiration of a number of disciplines and sub-disciplines 
targeted at understanding (and explaining, though obviously to a lesser 
extent) social worlds and outlooks, which opens the historian up to such 
disciplines, emerging with increasing impact and distinction on the hori­
zon of the study of mentality, as psychology, linguistics, media studies, 
emotionology, etc.20. Historians entering the area of studies on mental-
18 G. Krzyminiewska, op. cit., p. 11.
19 W. Wrzosek, op. cit., pp. 127-128.
20 See: J. Anusiewicz, Lingwistyka kulturowa. Zarys problematyki, Wrocław 
1994.
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ity would clearly see that this interdisciplinarity and openness, “prob­
ably tempting with an intellectual experience”, is also a major and real 
source of the risk of getting lost in a maze of theoretical ways and paths 
as mentioned above in the quote by Topolski.
How far can historians of mentality go in their research and inspira­
tions to avoid being suspected of ‘heresy’ or ‘non-historicity’? Does it 
suffice to remain faithful to historical thought, as represented in a sen­
sitivity to the changeability and dynamism of time, the historical (socio- 
-cultural) context of the period, and not to wander off onto any of the 
paths of the inspiring discipline?
Obviously crucial, though still seemingly insufficient, support for the 
historian of mentality in answering these questions is the outcome of the 
theoretical and methodological debate concerning postmodernist his­
torical thought, which appeared in the 1990s in Historyka and in a pre­
cious few other publications21. Works by such historians and method­
ologists as Ewa Domańska, Wojciech Wrzosek, Jerzy Topolski or Alina 
Barszczewska-Krupa, Czesław Robotycki, which referred to the latest 
Western-European achievements in the history of mentality at that time, 
provided irreplaceable assistance in Polish studies of mentality. Having 
given considerable space to the latest research concepts and theories 
in a number of social disciplines (such as anthropology, literature stud­
ies, linguistics, film and media studies, etc.), these works were highly 
inspiring to contemporary researchers. The articles by Polish theorists 
and methodologists often clearly distinguished between a historical and 
an anthropological approach to the studies.
Indeed, it may be dangerous for historians to accept uncritically the 
structural perspective in ethnological or anthropological research (an 
exceptionally important one in the study of mentality), as it implies the 
risk of “immobilizing”, making a static and uniform (simplifying) mental­
ity of the analyzed community. Presenting the specificity of a studied 
group and its internal diversity, along with putting a strong emphasis 
on a wider social context, changes in time and space, is an enormous
21 E. Domańska, Montaillou... eadem, Mikrohistorie: spotkania w między- 
światach, Poznań 1999; W. Wrzosek, op. cit.; Dokąd zmierza wspólczesna 
humanistyka, ed. by. T. Kostyrko, Warszawa 1994; W poszukiwaniu antropolo­
gicznego wymiaru historii: Aron Guriewicz, Carlo Ginzburg, ed. by J. Pomorski, 
„Res Historyka” 2 (1998).
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challenge for the researcher of mentality. Difficulties in overcoming the 
above-mentioned problems were also pointed out by Peter Burke in 
History and Social Theory. Next to the obstacles given above, he also 
drew attention to yet another aspect, often ignored by the anthropology­
-inspired researchers:
a still more serious problem arises from the fact that historians o f 
mentalities easily slip into assuming the existence o f a binary op­
position between two belief system, the ‘traditional’ and the ‘modern’ 
(...) also the contrast between Them and Us reduces the variety o f 
the ‘other’ to uniformity22.
Therefore, the descriptive categories often adopted by anthropologists 
immersed in the temporal ‘here and now’ need not easily or directly be 
translatable into the past, historical reality. Inspiration from the anthro­
pological methods may also imply another risk, the one I also encoun­
tered when studying rural communities.
This risk was very meaningfully described by Piotr Kowalski, in my 
opinion one of the most eminent Polish anthropologists:
Good material for presenting epistemological limitations in attempts 
at reconstructing mentality is provided when reflecting upon ‘lu- 
doznawstwo’ [folklore studies], the study o f rural communities: eth­
nographers have long been referring readily to the folk view o f the 
world. Yet the ‘anthropocosm o f folk culture’ as a cognitive construct 
is more sensible than the culture o f the described community. Ob­
viously, never has there existed a world as it emerges from such 
descriptions. However, there is no other way: to go beyond ... cul­
tural ‘stocktaking’ and have the urge to reach an understanding, the 
meanings, one cannot avoid using similar constructs. The result o f 
works by Polish researchers is the image o f a rural culture in Poland 
in the 19th century which can be charted like a periodic table o f ele­
ments, while there is no doubt that this folk culture never existed in 
such a systemic form; it is an ordering construct which does not cor­
respond to the historical reality. 23
In other words, the so-called traditional village/folk culture as described 
by ethnographers and anthropologists is but a scientific construct which 
helps us attach meaning to and understand the symbols and meanings
22 P. Burke, History and Social Theory, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 
New York 1992, p. 94.
23 P. Kowalski, op. cit., p. 12.
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of folk culture. It is more of an interpretation than a reflection of the past 
social reality. It also makes the historian of mentality face the crucial 
question about the purpose and limits of anthropological inspiration. 
The table of elements, mentioned by Kowalski as a base for recon­
structions which “lead dangerously to the creation of images of order 
contradictory to movement”24, obviously should not be used by a histo­
rian as the only and definite set used in interpreting cultural codes and 
meanings. Although the interpretations of cultural codes and symbols 
worked out throughout years of studies are greatly inspiring for histo­
rians, i.e. by opening them up to wider possibilities of perceiving and 
interpreting social reality, they should be approached with caution and 
reserve, depending on the specificity of the analysed period, space, or 
social group25.
The problem described here is also linked, to some extent, to the 
issue of the methods of using sources in studying mentality. Despite 
the popular belief among researchers that “the sources for studying 
the history of mentality can be found in every object and document” 26, 
this belief is always followed by an additional condition that using such 
comprehensive sources requires “approaching them with a specified 
questionnaire”. When formulating questions about the ‘mental reality’ 
reflected in the sources, it is helpful to refer to the above disciplines 
that deal with the internal mechanisms of all cultures (and anthropology 
and ethnology in particular, as is the case here) and with the unfulfilled 
collective phenomenon. In 1981 Natalie Zemon Davis, an excellent his­
torian observed the following:
We consult anthropological writings not for prescriptions, but for sug­
gestions; not for universal rules o f human behavior, but for relevant 
comparisons. There is no substitute for extensive work in the histori­
cal sources. There is no way that a ritual in New Guinea or Zambia 
can be used to establish the meaning and uses o f a ritual, say, in
24 Ibidem.
25 See also: P. Kowalski, Leksykon: znaki świata, omen, przesąd, znaczenie, 
Warszawa 1998; L. Stomma, Antropologia wsi polskiej w X IX  wieku, Warszawa 
1983; W. Pawluczuk, Świat w kulturach tradycyjnych, „Literatura Ludowa”, 
vol. 29, 3/4, (1985), pp. 3-11.
26 J. Ronikier, op. cit., p. 57; G. Duby, B. Geremek, op. cit.
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sixteenth-century Europe; the evidence must come from the people 
and the institutions o f the time 27
Therefore, according to this historian, the methods and techniques of 
anthropology cannot be easily implemented in history of mentality. This 
conviction is in accordance with that of Ewa Domańska, who claimed 
that the difference between studies by anthropologists and those by 
historians is that the former can verify their hypotheses systematically 
by contacting the live material; they have ‘source of experiences’ of 
a synthetic character at their disposal, as they can use their senses, 
see, hear, smell, try to feel what they are studying. Therefore, they are 
always in the situation of ‘being here’, ‘face to face’, with the studied 
natives and their culture. Historians do not have this opportunity28. This 
situation definitely applies to historians of antiquity, mediaevalists or 
a 19th-c. historians, yet it is worth a thought to see whether, and to 
what extent, the same applies to researchers dealing with the the his­
tory of the 20th century (and in particular the period from the 1950s 
onwards). It seems that the possibility of having direct contact with the 
‘time-witnesses’ of the analysed period and the methods of oral his­
tory, makes historians closer to the position of the anthropologists than, 
say, mediaevalists. Still, historians must take into account the distance 
through time. However, based on stories and the still vivid memory of the 
participants or observers of the described social groups, historians have 
the opportunity to have deeper insight into the described problems.
However, the temporal closeness of 20th-c. historians of mentality 
implies other problems, which are not so troublesome to researchers 
dealing with earlier periods. One such problem is the necessity of his­
torians’ distance to the analysed sources and traces of the recent past, 
what is extremely different to learn or master, often difficult to achieve 
in terms of not having a more or less fulfilled emotional attitude. In the 
case of studying mentality, analysing sources is not identical to the 
analysis that is applied in the traditional ‘positivist’ historical research, 
and this does not just concern the careful reading and analysing of usu­
ally written sources anymore. Fascinated with the early-modern times,
27 N.Z. Davis, The possibilities of the past, „Journal of Interdisciplinary His­
tory”, vol. 12, 2 (1981), p. 273.
28 E. Domańska, Mikrohistorie.., p. 73.
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Piotr Kowalski wrote very aptly about the method of reading mentality­
-related sources — for him the content in the sources is:
not contained in the direct, explicit statements, but on the level of 
the ‘obvious’. ... a researcher cannot trust what a source is talking 
about; he should go into the world o f ‘implied information’ and reach 
the outlook on the world which underlies that source ‘above’ the text 
itse lf29
This way of reading sources requires that the researcher maintain an 
enormous distance and remain ‘outside’ of the described ‘mental real­
ity’, which is extremely difficult in the case of studying the 20th century. 
The problem of this ‘distance’ was described even more bluntly by one 
of the most eminent historians of mentality, Carlo Ginzburg, who said: 
“one cannot go beyond one’s culture, unless at the cost of madness”30.
The anxiety expressed by Ginzburg may explain the reasons why 
the predominant fields of interest for the historians of mentality are ear­
lier periods, such as the 16th or 18th centuries. Does this mean that 
researchers dealing with the 20th century, who have no influence what­
soever on their cultural immersion, is foredoomed to limitations, if not 
failure, in their pursuit to study mentality? I believe, though definitely not 
without a bias, that the decider here is the context, i.e. the object and 
the subject of the study. Polish scholarship in the area of contemporary 
history with regard to systems of values, attitudes, everyday life, men­
tality and privacy in the period of the People’s Republic of Poland by 
such researchers as Dariusz Jarosz, Tomasz Szarota, or the authors 
of the series W krainie PRL (‘In the Land of the People’s Republic of 
Poland’)31 seem to contradict the above question. Although studies of 
this type do challenge researchers, forcing them to develop a consider­
able sense of self-awareness and self-control, their successful outcome 
is possible also thanks to the fact that the analysed period is a finished 
era. Michel Foucault would probably call that period a specific discur­
sive formation, governed by its characteristic rules and practices of dis­
course. The peculiar splits within the formations understood as such,
29 P. Kowalski, op. cit., p. 11.
30 C. Ginzburg, Ser i robaki: wizja świata pewnego młynarza z XVI w., 
Warszawa 1989, p. 17, quoted in J. Ronikier, op. cit., p. 57.
31 See D. Kałwa, Na peryferiach peryferii? Codzienność PRL w polskiej his­
toriografii, „Roczniki Antropologii Historii” vol. 2, 1 (2012), pp. 175-193.
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along with the shifts within the practical area which have emerged suc­
cessively since 1989, may render this period perceivable as a distinct 
system of symbols and meanings in a number of aspects. This distinc­
tion, in turn, enables researchers to detach themselves from the ways 
of thinking which were predominant within a given formation (‘the era of 
the People’s Republic of Poland’) 32.
Thus we move gradually from the problem of terminological chaos, 
through the more complex problem of sources and that of research 
methods and techniques, a fundamental issue for mentality studies, to 
the extremely important question of the researchers themselves.
This unprecedentedly extensive turn towards the person of the re­
searcher, or the author, forced historians to expand the horizon their 
own self-awareness in their research, results to a great extent from the 
discussions held among historians in the 1970s. Their consequence 
was disputing the concept of objectivism and historical truth. Preceded 
by the ‘linguistic turn’ (in the 1960s) and the eruption of works dealing 
with discourse and historical narrative (Roland Barthes, Haden White), 
these discussions had a considerable impact on studies of mentality. 
Their particularly important effect was an innovative approach to cap­
turing and presenting research results, as exemplified in publications 
by Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Natalie Zemon Davis, or Carlo Ginzburg, 
which were exceptional for their novel-like narration (abounding with 
literary figures of speech, metaphors, dialogues, etc.) and lack of objec­
tivity, declared openly by the authors33.
Although these publications were enthusiastically welcomed by 
readers in Poland, their Polish counterparts have not been written. 
This was partly due to the occasional accusations of non-historicity, 
and partly because postmodernist ideas did not have numerous ad­
herents in the environment of Polish historians. The strong attachment 
of historians to traditional research methods resulted in their unwilling­
ness to undertake the risk of a more innovative (literary) presentation 
of their research results. This issue was also mentioned to some extent
32 On specific discursive formation see: E. Szpak, op. cit..
33 On critical reception of antrhopological history see: D.A. Sikorski, Jak 
historyk potyka się o antropologię historyczną. Na marginesie książki Karoliny 
Polasik “Antropologiczny rekonesans historyka. Szkice o antropologii history­
cznej", “Kwartalnik Historyczny”, vol. 118, 1 (2011), pp. 485-510.
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by J. Ronikier, who wrote in 1995, with reference to mentality stud­
ies, that “what is particularly dubious is the largely speculative char­
acter of providing evidence, missing the possibility to verify the results 
empirically”34. Therefore, the history of mentality, close in its medium to 
literature, was not accepted positively in the circle of historical practi­
tioners. Obviously, history methodologists and theorists approached it 
with more understanding, to mention only Ewa Domańska, who wrote: 
Since the purpose behind studying the past is to understand it, this 
purpose can be met by both literature and history; with its appeal to 
imagination and emotions, literature can reach further into the es­
sence o f reality than history, limited by rational analysis35
Yet the question about how to write about mentality in this situation 
remains open. How does one reconcile history as a discipline (with its 
scientific analytical methods) with history as the art of literature (with its 
literary form of presentation)?
Obviously the necessary precondition to meet this task is the re­
searcher’s courage as well as joy and skill in asking questions, search­
ing, experimenting and wandering around in Topolski’s ‘network of inter­
secting paths’, each of them containing valuable hints for the definition, 
the methods, the sources and the ways of presenting the research.
However, regardless of which paths are selected by a historians of 
mentality to follow, the important thing is for that historians to always 
head towards their clearly defined object of study. Although, in Topol­
ski’s words, that objective can be as ungraspable as ‘the moving sky­
line’, the path to that objective will surely be filled with amazing encoun­
ters, adventures and traps, which make it worth following even more...
Polscy historycy na drodze do historii mentalności
Artykuł jest próbą wskazania na trzy, w moim przekonaniu najważniej­
sze problemy, z jakimi zmierzyć się musi historyk mentalności. Pierw­
szym z nich jest terminologiczna niedookreśloność i „otwartość” pojęcia 
mentalności, kolejnym — wielość źródeł i sposobów ich wykorzystywa­
nia, ostatnim zaś — interdyscyplinarność badań. Niezależnie od przyję­
tej przez historyka perspektywy i sposobu rozumienia, a więc i definio-
34 J. Ronikier, op. cit., p. 55.
35 E. Domańska, Montaillou..., p. 101.
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wania przedmiotu badań, „mentalność” zawsze odsyłać go będzie do 
„rzeczywistości myślowej”, która daje ogromne możliwości samodziel­
nej konceptualizacji badań. Różnorodność źródeł i pytań badawczych 
wymagać będzie jednak poszukiwania nowych, interdyscyplinarnych 
metod ich analizy. Jak daleko w swych poszukiwaniach i inspiracjach 
badawczych posunąć się może historyk mentalności, by nie zostać 
posądzonym o „herezję”? Czy wierność historycznemu myśleniu ob­
jawiającemu się we wrażliwości na zmianę oraz historyczny kontekst 
epoki są wystarczające, by nie zbłądzić? To główne pytania, na które 
staram się odpowiedzieć w tekście. Punktem wyjścia dla stawianych 
w nim problemów badawczych jest kontekst polskich badań nad men­
talnością, nie pozbawiony jednak odniesień do analogicznych badań, 
podejmowanych na gruncie historiografii zachodnioeuropejskiej.
Polnische Historiker auf dem Weg 
zur Mentalitätsgeschichte
Dieser Beitrag ist ein Versuch, auf drei — meines Erachtens — wichtig­
ste Probleme hinzuweisen, denen ein Mentalitätshistoriker gegenüber­
gestellt wird. Das erste Problem ist die terminologische Unbestimmtheit 
und die „Offenheit” des Begriffs der Mentalität. Das weitere ist die Viel­
falt der Quellen und ihrer Nutzungsweisen. Das letzte Problem dage­
gen bildet die Interdisziplinarität der Forschungen. Unabhängig von der 
von dem Historiker angenommenen Perspektive und seiner Verstan­
deskraft, also auch nicht von der Definierung des Forschungsgegen­
standes bedingt, wird er immer von der „Mentalität“ zur „Denkrealität” 
weitergeleitet, die eine Vielfalt der Möglichkeiten zur selbständigen For- 
schungskonzeptualisierung bietet. Die Verschiedenheit der Quellen und 
Forschungsfragen verlangt jedoch die Suche nach den neuen interdis­
ziplinären Analysemethoden. Wie weit kann ein Mentalitätshistoriker in 
seiner Forschungssuche und seinen Forschungsinspirationen gehen, 
um keiner Häresie beschuldigt zu werden? Sind die Treue dem histo­
rischen Denken, das sich in der Empfindlichkeit für das Neue äußert, 
und der historische Zusammenhang der Epoche genug, um sich nicht 
zu irren? In diesem Beitrag wird versucht, diesen Fragen nachzuge­
hen. Den Ausgangspunkt für die Forschungsprobleme bilden polnische 
Mentalitätsforschungen im Zusammenhang mit den historiografischen 
westeuropäischen Studien.

Barbara Klich-Kluczewska
Taboo as a useful category of historical analysis1
At the dawn of the new millennium, a German professor of Slavic stud­
ies carried out a survey among Poles on the presence of taboos in 
Polish culture. Respondents puzzled over questions relating to what 
they were not allowed to say, what was not spoken of, what taboo was 
and who or what supervised its observance.2 The study revealed that, 
according to one quarter of Poles, you could speak of everything in 
contemporary Poland, and there were only two topics here which were 
clearly taboo. Almost half of the respondents indicated sex as the most 
important taboo in the Polish culture3. Survey results also indicated 
that “speaking negatively about the Church” is a “collectively anchored 
and sanctioned” taboo in Poland. Other taboo topics are much less 
present. Respondents only marginally indicated violence, abortion, 
homosexuality, Jewish-related topics and anti-Semitism, death, love, 
drugs, disease, politics, euthanasia, incest, pornography, corruption, 
contraception or xenophobia were only marginally pointed out by the 
respondents. According to the study results, the community (public 
opinion, social norms) and the Church (clergy, Catholicism, pope, reli­
gion) perform the supervision over the observance of the taboo4.
1 Badania przeprowadzone w ramach projektu finansowanego przez Naro­
dowe Centrum Nauki (N N108 252135).
2 M. Fleischer, Obszar tabu w systemie polskiej kultury, „Rocznik Cen­
trum Studiów Niemieckich i Europejskich im. Willy Brandta Uniwersytetu 
Wrocławskiego”, nr 1 (2003), p. 21.
3 30% of respondents stated it was something “not spoken o f, although 
only 17% were convinced “you were not allowed” to speak of sex.
4 Ibidem, pp. 24, 28-29.
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An analysis of the results of the survey carried out by Fleischer, rela­
tively innovative in Poland, provides some information on social con­
sciousness regarding the phenomenon of taboo but, at the same time, 
begs the question whether this type of research makes sense. Can 
you ask questions regarding taboo in the same manner you ask Poles 
about their holiday or voting preferences? Is taboo only something you 
are not allowed to say/is not spoken of? Where certain things, such 
as sex, are not spoken of? At home, with husband or wife, or at work? 
What does it mean to speak negatively about the Church? Does this 
relate to a discussion of columnists about secret agents in the Polish 
Church during the communist era? Or to criticising a poor sermon dur­
ing Sunday dinner?
These concerns lead a social historian researching the communist- 
-era Poland to believe that the fact that none of the sociologists of the 
60’s and 70’s had the idea to carry out a similar survey is not worth 
regretting5. The quantitative sociological research once again confirms 
that there are enormous difficulties in grasping the scientific phenom­
enon of taboo in society in 20th century. It is also undoubtedly related to 
the great conceptual confusion and identifying taboo simply as a ban, 
norm, decency, and finally, political correctness, superstition, dogma, 
silence or omission6.
Taboo. Semantic journeys.
The concept of taboo, literally meaning “forbidden”, “sacred” brought 
over by James Cook, or rather, due to objective reasons, by his succes­
sor as captain — Sir James King, in the logbook from the Polynesian 
islands at the end of the eighteen century, can, without a doubt, be 
described as one of the most popular goods imported to Europe from 
overseas7. Thanks to the popularity enjoyed, especially in the British
5 Permission to carry it out would probably not be granted.
6 K. Kończal, Uniwersalny fenomen, „Borussia” 37 (2005), p. 31.
7 James Cook wrote in his diary: The people of Atooi(...) resemble those 
of Otaheite [Tahiti]in the slovenly state of their religious places, and in offering 
vegetables and animals to their gods. The taboo also prevails in Atooi, in its full 
extent, and seemingly with much more rigour than even at Tangataboo. For the 
people here always asked, with great eagerness and signs of fear to offend, 
whether any particular thing, which they esire to see, or we were unwilling to 
shew, was taboo, or, as they pronounced the word, tafoo?”, quoted in: F. Stein-
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Isles, through the writings of the famous captain, the concept gradu­
ally took up a stunning career in the colloquial languages of European 
countries. As early as at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth cen­
turies, it entered encyclopaedias, thus filling the language ‘vacuum’, to 
express “secularised sanctities and simultaneously prohibition of their 
violation”8. Explorers and adventurers, who followed in the footsteps of 
Cook, have also felt obliged to pay special attention to the phenomenon 
of taboo. According to critical researchers, nineteenth-century explor­
ers reported public usage of the word taboo as often as the word bak­
sheesh can be heard when travelling to the cities of the Levant, even 
though, according to Captain Cook, taboo was more often seen than 
heard, and as a word (however ridiculous this may sound) was hardly 
noticeable.
Overt and hidden meanings of taboo were studied by the greatest 
anthropologists, sociologists and psychologists of the second half of 
the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century: William Robert­
son Smith, James Frazer, Sigmund Freud, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Alfred 
Radcliffe-Brown, Émile Durkheim9. Particular interest in taboo emerged 
in Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century; what contempo­
rary critics justify with the Victorian minds’ fascination with the forbid­
den. It is justified to say that the publications issued and discussed in 
the studies of the University of Cambridge were the answer to this era’s 
social demand for this type of topic. Franz Steiner observed, prior to 
World War II, that a reflection on the functioning of taboo is very strong­
ly associated with the culture contemporary to the examiner/observer 
of the phenomenon10. The very fact that James Cook was the first to 
draw attention to taboo in the religious and magical space of the Poly­
nesian communities did not necessarily mean — he wrote — that his
er, Selected writings, vol.1: Taboo, truth and religion, ed. by J. Adler, R. Fardon, 
New York: Berghahn Books 1999, p. 109. Cf. K. O’Grady, The Semantics of 
Taboo. Menstrual Prohibitions in the Hebrew Bible, in: Wholly Woman, Holy 
Blood: A Feminist Critique of Purity and Impurity (Studies in Antiquity and Chris­
tianity), ed. by K. De Troyer, J.A. Herbert, J.A. Johnson, A.-M. Korte, Trinity 
Press International 2003, pp. 1-3.
8 K. Kończal, Uniwersalny fenomen.., p. 33.
9 E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Preface, in: F. Steiner, Taboo, Routledge 2004 (Re­
print edition), p. 12.
10 F. Steiner, Selected writings.., pp.132-139.
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predecessors, the great Spanish and Danish explorers, had not come 
across it. Perhaps none of them found it as important as the protestant 
explorer.
Taboo has widely been used by religious studies researchers for 
comparative analysis of the great cultures, especially within Judaism, 
and it served them to prove, using the theory of evolution, the thesis of 
the transformation of primitive cultures towards progressive and ethical 
ones. According to James Frazer, taboo, which as universally agreed 
upon, uniquely combines impurity and sanctity, was one of the essen­
tial elements of magical thinking and, as “a negative form of magic”, 
was used to prevent unwanted events. In this way, the demonic power 
inherent in the taboo was used to prove the specificity, but also the 
inferiority, of ‘primitive cultures’ to ‘developed cultures’. According to 
Robert Marett, it provided protection from danger resulting from the su­
pernatural powers of people, things and places. Émile Durkheim also 
considered taboo as an extremely important component of religion. He 
considered the prohibition of contact with what had been desecrated 
a prerequisite for establishing contact with sanctity11.
Franz Steiner, an employee of the Institute of Social Anthropology 
of the University of Oxford, a very devout Jewish immigrant from the 
Czech Republic, was the first researcher to undertake a thorough and 
critical analysis of the functioning of this concept in the field of cultural 
anthropology. He concluded something that is even today repeated like 
a mantra in all modern studies. He wrote that a lot of very different is­
sues are discussed under the heading ‘taboo’12.
According to Steiner, taboo can be generally described as a phenom­
enon linked primarily to the mechanisms of obedience, of ritual nature, 
including to specific rules of behaviour in emergency situations, strictly 
adhered to, which as such are not only related to the protection of indi­
viduals in danger but also to the protection of the whole of community 
from “endangered — and therefore dangerous — persons”13. He noted, 
however, that when considering taboo, we have to currently take into 
account a number of social mechanisms, forms of which do not fall un-
11 Taboo, in: Robert H. Winthrop, Dictionary of Concepts in Cultural Anthro­
pology, Greenwood Press, 1991, pp. 295-297.
12 F. Steiner, Selected w rit in g s ., p.107.
13 Ibidem.
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der one category. This was in contradiction with the existing broad prac­
tical application of this category in the field of social sciences, where the 
narrow understanding of taboo as a negative sanction — “a prohibition 
whose infringement results in an automatic penalty without human or 
supernatural mediation”14. Steiner rejected the unambiguous definition 
of taboo formulated by Margaret Mead in 1935, noting it was not even 
applicable to the peoples of the Pacific, where it supposedly derived 
from. As proof of this, he quoted Captain King’s story about a girl who 
visited the European ship and had some prohibited foods, consisting of, 
inter alia, pork, and then, as the records tell us, she did not drop dead 
immediately, but was heavily beaten as punishment by her countrymen. 
He pointed out that the Polynesian taboo itself, which incidentally he 
described as unusual, concerned practices aimed at “avoiding certain 
behaviour” that could involve very different issues not related to magic: 
reserving rights to specific items, selecting cereals to be cultivated in 
a given place, subordinating local dignitaries to the ruler, etc15.
The structural functionalists proposed the new approach to the sub­
ject of taboo. They finally ceased to associate taboo with ‘irrational’ ‘un­
enlightened’, with ‘primitive mentality’. Radcliffe-Brown has interpreted 
taboo as a value of ritual nature, through which the most fundamental 
values for social life are revealed. Rites of passage associated with 
maturation, entering into a marriage and death played a particularly 
important role in this system. Such an approach has been developed 
by the British anthropologist Mary Douglas, who demonstrated that all 
social structures are connected by a thin and tangled thread, woven by 
the concepts of impurity, disorder, danger and taboo16.
Mary Douglas’s considerations on taboo appeared in the least ap­
propriate moment for them — the era of flower power and joyful viola­
tion of all possible taboos. Consequently, her arguments did not meet 
with any special interest at the time of their publication and had to wait 
for a long time to be recognised. Her Purity and Danger has finally 
been recognised as one of the most interesting and influential works 
in the field of cultural anthropology published in the twentieth century.
14 Ibidem, p. 108.
15 Ibidem, pp. 209-211
16 Taboo, pp. 295-297.
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As Joanna Tokarska-Bakir emphasises — expanding the horizons of 
research on taboo and its relativisation was not the only breakthrough 
concept of Mary Douglas. She also referred to dirt (impurity) as a very 
important element of a cultural system. The fact that she demonstrated 
“the inner rationality of prohibitions and their inevitability, however con­
fusing and burdensome they might be,” must have had a negative im­
pact on the reception of her book at the time of its publication in 196617. 
Douglas has, to some extent, opposed all those who considered taboo 
to be atavistic social practices, and those breaking them became ‘sol­
diers of modernity and rationalism’. According to her, taboo is not in 
itself bad or good, right or wrong; it simply exists and, in its own way, 
affects the social norms and values18. Therefore, it should not be used 
to evaluate the world as a black and white reality.
Taboo — Douglas writes —“is a spontaneous device for protecting 
the distinctive categories of the universe. Taboo protects the local con­
sensus on how the world is organised. It shores up wavering certainty. 
It reduces intellectual and social disorder”.19
Taboo as ordering by avoiding
Taboo will exist as long as there will be culture —  all the same; 
be it the culture o f African Lele, American criminal gangs, ‘interna­
tional banking conspiracies’ (Richard Rorty), German concentration 
camps, Byzantine or gay culture —  for taboo is a condition o f its 
self-definition20.
Only such an explicit recognition of the functioning of taboo as a uni­
versal element which governs social order may serve a historian as 
a methodological basis for the analysis of societies of the twentieth 
century, although it certainly places our discussion within the structural­
ist positions and the belief in the universality of the ritualisation of social
17 J. Tokarska-Bakir, Energia odpadków, in: M. Douglas, Czystość i zma­
za, Warszawa 2007, pp. 7-12. C.f. B. Walczak, Brud a społeczeństwo. Funk­
cja marginalizacji kategorii z perspektywy antropologii społecznej, „Kultura 
i Społeczeństwo” 50, 4 (2006), pp. 143-156.
18 G. Koch, Between Fear of Contact and Self-Preservation: Tabor and its 
Relation to Dead, “New German Critique”, No. 90: Taboo, Trauma, Holocaust 
(2003), p. 73.
19 M. Douglas, Purity and Danger, New York 2002, p. 9.
20 Ibidem.
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life, subject to the reservation of the general volatility of social struc­
tures and patterns of thinking made by Douglas. Taboo is present in 
every culture, but in a specific way for each culture, just as every culture 
has its own concept of ‘dirt’ and ‘defilement’. In her opinion, the fear of 
breaking a taboo is also universal, and it is related to a conviction that 
certain phenomena /items /people are impure.
In this way, it overcomes the (still present) basic division of taboo 
between the primitive taboo — relating to the exotic system of primitive 
beliefs — and the contemporary taboo, which, despite various differ­
ences, are similar, pointing to the trophic taboo as the best example.
Taboo processes, in Douglas’s concept, are part of the system of 
methods of dealing with phenomena not falling into the categories of 
cultural pattern and having ‘ambiguities’ which can not be explicitly re­
corded anywhere. Both of them, as so-called anomalies, are associ­
ated with ‘dirt’, and according to Douglas, with ‘what is not in place’, 
and thus it is a potential threat to the existing order. The tendency to 
organise ‘what is not in place’, what is ‘unclear’ provokes a concrete so­
cial action. According to Tokarska-Bakir, Douglas identified five patterns 
of dealing with these “different situations”:
1. Avoiding ‘anomalies’ through the establishment of taboo, which con­
firms and reinforces the definitions with which they are incompat­
ible;
2. Disqualification of ‘anomaly’ through re-qualification, which limits its 
ambiguity;
3. Physical control;
4. Labelling a phenomenon as a ‘danger’, thus pushing the ‘anomaly’ 
away, creating a cordon sanitaire around it;
5. Sacralisation of ‘anomaly’, subjecting it to rituals and then using it for 
the same ends as they are used in mythology and poetry to enrich 
meaning and to call attention to other levels of existence21.
For the researcher of taboo, these conclusions are important, as they 
let you realise that ‘tabooisation’ as a way of action against ‘anomaly’ 
is never detached. It is almost always accompanied by other phenom­
ena. Joanna Tokarska-Bakir illustrated this phenomenon using the ex­
ample of homosexuality in nineteenth-century English society, which
21 M. Douglas, Purity and danger..., pp. 48-50.
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simultaneously subjected people of this sexual orientation to physical 
control through punishments such as imprisonment, ideological control 
through association with danger (a cordon sanitaire is here formed by 
the odium of sin and vice, and then by association to a disease that 
has to be cured), disqualification of ‘anomaly’ (a new norm appears in 
the scientific discourse — homosexuality is beginning to be defined 
as a different sexual identity and not as a sinful choice) and, finally, 
‘anomaly’ is avoided through the introduction of taboo (social ostracism 
— homosexual men are described as ‘decadents’ and ‘aesthetes’)22.
In a similar way, you can organise the social practices relating to 
one of the phenomena defined as a social problem of Communist-era 
Poland-divorce.
At the end of the sixties, in rural houses in the Ciechanów area, 
where divorce has remained an urban eccentricity, something spoken 
of from the church pulpit, on the radio, television, within school com­
mons or in films shown by a visiting rural touring cinema twice a month, 
Warsaw ethnologists have noted the following, typical according to 
them, statement:
Once a woman enters a relationship, there’s nothing you can do 
about it. Guys torment women; she’s gonna do a bit o f crying, but 
has to raise her kids; otherwise, she would be ashamed in front of 
people23.
“Life was not easy after divorce” — complained women in response 
to the first survey on the subject carried out in Poland by the “Kobieta 
i Życie” magazine in 1974:
M y friends and family turned away from me. Men were interested in 
me, but they only tried to get me to bed24.
A woman who left her husband and moved from her native village to 
a nearby town wrote:
Among people I felt as if  I was a “leper”. People here are prejudiced, 
and a woman without a husband is suspicious. I was young, rather 
pretty, but I was scared o f a bad reputation25.
22 J. Tokarska-Bakir, Energia odpadków., p. 34.
23 A. Zadrożyńska, Zawarcie małżeństwa. Analiza systemu wartościowania, 
Warszawa 1974, p. 49.
24 „Kobieta i Życie” nr 19, 12 V.1974, p. 10.
25 „Kobieta i Życie” nr 18, 5 V.1974, p. 13.
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The above sources indicate the existence of the practice of bypassing/ 
avoidance, i.e. of the tabooisation of divorce through the practice of 
ostracism.
Simultaneously, the sociologists of the first half of the sixties record­
ed residents of Nowa Huta stating that:
. th e re  is one divorced woman in our neighbourhood, and now no 
one knows where she is ... These sort o f people usually don’t have 
a place to stay, so they hit the bottle, and women tend to start hang­
ing out in p u b s .26 .
Divorce was also to be, according to many surveyed women, a down­
ward spiral leading women to prostitution27. All of these statements in­
dicate further control practices (ideological control): associating divorce 
with a real danger; in this case, with phenomena perceived as social 
pathologies — alcoholism, immoral conduct and finally prostitution.
It should be noted, however, that twenty years earlier, divorce had 
been, using Douglas’s terminology, qualified as ‘a norm’, when, on the 
1st of January 1946, it was introduced into the Polish Civil Code. So, 
when ethnologists, led by Anna Zadrożyńska at the turn of the sixties 
and seventies, visited a collective farming village in the Koszalin area, 
the inhabitants of which had migrated from the Kielce area, they heard 
stories of people’s lives for whom divorce was often an integral part of 
life’s experience, which did not result in stigmatism28.
Simultaneously, the analysis of court cases carried out by Józef 
Górecki demonstrate that a divorce was easily obtained in cases of 
spouses who had been separated for decades or who hated each other 
with a passion and demonstrated this hatred in the courtroom, e.g. “the 
husband’s behaviour indicates he is a psychopath”. It was favourable 
(e.g. useful for convincing the court about the need to grant the divorce) 
to demonstrate, apart from emotional tensions, “primitiveness” and “ob­
tuseness”. It was advisable to deliver to the court a certificate of criminal 
record, rehab treatment, a stay in prison or a psychiatric institution, etc. 
The following words from the courtroom Górecki quotes as persuasive:
26 J. Wódz, Rozwody w świadomości społecznej mieszkańców Nowej Huty, 
„Kultura i Społeczeństwo” 9, 1 (1965), pp. 137, 142.
27 J. Wódz, Zjawiska patologii społecznej a sankcje społeczne i prawne, 
Warszawa 1973, p. 161.
28 Ibidem, pp. 63- 68.
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“I was afraid of him; he is a real bastard. I hate him and will not live with 
him.” In such cases, the chances of getting a divorce increased. In the 
case of uncontested divorce cases, the chances decreased. After all, 
cultured people should be able to come to an agreement for the sake 
of the child29. The legal practice of the sixties led to a phenomenon, 
described by Barbara Łobodzińska in 1986, of the criminalisation of 
divorce, which was to be primarily associated with the margins of soci­
ety. One instance has thus applied two completely different patterns of 
action toward divorce, incorporating a kind of chaos into the ‘disorder’ 
of the officially propagated social system of Communist-era Poland. 
Perhaps this inconsistency can be interpreted as evidence of the weak­
ness of the instance. Without a doubt, however, the taboo of divorce in 
Poland of the 60’s was reinforced by a number of other actions, pushing 
this phenomenon into the margins of social acceptance.
Morphology o f  taboo
Taboo does not only operate in a complex system of the social control 
of phenomena which are considered undesirable, but it itself has a mul­
tilevel structure. On the one hand, it consists of the taboo area (the so­
-called object of taboo) and an instance supervising its observance (an 
element justifying compliance with the taboo). On the other hand, as we 
might have observed, it is subject to stratification divisions: for public 
discourses and for different social groups.
The above-mentioned actions toward ‘anomaly’ may indicate to the 
researcher that he/she is dealing with a potential object of taboo. Taboo 
is, however, an informal prohibition of a certain behaviour/requisition 
to bypass (avoid). There are no records of topics which, for example, 
should not be raised, of topics that cause embarrassment, shame or 
even disgust. Taboo leaves traces, however, examples of which ap­
peared in the above considerations, which are referred to as its man­
ifestations. The most important manifestations of a specific taboo in 
a society include:
1. a sanction imposed when an individual openly violates a social pro­
hibition or when the news of this fact becomes public. It is mani­
fested by disapproval on the part of the environment, conflict and
29 J. Górecki, Rozwód, Warszawa 1965, p.105.
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even by the exclusion of the individual from the community, social 
ostracism (according to some researchers, this type of ‘manifesta­
tion’ is associated with a narrowly conceived moral taboo);
2. a sense of shame / embarrassment / experienced by the individual 
violating the prohibition or having contact with its manifestation;
3. public comments on the functioning of taboo, made by our contem­
poraries, who in various forms (scientific, literary, film, etc.) present 
a critical diagnosis of the society;
4. a need to ‘bypass the topic’30 in public discourse. Too direct, too sug­
gestive, too ‘communicative’ forms, which refer to the phenomena 
controlled by social censorship, are excluded from the normal use 
of language and are not spoken of. Direct statements are replaced 
by euphemisms, metaphors, diminutives, comparisons, or other al­
ternative forms / e.g. medical language/31.
It is worth mentioning at this point that, thus far, it is language taboo 
that has attracted particular the interest of researchers, in and outside 
of Poland, due to the most available sources.
To analyse taboo, one should not only look for manifestations of ta­
boo, answer questions on objects of taboo, controlling instances, extent 
of its impact, context or mechanisms accompanying it, strengthening or 
weakening its force, but above all, repeat the question about its purpose 
(apart, of course, from the general application of the universal human 
pursuit of maximum order = control of the surrounding world). Finally, 
we are left with the ‘simple’ task of finding out what impact the taboo 
and its changes have on the life of a particular Pole. In the context of 
individual experience, subsequent, very important questions about the 
role of shame, disgust and fear inevitably arise.
The study of border areas allows us to grasp the essence of the 
rules the social order of Communist-era Poland relied upon. This will 
help us to draw conclusions on internal social tensions, the strength of 
modernisation processes and the durability of ‘traditional’ thinking, as 
it was referred to in the era of our interest. I also think that it will show 
the diversity of Polish post-war environments, which one can lose sight
30 Zob. szerzej Z. Leszczyński, Szkice o tabu językowym, Lublin 1988.
31 Cf.: S. Widłak, Zjawisko tabu językowego, „Lud” 52 (1968); Allan K., Burr- 
idge K., Forbidden words. Taboo and Censoring of the Language, Cambridge 
University Press 2006.
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of when looking at post-war Poland from the perspective of Krakow or 
Warsaw.
Tabu jako kategoria badawcza w warsztacie historyka
Artykuł dokumentuje poszukiwania sposobów wykorzystania w bada­
niach historiograficznych tabu, jako kategorii charakterystycznej dla ba­
dań antropologicznych. Autorka postawiła sobie za cel odpowiedź na 
pytanie o możliwości zastosowania tej kategorii w praktyce badawczej, 
prezentację towarzyszących badaniom wątpliwości oraz korzyści, jakie 
tego typu interdyscyplinarne ujęcie może nieść dla zrozumienia epoki 
historycznej.
Zasadniczą cześć analityczną tekstu poprzedza wprowadzenie, 
mające na celu podkreślenie podstawowych różnic semantycznych 
pojawiających się w toku rozwoju naukowej refleksji na temat tabu, 
ze szczególnym podkreśleniem kocepcji Mary Douglas, według któ­
rej wszelkie struktury społeczną są „powiązane cienką i splataną nicią 
utkaną z idei nieczystości, nieporządku, zagrożenia i tabu”. W nawią­
zaniu do refleksji Joanny Tokarskiej-Bakir na temat historycznego funk­
cjonowania tytułowego zjawiska, autorka stara się wypracować projekt 
„morfologii” tabu użyteczny w praktycznych badaniach źródłowych na 
temat tabu obyczajowego obecnego w wyobrażeniach społecznych 
w powojennej Polsce.
Tabu als Forschungskategorie im historischen Verfahren
Der Artikel stellt die Suche danach dar, wie das Tabu als eine für Anthro­
pologie charakteristische Kategorie in den historiografischen Forschun­
gen genutzt wird. Zum Ziel setzt sich die Autorin die Antwort auf die 
Frage nach der Möglichkeit, diese Kategorie in die Forschungspraxis 
umzusetzen. Außerdem stellt sie bei den Forschungen aufgetauchte 
Zweifel sowie unbestrittene Nutzen dar, mit denen diese interdisziplinä­
re Auffassung zu dem Verständnis der historischen Epoche beitragen 
kann.
Dem analytischen Hauptteil des Textes geht die Einleitung voran, 
deren Funktion ist, semantische Grundunterschiede zu betonen, die in 
der Forschung zum Thema Tabu auftauchen. Hervorgehoben wird die 
Konzeption von Mary Douglas, nach der alle gesellschaftlichen Struk-
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turen „mit dem dünnen, geflochenen Faden gebunden sind, der aus 
den Ideen der Unredlichkeit, Unordnung, Bedrohung und Tabu gewebt 
wird“. In Bezug auf die Reflexion von Joanna Tokarska-Bakir zum Tabu­
phänomen, bemüht sich die Autorin, das Projekt der „Tabumorphologie” 
auszuarbeiten, das sich für die praktischen Quellenforschungen zum 
Thema des gesellschaftlichen Tabus, welches in den soziologischen 
Vorstellungen im Nachkriegspolen auftritt, als nützlich erweist.

Piotr Perkowski
Social order and social pathology in the People’s 
Republic of Poland. Comments on the studies in the 
history of private and public lives
After the period of systemic transformation in Poland, there was no 
demand for the historical works devoted to the issue of the social life 
in the People’s Republic of Poland. One of the reasons was the re­
quirement to legitimize the new social order and political system. The 
historiography of the time concentrated on describing the blank pages 
and distortions of the Marxist historiography and on the history of the 
opposition and social resistance. It was dominated by political themes. 
The earliest proposals to study everyday life of the period of People’s 
Poland were made in the mid-1990s1. Borrowed from the French his­
toriography, these proposals referred to the traditional historical narra­
tion in which the history of everyday life was marginalized to give way 
to the ‘serious’ reflections on political history; the first played the role of 
a mere interesting supplement to the latter. The studies of the history of 
the public and private lives leaving aside the contributory character of 
the history of everyday life have been inaugurated only recently in the 
contemporary Polish historiography2.
However, the historiographic reflections on everyday life still lack 
references to the narration of the testimonies to the period produced by
1 T. Szarota, Życie codzienne w Peerelu — propozycja badawcza, „Polska 
1944/45-1989. Studia i materiały”, vol. 1 (1995), pp. 201-215.
2 B. Klich-Kluczewska, Przez dziurkę od klucza. Życie prywatne w Kra­
kowie (1945-1989), Warszawa 2005; K. Kosiński, Oficjalne i prywatne 
życie młodzieży w czasach PRL, Warszawa 2006; B. Brzostek, Za progiem. 
Codzienność w przestrzeni publicznej Warszawy lat 1955-1970, Warszawa 
2007.
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a variety of official institutions (such as state institutions, the mass me­
dia, or scientific papers from that time). Polish historians still seem to be 
overtly trusting when it comes to the discursive practices of the period 
and use them as a neutral instrument for describing the social reality of 
the time. There are cases when certain definitions of the phenomena 
of the social life in People’s Poland are repeated by historians without 
a second thought. For example, deeper consideration is not given to 
the historical and political development of such concepts as ‘hooligan­
ism’ or ‘homosexuality’, which unexpectedly become nothing but the 
instances of the distortion of social life, understood similarly by the then 
militiamen in their duty reports, as well as the today’s historians. On 
the other hand, Polish historians approach other concepts used by the 
authorities and researchers in People’s Poland with due suspicion. Ac­
count is taken of the intentional propaganda technique of addressing 
the members of the pro-independence underground resistance move­
ment as ‘bandits’, or the practice of using the term ‘saboteurs’ when 
referring to the workers of an industrial plant where a breakdown has 
occurred. Full account is also taken of the linguistic abuse in classify­
ing the youth who were protesting in 1968 as ‘hooligans’, and yet it is 
ignored that the very category of hooliganism as a form of street delin­
quency also requires a much more thorough analysis containing a ref­
erence to the practices of imposing discipline on the public and private 
spheres of social life.
A study of human behaviour and attitudes in People’s Poland can­
not be carried out in disregard for the language of the media, official 
documents and science of the time. Obviously the discourse on public 
and private morality was not a communist invention. A reference can be 
made here to the understanding of maintaining public order in the cities 
in Europe during the period of strenuous industrialization and the popu­
larity of nationalist ideas observed towards the end of the 19th century. 
According to that idea, the city’s public sphere was divided into good 
and evil, while the dwellers were classified as either pure or impure 
compliant with the said Manichean geography, which in turn expressed 
itself in distinguishing between the rich and the poor districts of London 
in the Victorian England. According to Judith Walkowitz, in that larg­
est city in the world at the time, the contemporary journalism did not
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treat the inhabitants of the poor, full of strangers from the outside and 
dangerous eastern part of the city as belonging to the national com- 
munity3.
A hypothesis could be put forward that this way of looking at the 
social structure of cities, the urban space and public order was main­
tained in the post-war Poland as well. This antithetical reasoning was 
translated into social definitions in People’s Poland only to the extent 
that it was believed that there existed some clearly defined group and 
some special locations where the degeneration of the private and pub­
lic life took place. Besides, that reference to ‘the hotbed of evil and 
offence’ served the communists as a pretext to liquidate public utility 
establishments operated by way of private initiative — both in the coun­
try and in the city. The militia documents from the 1940s and 1950s 
speak of the search for the particularly ‘impure’ locations on a city map. 
Their authors wrote about the ruins of bombed cities and hideouts full 
of bandits, thieves, hooligans, prostitutes and homosexuals, referred to 
collectively as the underworld. These groups were being reeled off one 
by one in the reports, marking off the hotbeds of social pathologies on 
a city map.
The ‘thaw’ journalism in the mid-1950s also featured representa­
tions of certain city districts and their inhabitants as the places of mor­
al decline of young men and numerous women. This way of thinking 
was reflected perfectly in Poemat dla dorosłych [lit. a poem for adults], 
a ‘thaw’ poem written by Adam Ważyk in 1955. One may hazard a the­
sis that the press articles from the period, having the hallmarks of inter­
ventions, defined the issues of the public and private lives in a manner 
similar to that of the contemporary militia reports. Since writing about 
delinquency in socialism had been allowed on the rising tide of political 
thaw, many phenomena were played up. Yet there is no evidence of 
a drastic increase in crime during that period. As can be concluded from 
the pages of Po Prostu [lit. simply], the lead opinion-forming magazine 
in the circles of Polish intelligentsia at the time, it was suggested to 
toughen up measures, introduce summary proceedings, impose admin­
istrative orders, such as restricting the right of the youth to spend time
3 J.R. Walkowitz, City of Dreadful Delight. Narratives of Sexual Danger in 
Late-Victorian London, London 1992, pp. 17-19.
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in the public sphere, or appoint special citizens’ formations intended to 
maintain order. Committing an offence was often equated with hooli­
ganism4. This way of writing about Polish city life displays both disgust 
and fascination, a characteristic resemblance to the accounts of living 
in Victorian London. Nowa Huta, a flagship project of Polish Stalinism, 
resembles East End in the late 19th century; it constitutes the bad face 
of the static and intelligent Krakow and attracts attention of the journal­
ists concerned about the otherness of workers and fascinated by it. 
After the period during which the bourgeois centre of Krakow became 
a symbol of reaction, while Nowa Huta under construction was a project 
of the modern communist community, an unexpected role reversal took 
place in the mid-1950s. Nonetheless, the antithetical way of evaluating 
urban space remained unchanged.
The 20th c. totalitarian systems enhanced this mode of speaking and 
functioning, the division into the ‘pure’ and the ‘impure’, the familiar ‘us’ 
and the strange ‘them’. Zygmunt Bauman5 pointed to a significant con­
trast in the way of thinking of 20th c. political elites and societies, namely 
that of what was ‘well-known, pure and ensuring social order’ as op­
posed to the phenomena considered ‘strange, filthy and undermining 
order by excessive mobility’. The scale of the disciplinary measures 
changed in relation to the 19th century in terms of toughening and mass 
enforcement of penalties, perfecting the methods of gathering informa­
tion about private lives, both in the Third Reich and the USSR6. In Po­
land in the late 1940s diverse social processes and problems became 
vulgarized in the official messages. The reflection on social issues was 
simplified particularly in the period of the ideological offensive (1948­
1955). A matter of considerable significance was that at that time the 
Marxist-Leninist ideology began to drive away sociology, since the lat­
ter was defined as bourgeois. Although Polish sociology revived in the
4 A. Leszczyński, Sprawy do załatwienia. Listy do „Po Prostu" 1955-1957, 
Warszawa 2000, pp. 125-132.
5 Z. Bauman, Ponowoczesność jako źródło cierpień, Warszawa 2000, 
pp. 11-67.
6 E.D. Heineman, What Difference Does a Husband Make? Women and 
Marital Status in Nazi and Postwar Germany, Berkeley-Los Angeles 1999, pp. 
27-28; J. Brooks, Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from Rev­
olution to Cold War, New Jersey 2001, pp. 126-128.
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1960s, after the thaw in October 1956, and it was decided to abandon 
the aggressive forms of ideologization and the more repressive forms 
of enforcing discipline on private life, the mode of defining social real­
ity and socio-economic problems by means of ‘sorting the wheat from 
the chaff’ was maintained until the decline of People’s Poland. It also 
seemed to have been noticeable after the period of systemic transfor­
mation at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s in the 
political practice of the representatives of former elites of both post­
-communist and Solidarity provenance.
It is worthwhile to present in greater detail the ways of utilizing the 
‘purity’ metaphor in post-war Poland. The sphere of private life was 
subject to normative control and purification procedures throughout 
the period of People’s Poland, although these processes intensified 
particularly during the implementation of the Six-Year Plan (1950-55), 
when various categories of the enemy, such as the ‘kulak’ or the ‘specu­
lator’, were the main focus of attention of the repressive apparatus. 
The most frequent term used in the official propaganda language was 
the ‘social plague’, while the most popular concepts in the research 
papers since the 1960s were ‘pathologies’ and ‘deviations’7. The first 
included mainly selected common offences, such as thievery or organ­
ized crime. An exceptionally wide range of pathologies were discerned 
in the behaviour of the contemporary youth. The utmost significance in 
this field was attributed to hooliganism, all types of juvenile delinquen­
cies, as well as the youth subcultures, such as the first Polish youth 
subculture of bikiniarze, a counterpart of American beatniks or English 
Teddy Boys (the term usually applied in the propaganda texts at the 
time was bikiniarstwo, the name of the subculture as a whole, as com­
pared to bikiniarz [plural bikiniarze], i.e. a representative of that subcul­
ture). Other described pathologies included negative attitude to one’s 
job, reflected in negligence, avoidance, or lack of employment (bume- 
lanctwo, lit. slacking), or individual’s excessive mobility (włóczęgostwo, 
lit. vagrancy). Alcoholism was also considered a pathology, classified
7 J. Wódz, Zjawiska patologii społecznej, Warszawa-Kraków 1974, 
pp. 6-22; A. Kojder, Wybrana bibliografia polskich publikacji z zakresu pa­
tologii społecznej 1948-1974, in: Zagadnienia patologii społecznej, ed. by 
A. Podgórecki, Warszawa 1976, p. 647; A. Podgórecki, Patologia życia 
społecznego, Warszawa 1969, pp. 128-279.
68 Piotr Perkowski
under the term ‘drunkenness’, and so was gambling and, since the end 
of the 1960s, drug abuse. The most frequently mentioned pathology of 
the family life was divorce. Prostitution, though a legally allowable occu­
pation at the time, was another condemned pathology, such as suicide, 
mental disease, or any unacceptable sexual behaviour, take youth sex 
or homosexuality. The term ‘deviation’ was a synonym for pathology at 
times (e.g. homosexuality was considered both a sexual deviation and 
a social pathology), although usually its meaning was somewhat less 
pejorative. Deviant was the name for a person whose behaviour vio­
lated the established social conventions. In this sense, such situations 
as young couples holding hands in public were defined as a form of 
deviant behaviour. Considering the fact that the category of deviations 
covered numerous types of behaviour with disparate degrees of social 
acceptance, a distinction was made between positive and negative de­
viations, and the researchers faced a serious problem with qualifying 
the particular deviations as either of the two categories.
The family life pathologies were said to involve divorce, juvenile 
crime, suicidal attempts made by children and the youth, or alcoholism, 
while excessive individualism of a family member was considered a de­
viation8. The grounds for the most frequent undesirable phenomenon, 
namely divorce, were seen in the industrialization and urbanization 
processes along with an increase in social mobility, their consequent ur­
ban lifestyle, marital infidelity, alcoholism and drug abuse. The causes 
for divorces were also sought in women’s professional activity (since 
they could not take care of children during work), a decreasing number 
of children in families, the developing branch of services offered as 
a substitute to aid received from relatives, an increasingly wider social 
consent for divorce, and the growing number of mental disorders.
One of the spheres which remained a taboo and were subject to the 
process of purification was human sexuality. In post-war Poland, the 
model of sexual freedom propagated in the USSR in the 1920s was not
8 A. Strzembosz, Niektóre zjawiska patologiczne we współczesnej 
rodzinie, in: Przemiany rodziny polskiej, ed. by J. Komorowska, Warszawa
1975, pp. 343-360; A. Dodziuk-Lityńska, D. Markowska, Rodzina w mia­
stach polskich. Przegląd badań społecznych z lat 1945-1968, Wrocław 1971, 
pp. 284-304; Z. Tyszka, Socjologia rodziny, 2nd edition, PWN, Warszawa
1976, pp. 226-233.
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accepted either in the period of Stalinism with its claims to control pri­
vate lives, or during the rule of prudish Władysław Gomułka, or during 
the decade of Edward Gierek, the time in the 1970s characteristic for its 
ostensible openness to the Western morals, or even in the 1980s, when 
imported VCRs and video cassettes appeared in some houses. The 
requirement for sexual abstinence dominated throughout the whole era 
of People’s Poland, though with varying intensity. Moreover, in the first 
half of the 1950s severe condemnation for unbridled sexual life would 
have been addressed not only to women, but also to men. People’s 
Poland was closer to the morals in the Soviet Russia of the 1930s, the 
period defined by Igor Kon as the ‘Stalinist sexophobia’9, than that 
of the 1920s, when one of the alternatives was the pro-revolutionary 
liberal sexual ethics promoted by Alexandra Kollontai. Obviously the 
methods of segregating and purifying people’s sex life were not Stalin’s 
invention. On the eve of modernity, distinguishing between the devia­
tions embedded deep in the individual’s personality and the modes of 
behaviour defined as standards was one of the founding principles of 
sexology10.
According to the design of a modern 20th century state, public life 
should have been free of any impure sexual behaviour. This was the 
approach applied in Poland mainly to prostitution — houses of prostitu­
tion were prohibited in Polish towns both before and after WWII, and at­
tempts were also made to control prostitutes’ health so that they did not 
infect the ‘pure’ citizens11. Homosexuality, tabooed even stronger than 
prostitution, was approached in much the same manner as the latter. 
Mentioned only occasionally in the sexology books from the period (and 
much more frequently by criminologists), homosexual behaviour was 
put next to such pathologies as drugs and alcohol, sadism and maso-
9 I.S. Kon, The Sexual Revolution in Russia, translated by J. Riordan, New 
York 1995, pp. 67-84.
10 Ch. Waters, Sexology, in: The Modern History of Sexuality, ed. by 
H.G. Cocks, M. Houlbrook, Houndmills-Basingstoke-Hampshire 2006, 
pp. 44-45.
11 M. Rodak, Prostytucja w Lublinie w dwudziestoleciu międzywojennym, 
in: Metamorfozy społeczne. Badania nad dziejami społecznymi X IX i XX  w., 
vol. 2, ed. by J. Żarnowski, Warszawa 2007, pp. 189-212; B. Klich-Kluczewska, 
Unzüchtiger Realsozialismus. Prostitution in der Volksrepublik Polen, „Osteuro­
pa“, vol. 6 (2006), pp. 302-317.
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chism, narcissism, exhibitionism, venereal diseases, prostitution, group 
sex, rape, premature ejaculation and female frigidity. Compliant with 
the metaphor of the pure being infected by the impure, the sources of 
male homosexuality were sought in having been seduced by a teacher 
or older colleague as a child12.
It is not difficult to notice that the persuasive practices of the period 
combined multiple types of behaviour of various origins and character 
under one category. Such combinations were applied to the greatest 
degree in the language used by the communist authorities and insti­
tutions responsible for ensuring public order and enforcing discipline, 
such as Citizens’ Militia, i.e. the contemporary police, Security Service, 
i.e. the secret police, and Polish People’s Army. The task of the state 
propaganda at the times of the particularly strong social tensions (in 
1956, 1968, 1970) was to put forth an enemy category to divert people’s 
attention from supply shortages or other problems. Such was the case 
in October 1956 and in 1968, though on different grounds, with the use 
of anti-Semitic feeling in the society. As a consequence, the definition of 
public enemy evolved depending on the demand from the state authori­
ties. An explicit example of that were the groups of young people called 
hooligans. Sociologists in People’s Poland claimed aptly that in the first 
place hooligans are a social group whose primary trait is a penchant for 
fun and violating public order13. Yet for the Bolsheviks and the Western 
policy-makers and researchers in the 1920s hooliganism was a useful 
metaphor for depicting the primitive part of the youth culture (the na­
ture as opposed to the culture), uncontrollable and liable for turning the 
streets into a jungle14. For party ideologists and Citizens’ Militia in Po­
land, hooliganism was a category which involved selected groups of the 
youth, depending on the requirement. In the Stalinist press hooligans 
were equated with bikiniarze, and usually identified with common crimi­
nals. On the other hand, in the 1960s and 1970s the category of hoo­
ligans was used with reference to the protesting students and workers:
12 L. Starowicz, Eros, natura, kultura, Warszawa 1973, pp. 278-280.
13 A. Pawełczyńska, Przestępczość grup nieletnich, Warszawa 1964, 
pp. 123-126.
14 A.E. Gorsuch, Youth in Revolutionary Russia. Enthusiasts, Bohemians, 
Delinquents, Bloomington-Indianapolis 2000, pp. 170-176.
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Hooliganism is a form of art for art’s sake, it is about doing some­
thing for the mere joy of doing it, pour la fun, as a friend of mine puts it, 
never mind the purposes. Yet propaganda attributes a surprisingly high 
level of political awareness to hooligans, who are seen as evil creatures 
knowing their reasons and goals. Beside that, they obviously are a tool 
in the hands of the Western imperialists ...
— as Michał Głowiński described the propaganda of March 196815.
A supplementary notion was the rhetoric of the infectious stranger; 
hooligans were accused of infecting the ‘healthy youth’ with drunken­
ness, indiscipline, sexual offence, and even depression. The rhetoric of 
infection was present in Polish Stalinism:
This youth, in fected... with the urge for pleasure, the petty bourgeois 
youth, let us make it clear, the youth soaked with the petty bourgeois 
ideology, the American ideology, i f  you prefer, these young people 
have developed a conviction about fun that there is no fun without 
alcohol, without intoxication, without frenzy, without unconscious­
ness, without sexual excesses, is there? They do not realize that 
this is not the way for people to have fun, this form o f fun leads to 
animalization.
— said Bolesław Bierut at a meeting with the activists from the Associa­
tion of Polish Youth in 195316.
A popular idea reflected in the order-establishing practices in Peo­
ple’s Poland was that one pathology must lead to another. Consequent­
ly, social reality was defined in medical terms — as a cluster of epi­
demic focuses which must be isolated from the healthy social structures 
to prevent the spread of the disease. Overcoming any such focus might 
prevent the spread of a social disease. The most popular methods in­
cluded penalizing the infected, maintaining social control and enforcing 
disciplinary educational measures on the individuals prone to infection. 
During Stalinism the sources of the social pathologies defined as such 
were not sought within social structures but beyond. The emergence 
of any phenomenon considered adverse for the party apparatus was 
blamed on the activity of the ‘hostile forces’. However, these forces
15 M. Głowiński, Marcowe gadanie. Komentarze do słów 1966-1971, 
Warszawa 1991, p. 116.
16 Archiwum Akt Nowych [AAN], Komitet Centralny PZPR 237/V/36, Narada 
z aktywem ZMP-owskim w KC, 27.08.1953, p.17.
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needed a weak link to be able to interact effectively. Therefore the 
blame for the appearance of given impurity was put on the individuals 
described as ‘devoid of ideals’ , e.g. the part of the youth exposed to the 
temptation of excess individualism and egoism:
A side product o f the rough ideological struggle which tears the 
world apart is definitely the ‘ideals-devoid’ character o f a part o f the 
youth, the peculiar philosophy o f living, the philosophy o f pleasure, 
o f remembering only about oneself, ‘what do I care about others,
I must take care o f myself, live my life to the full, this is my ideal, this 
is the meaning o f my life ’. The enemy is well aware that this attitude 
is extremely comfortable for them, for that enemy sometimes wins 
them over to his side by fuelling that urge for pleasure.
— said Bolesław Bierut in his address during the meeting with APY 
quoted above17.
This rhetoric of struggle developed the category of an enemy re­
sponsible not only for political and economic mishaps, but also for 
a range of social problems, in particular alcoholism, hooliganism and 
negative attitude to work. The struggle was for peace and socialism, 
against imperialism and sabotage, but also against alcoholism, crime, 
hooliganism and bikiniarstwo. Since the mid-1950s, the category of en­
emy ceased to have been exploited on such a scale, and the ‘idealess 
character’ mentioned above was often a synonym for effectiveness in 
the machinery of power. In the successive years the sources of the phe­
nomena defined as pathologies were sought more readily in variously 
described cultural changes, such as improper education of the youth, at 
the same time abandoning the rhetoric of ‘hostile activities’.
Polish communists failed to violate the sphere of private life to the 
extent observed in the USSR during the interwar period. In the revolu­
tionary Russia, the stories of some Bolshevik families evidenced that 
the experiment of imposing dominance of the public matters over the 
private ones was performed successively among the activists. Private 
and family lives were disregarded ostentatiously, which was reflected 
in the ascetic design of flats, austere clothes, marriages entered into 
under the influence of the shared ideology and divorces for political 
reasons, as well as treating children as ‘little adults’ and parents’ mani-
17 Ibidem, p. 12-23.
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fest absence from home18. Polish communists did not undertake such 
radical revolutionizing of the bourgeois models even in the first half of 
the 1950s, when their aspirations to transform private life were at their 
peak. Obviously complete submission to the public matters was ex­
pected according to the official propaganda, but family was never ruled 
out as a redundant unit of the society. Instead, a reference was made in 
this respect to the policy propagated in the USSR in the second half of 
the 1930s, when the state began to promote the pro-family and national 
values by way of rewarding numerous families, reducing the possibility 
to get divorced and award the presence of parents both in a factory and 
at home (especially with regard to women)19. Polish women’s press in 
the first half of the 1950s also encouraged more effective work in the 
public sphere, as well as in the private one20. It was particularly sympto­
matic to claim emphatically that socialism does not strive after breaking 
up families, but the opposite21.
Maybe Polish ideologists did not trust the radical reconstruction of 
the social structure attempted at in the Soviet Russia of the 1920s. Af­
ter all, it was the example of the eastern neighbour which showed that 
even in the times of the most severe cleansing of the nation, terror was 
unable to disintegrate the ties in a multigenerational or nuclear family 
to a satisfactory extent22. Also, it appears that the modes of behaviour 
typical for the protection of private life were practiced throughout the 
period of People’s Poland, including the first half of the 1950s. Such 
was the case in the circles of the pre-war intelligentsia. The protec­
tive strategies assumed different forms, e.g. ‘shutting oneself away’ or 
competing with the school for prominence in bringing up children. Due 
to the ideologization and violence of the state against the individual,
18 O. Figes, The Whisperers. Private Life in Stalin’s Russia, New York 2007, 
ppp. 10-19.
19 W.Z. Goldman, Women, the State and Revolution. Soviet Family Policy 
and Social Life 1917-1936, New York 1995, pp. 340-341.
20 Jak sobie radzę w pracy i w domu, „Moda i Życie” 1950, no. 121, p. 10; 
Pracujemy wszędzie, „Przyjaciółka” 1949, no. 10, p. 3.
21 W obronie rodziny, „Przyjaciółka” 1949, no. 10, p. 5; O trwałość rodziny, 
„Przyjaciółka” 1949, no. 15, p. 3.
22 C. Hooper, Terror of Intimacy: Family Politics in the 1930s Soviet Union, 
in: Everyday Life in Early Soviet Russia, ed. by Ch. Kiaer and E. Naiman, 
Bloomington-Indianapolis 2006, pp. 77-78.
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family ties strengthened at the cost of public activity, participating in the 
political life and acting for the benefit of local communities. As a result, 
family ties became increasingly stronger during Stalinism and through­
out the time under marital law (1981-83) at the expense of participat­
ing in the public sphere. The phenomenon was observed in the post­
-Stalinist Russia, as well as in Poland under the rule of Edward Gierek 
(in the 1970s) and General Wojciech Jaruzelski (under marital law)23, 
with a relatively brief interruption in the years 1980-81, when the victory 
of the legalized Solidarity trade unions encouraged people to involve in 
the public life. Yet this involvement was totally in opposition to the idea 
of the state authorities about public activity.
It seems that the moral values proposed by Polish communism were 
most readily accepted when they did not clash with the traditional cus­
toms and religiousness of the Polish nations. As an outcome of the 
political decisions regarding national borders, demographic process­
es and post-war deportations, as well as the Holocaust, the territory 
of post-war Poland was inhabited mainly by the people who declared 
themselves as Catholics. Poles remained a nation of believers through­
out the period of People’s Poland which did not become secularized 
despite the efforts of some party ideologists. Polish religiousness was 
characteristic of its folk features (such as the faith in local miracles), 
and its power was manifested in strong opposition against withdrawing 
the classes in religious instruction from schools, as well as in mass par­
ticipation in Corpus Christi processions, pilgrimages to the Jasna Góra 
Monastery in Częstochowa and other religious practices, which were 
condemned during Stalinism24. The documents left by party organi­
zations provide evidence of the numerous cases of internal conflicts 
experienced by rank and file members, and even by the party activists, 
who had to choose between the faith in communism and the faith in 
God and taking part in traditional religious celebrations. This must have
23 V. Shlapentokh, Public and Private Life of the Soviet People. Chang­
ing Values in Post-Stalin Russia, New York 1989, pp. 153-159; E. Tarkowska, 
J. Tarkowski, „Amoralny familizm”, czyli o dezintegracji społecznej w Polsce lat 
osiemdziesiątych, in: J. Tarkowski, Socjologia świata polityki, vol. 1: Władza 
i społeczeństwo w systemie autorytarnym, Warszawa 1994, pp. 264-265.
24 J. Żaryn, Sacrum i profanum. Uwagi o religijności Polaków w latach 
1945-1955, „Polska 1944/45-1989” vol. 5 (2001), pp. 273-307.
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been the reason for the decision of the party made after the events of 
October 1956 to allow moderate religiousness of its members on condi­
tion that it did not assume the form of organized activities in support of 
the Catholic Church and that it did not concern the party elite, i.e. its 
staunch activists25. The crucial role of social appraisal in the light of the 
professed religion was evidenced in the sociological survey among the 
youth in the mid-1960s, when 35.5% of the respondents considered 
it impossible to marry a person of different faith, while nearly 30% of 
the inhabitants of Polish countryside approved of civil marriages. At the 
beginning of that decade, half of the respondents opted for some form 
of persuasion or obligation on the shacked up couples to force them to 
marriage26.
The list of negative social phenomena complained about in a survey 
of the inhabitants of Warsaw conducted in the middle of the 1970s, half 
way through the decade of the rule of Edward Gierek, was topped by 
the promiscuity of the youth. The successively less concerning issues 
were alcoholism, ‘social callousness’, self-interest and nepotism (a.k.a. 
kumoterstwo, lit. cronyism), corruption (a.k.a. łapownictwo — bribery), 
‘bureaucratism’ (i.e. excessive bureaucracy), greed and hooliganism27. 
On the one hand, the respondents referred to the daily difficulties en­
countered by a citizen of People’s Poland with running an official errand 
or buy necessities. On the other hand, some of the mentioned issues, 
such as callousness, greed and cronyism were condemned in the of­
ficially propagated though not practiced communist activist’s ethics, but 
also in the doctrine of the Catholic Church.
Similar conclusions can also be drawn when reading denunciation 
letters sent by citizens to various party authorities and government in­
stitutions. The Office of Letters and Inspections28 was established in
25 Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku [APG], Komitet Wojewódzki PZPR 
w Gdańsku [KW PZPR], file 1824, Informacja z narady aktywu partyjnego 
i służbowego wojewódzkiego aparatu MO w Gdańsku, poświęconej sprawom 
laicyzacji, 11.05.1960, p.212.
26 J. Kwaśniewski, Społeczeństwo wobec dewiacji, Warszawa 1983, 
pp. 56-57.
27 Ibidem, pp. 39-40.
28 D. Jarosz, Akta Biura Listów i Inspekcji KC PZPR jako źródło do badań 
rzeczywistości społecznej w Polsce w latach 1950-1956, „Polska 1944/45­
1989”, vol. 2 (1997), p. 192.
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December 1948 as a department of the newly formed Polish United 
Workers’ Party. The functions of the department were diverse. It was 
to receive correspondence from the low-ranking activists and ordinary 
people for the purposes of controlling the party apparatus and monitor­
ing public feeling, as well as in order to give people a sense that the 
state authorities looked after their interests. Another important reason 
for establishing the Office was to legitimize squealing. The official ap­
proval for denunciation in the steering circles of PUWP was expressed 
explicitly in People’s Poland at least twice — in the first half of the 1950s, 
and later during the anti-Jewish campaign in the years 1967-68. Col­
laboration with the secret police was not required to perform an act of 
denunciation. The social history of People’s Poland, including the his­
tory of citizens’ private lives during that period, provides evidence that 
denunciation was an occupation of a citizen who need not have been 
an informant. The majority of denunciation letters, both in the USSR 
and in People’s Poland, were not addressed to the security service, 
but to party or government institutions. As a matter of fact, the strat­
egy of denunciation in Poland had more similarities with the practice of 
sending supplications to the authorities and the letters of denunciation 
regarding other citizens which was propagated in Russia in the 1930s 
and described by Sheila Fitzpatrick29.
The letters can be analyzed at least in two ways. They serve as the 
sources of information about the daily routines of various plants and 
households, a substantial evidence of the character of the invigilation of 
employees in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as a proof of the condition 
of morals in People’s Poland. The majority of letters of denouncement 
were signed with the full name of the sender, although there was no in­
stitutional constraint to submit denunciations, same as in Russia in the 
1930s. The purpose behind writing a denunciation was to distinguish 
oneself in front of the local or central authorities, hence the attempts 
at guessing which information will be considered the most incriminat­
ing for the target of the denunciation. Yet regardless of the controversy 
whether the majority of letters of denouncement were written so as to
29 S. Fitzpatrick, Supplicants and Citizens. Public Letter-Writing in Soviet 
Russia in the 1930s, “Slavic Review” 1996, No. 1, pp. 78-105; S. Fitzpatrick, 
Signals from Below. Soviet Letters of Denunciation of the 1930s, “The Journal 
of Modern History” 1996, No. 4, pp. 831-866.
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endear oneself to the addressee, or whether their purpose was to ex­
press author’s beliefs, the correspondence seemed to reflect the hier­
archy of values in the contemporary sphere of social conventions. It can 
be observed which types of behaviour or traits were commonly pointed 
out as the most embarrassing.
An analysis of the letters from citizens sent to the Voivodeship 
Committee of the PUWP in Gdańsk at the beginning of the Gierek’s 
decade,30 the issue which met with condemnation particularly often 
was leading an ‘immoral’ or ‘bad’ life, which was understood as having 
extramarital sex life, and more specifically sexual activity of women and 
love affairs involving men in managerial positions (such as the charge 
that someone ‘dates women’). Such misconduct was seen in the con­
text of ‘breaking one’s family’. Similar issues were touched upon in the 
letters of denouncement from the first half of the 1950s, as well as from 
the later period: there were no dissimilarities in terms of either qualita­
tive or quantitative terms, though an estimate analysis may suggest the 
opposite:
Comrade Langer neglected his family and children and engaged in 
an immoral and riotous life with Majewska, which also had negative 
effect on his professional work, and he also had negative effect on the 
employees. It was also acknowledged that Majewska had led an im­
moral life even before she was employed as a personnel officer, which 
was known to Langer.
— said one of the letters31. The charge of unregulated sex life was 
equivalent to other charges concerning the lack of professional qualifi­
cations or overstepping one’s authority:
He is an illiterate elementary school graduate who occupies the po­
sition of utility inspector and flirts with citizen Bielińska.
He found himself a lover, the manager of the shop no. 18, ... whom 
he takes away on business trips32.
30 APG, KW PZPR, file 1455; ibidem, file 1456; ibidem, file 1457.
31 APG, KW PZPR, file 653, Sprawozdanie z pracy Referatu Listów i In­
spekcji KW PZPR w Gdańsku za okres od 1 maja do 1 czerwca 1954 r., p. 35.
32 APG, KW PZPR, file 13103, Notatka służbowa z przeprowadzonej kon­
troli w Wydziale Rolnictwa i Leśnictwa PWRN — Wojewódzkiej Stacji Oceny 
Zwierząt w Gdańsku, 5 11963 r., pp. 9-10; ibidem file 10629, Notatka dotycząca
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The term ‘leading an immoral life’ was also understood as charac­
teristic of other types of behaviour, such as intemperance in drinking al­
cohol, excessive inclination towards entertainment and, less frequently, 
emphasizing one’s wealth (the phenomena referred to in general as 
‘a riotous life’). Many letters criticized bad relationships at work; their 
authors pointed out drunkenness, thievery and fraud committed by cler­
ical workers, abusing power, accepting bribes, stealing public property 
from a plant, nepotism and connections — the phenomena described 
widely by today’s Polish historians33 and usually reviled in the press 
from the period.
Some types of denunciation present in the 1950s vanished gradually 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The accusations of having ‘improper 
class background’ or ‘blemish on reputation’ were made only in excep­
tional cases, and the charges concerning religiousness were less and 
less frequent either. Bearing in mind the nation’s religiousness declared 
at that time, one can formulate a hypothesis that it would be more haz­
ardous to become condemned by one’s neighbours and relatives due to 
not having baptized one’s newborn baby than to face possible punitive 
measures at work or in the party for active involvement in the religious 
life. It was not practiced in Poland either during Stalinism or later to 
denounce one’s relatives. The only cases which could evidence the op­
posite were letters of denouncement against an ex-husband intended 
to execute alimony or throw him out of the flat. The cases of domestic 
violence would also be described on exceptional occasions, with the 
offender’s names given in the letters. Yet none of the above had any 
hallmarks of acting on ideological grounds. This undermines certain 
statements made by the historians and sociologists about the totalitar­
ian character of the communist system in People’s Poland. According
anonimu na dyrektora Wojewódzkiego Przedsiębiorstwa Handlu Meblami 
w Gdańsku, marzec 1970 r., p. 1.
33D. Jarosz, M. Pasztor, Afera mięsna. Fakty i konteksty, Toruń 2004; 
K. Madej, Siermiężna i dolarowa — korupcja w PRL w latach 1956-1980. in: 
PRL. Trwanie i zmiana, ed. by D. Stola and M. Zaremba, Warszawa 2003, 
pp. 249-280; K. Kosiński, Z historii pijaństwa w czasach PRL. „ Peerelowskie” 
wzory picia alkoholu, „Polska 1944/45-1989. Studia i materiały”, vol. 7 (2006), 
pp. 267-305.
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to Fitzpatrick, even in the USSR in the time of the most dreadful terror 
Pavlik Morozov was more of an exception that a rule34.
One of the fundamental challenges which a historian dealing with 
People’s Poland must face is the problem of distinguishing between 
the assumptions and projects concerning social transformation from 
the contemporary cultural habits. Only some of the projects were im­
plemented, and only some of them survived after the thaw in October 
1956. In some cases particular elements of the proposed ethics were 
adopted with success. It can be concluded from the discussion provid­
ed above that the best acceptable elements of moral code in post-war 
Poland were those corresponding with the culture of workers or peas­
ants, as well as those that were not at odds with what the churchgoers 
could hear during sermons. ‘Intemperance in eating and drinking’, vani­
ty, greed, adultery — these sins were condemned in the orthodox ethics 
of Stalinist officers, as well as in the teachings of the Catholic Church. 
It also seems that many political decisions in People’s Poland were 
made according to the dictates of conscience and the values inherited 
from one’s background. This thesis is evidenced in the private accounts 
of the officers who attended church despite the recommendations of 
their superior party organization. Another proof of that is the state’s in­
consistent policy towards the institutions of the Catholic Church in Po­
land, the protracted withdrawal of religion classes from schools (which 
eventually took place in 1961), or the participation of party officials in 
religious celebrations in the second half of the 1940s, which should not 
be considered as practiced by the authorities for mere opportunistic 
purposes. By analogy, the social resistance was profiled not only politi­
cally, but also culturally. In other words, a range of resistance-oriented 
activities were also aimed at protecting the values and habits stemming 
from one’s community.
The history of People’s Poland saw various projects developed with 
regard to public morality, all of which featured the underlying inclination 
towards purifying the social tissue, separating the wheat from the chaff. 
The authorities made use of the hostility towards strangers shared by 
the majority of people inhabiting the territory of Poland after WWII and 
earlier, during the interwar period, an example of which was Polish anti-
34 S. Fitzpatrick, Signals from Below..., p. 849.
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-Semitism. The actions aimed at dividing the public sphere according 
to the category of purity were supported during Stalinism by a complex 
privacy-controlling apparatus. Such practices were limited in the suc­
cessive years. The contemporary science was making certain efforts to 
meet the requirements of the order-generating practices in its attempts 
at describing the differences between the pathological and the healthy 
behaviour. All the contexts referred to above — the categories of purity 
vs. impurity, order vs. excessive social mobility, the ill who infected the 
healthy, the Manichean dichotomy in the space of the modern city, cul­
ture as opposed to nature, and finally normal behaviour as contrasted 
with pathologies and deviations — evidence the complexity and dif­
ficulties encountered by a researcher dealing with the latest history of 
People’s Poland whose field of interests covers studying the public and 
private life during that period.
Wymiary ładu i patologii społecznej w PRL. Uwagi do 
badań na historią życia prywatnego i publicznego
Polscy historycy nadal zbyt łatwo zawierzają praktykom dyskursywnym 
charakterystycznym dla badanej rzeczywistości historycznej, używając 
ich w roli pozornie neutralnego narzędzia historiograficznego opisu. 
Tymczasem społeczno-kulturowe konstruowanie pojęć takich jak „chu- 
liganizm”, „homoseksualizm” czy wreszcie kluczowe dla autora artykułu 
pojęcie „patologii społecznej”, wymagają pogłębionej refleksji badaw­
czej, tak na podstawie analizy języka ówczesnych mediów, jak wytwo­
rów instytucji państwowych czy nauki.
Zasadnicze pytania artykułu koncentrują się wokół metafory „czy­
stości”, jako ważnego składnika dyskursu publicznego doby PRL. Autor 
zwracając uwagę na obecność w powojennej Polsce kilku projektów 
moralności publicznej, prezentuje konteksty społeczno-polityczne funk­
cjonowania kategorii „czystości” i „brudu”, ładu i nadmiernej ruchliwości 
społecznej. Podkreśla wyjątkową rolę metafory „epidemii” w refleksji 
na temat patologii społecznej, wskazuje na manichejski podziału prze­
strzeni nowoczesnego miasta oraz zjawisko kontrastowania zachowań 
„normalnych” oraz „patologicznych” i „dewiacyjnych” .
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Ordentlichkeit und gesellschaftlicher Missstand 
in der Volksrepublik Polen. Bemerkungen zu Forschungen 
nach der Geschichte des privaten und öffentlichen Lebens
Zu leicht vertrauen polnische Historiker den diskursiven, für die histo­
rische Wirklichkeit charakteristischen Praktiken, indem sie diese als 
ein scheinbar neutrales Mittel der historiografischen Beschreibung an­
wenden. Das gesellschaftlich-kulturelle Konstruieren der Begriffe wie 
„Randalieren”, „Homosexualität” oder, „gesellschaftlicher Missstand” 
das Schlüsselwort des Artikels erfordert dagegen eine vertiefte Refle­
xion der Forschung sowohl aufgrund der sprachlichen Analyse dama­
liger Medien als auch der Produkte öffentlicher Einrichtungen oder der 
Wissenschaft. Grundfragen des Artikels konzentrieren sich auf die Me­
tapher der „Sauberkeit“ als den wichtigen Bestandteil des politischen 
Diskurses der Volksrepublik Polen. In Bezug auf ein paar Projekte der 
öffentlichen Moral im Nachkriegspolen präsentiert der Autor den gesell­
schaftlich-politischen Zusammenhang, in dem die Kategorien „Sauber­
keit” und „Schmutz”, Ordnung und gesellschaftliche Überbeweglichkeit 
funktionieren. In der Reflexion zum Thema gesellschaftlichen Missstan­
des wird die außergewöhnliche Rolle der Metapher der „Epidemie“ be­
tont. Der Autor weist auf die manichäische Einteilung moderner Städte 
(Stadträume?) und das Phänomen des Kontrastes der „normalen”, „pa­
thologischen” und „abweichenden” Verhaltensweisen hin.

Olga Gorbatcheva
Everyday life in the 19th century. Belarusian case
Growing interest in the history of daily life became a natural phenomenon 
in the context of positive changes in Belarusian historiography of early 
1990’s. Within the framework of national historical school “renascence”, 
the history of daily life was regarded as one of the promising research 
methods. The status of the history of daily life underwent significant 
changes with the emergence of specialised research, which accompa­
nied a so-called “historical boom”. Belarusian researchers of the history 
of daily life emphasise that the main subject of their investigations is not 
global historical events and great ideas, but the everyday life of ordi­
nary people with all its varieties and peculiarities, including a person’s 
inner life changes within the spatio-temporal continuum. Everyday life 
is manifested not as a totality of special and unique events, but also as 
a sequence of events repeated again and again.
Having accepted an anthropological method in historical research, 
historians can focus their attention on issues, which were considered in­
significant within the framework of macro historical approaches. These 
are questions about the constituent parts of 19th century ordinary peo­
ple’s life in general and Belarusian women in particular; or which values 
determined the life of various social groups; or how society treated chil­
dren; or which crimes dominated in society and how society imposed 
penalties upon criminals. 19th century peasant attitudes towards faith, 
holiness and to sorcery are one of the issues to be considered in the 
framework described above.
Putting emphasis on daily life, changing of the focus from great 
persons to ordinary people brings about the necessity of widening the 
range of sources. Representatives of lower classes practically did not
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leave any records. Sources widely used by traditional historians are 
accounts about “minor people” compiled by others. For this reason, 
elements of material culture (clothes, nutrition, tools, etc.) and visual 
sources together with oral testimonies of the actors of history are to be 
studied extensively by historians of daily life.
Therefore, court records, including testimonies of and about com­
mon people, become the most representative sources of information. 
During the 19th century, numerous legal and court reforms were imple­
mented in Belarus. This circumstance dictates the necessity to study 
documents from various judicial bodies specialising on criminal cases. 
From the late 18th century until 1831, criminal cases were under the 
competence of I Department Principal Courts1. Later, up to 1867, 
these cases were in the competence of Criminal Chambers2, which, 
after the reform of 1867, were united under the authority of Joint Crimi­
nal and Civil Court Chambers3. In 1883, instead of the Joint Cham­
bers, a new body — Regional Courts that existed until 1918 — was 
introduced4.
The sphere of action of the Courts extended far beyond the bounds 
of their juridical assignments. The legal cases represent the people’s 
sense of justice, their welfare, their ideas of fairness and morality, their 
attitudes to innocence, to illegitimates and to extramarital affairs, to tol­
erance and to religious rites, as well as relationships between Christian 
and pagan traditions.
While studying everyday life, it is possible to single out several main 
spheres. The first one is connected with the anthropological factor, 
which is related to a man as a living being. It includes birth, sexual­
ity, illness, childhood and old age. The other one deals with man’s vi­
tal functions: nourishment, clothing, dwelling, labour, leisure time. The
1 National Historical Archive of Belarus (NHAB), f. 76, Minsk Principal 
Court of I Department.
2 NHAB, f. 145, Minsk Criminal chamber the Ministry of Justice (1831­
1867). The fund consists of two units (II unit: 1341 legal proceeding files).
3 NHAB, f. 147, Minsk united Chamber of Criminal and Civil Court the Min­
istry of Justice, 1867-1883 (IV unit: files of criminal contents).
4 NHAB, f. 183, Minsk Regional Court (1883-1918). II unit: 26392 files of 
criminal contents.
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third sphere includes issues of survival in extreme situations — war, 
persecution, nature disasters, etc.
For 19th century Belarusians, belief in witchcraft and in different 
kinds of signs, e.g. the “evil eye” and the like, could be considered 
as one of the most important aspects connected with the birth-illness 
sphere. It was believed that there were people who had the power to 
make all sorts of incantations to place natural disasters and other forces 
under their control. People thought that with the help of such forces, it 
was possible to avoid disaster, to eject an “evil spirit”, to cure diseases, 
to achieve happiness and joy and vice versa — to create mischief, to 
cause death, illness, to call upon an evil spirit, to invite boredom, mad­
ness, fits, to ruin peace and harmony in a family and so on.
People possessing higher knowledge and able to do such things 
were called differently — sorcerers, wizards, witches (charodei, cha- 
rovniki, kolduny, znakhari, vorozhbity, ved’maki, ved’my, volkolaki). 
According to the famous 19th century ethnographer A. Bogdanovich, 
these names corresponded to more ancient ones that had disappeared 
before the 19th c. — kudesnik, volhv, veshchaya zhonka5.
It was regarded that not every sorcerer was able to commit all the 
actions mentioned above; most of them possessed only one specific 
skill. One could cure and send out a disease, the other could bring 
about strife in a family, the third was able to cause hail or drought, the 
forth — to turn people into a wolf or frog. According to Belarusians’ 
beliefs, one could become a sorcerer if he or she had been put within 
the bounds of his occupation in constant and close communication 
with some force of nature. For example, blacksmiths, millers, forest­
ers, herdsmen, beekeepers, brewers, distillers of spirits were regarded 
as sorcerers6. That did not mean that people of other trades were not
5 A.E. BorflaHOBMH, nepexumKu ôpeeHeao Mupoco3epu,aHua y  denopycoe. 
^mHo^pa$>u^ecKuü ovepK, TpoflHO 1895, p. 133.
6 Cf. n.B. HleMH, Mamepuanbt dnn u3yneHuz 6bima u P3biKa pyccKoao 
HaceneHun Ceeepo-3anaöHoaoKpan, v. III, OnucaHuexunuw,a, oöexöbi, nuui,u, 
3aHnmuü; npenpoeowöeHue epeMeHu, uapbi, eepoeaHun, odbiwoe npaeo, 
napoöeücmeo, Konöoecmeo, 3Haxapcmeo, neneHue 6one3Heü, cpeócmea om 
Hanacmeü, noeepbn, cyeeepun, npuMembi, CaHKT-neTepöypr 1902, p. 248; 
A.E. BorflaHOBMH, nepexumKu ôpeeHeao Mupoco3epu,aHun y  denopycoe, 
p. 134.
86 Olga Gorbatcheva
able to become sorcerers; but the sorcery of those mentioned above 
was, to some extent, more ‘preferable’. It was considered that each 
of them knew the properties of the ‘evil spirit’ he dealt with while doing 
the job. Peasants believed that specific spirits lived in a smithy, mill, 
forest, cattle-yard. Belarusians had very strong superstitious fears of 
these spirits. Such a miller was in low regard if he did not know how to 
please a water spirit, or such a forester was not respected if he couldn’t 
get along well with a forest spirit, or such a herdsman was blamed if he 
couldn’t protect livestock from other animals by spells or to drive out 
a cowshed spirit. They were expected to be good craftsmen as well as 
able to use the power of spirits. Thus, millers from water mills could to 
‘take water’, i.e. cast a spell on water, to cure or to send out diseases. 
Of course, nothing could prevent a miller to learn the craft of a fortune­
-teller, for example. A miller could be a werewolf and his wife could be 
a witch; but these skills were optional. Millers needed them to please 
a water spirit so that they always had the proper deal of water, so that 
a water spirit did not break a dam and did not damage the wheels of 
a mill, did not pull a mill down during high water — that was his concern. 
A miller had to learn all these tricks or give up his trade. A miller should 
also know how to place air elements under his control and, of course, 
know how to get on with the spirits of wind — whirlwind, storm and other 
air phenomena. He had to take everything into his consideration in or­
der not to make the wind angry so that it calms down for a time; he had 
to know how to lull a storm when one had to mill, to conciliate a storm 
so that it wouldn’t break the sails7. Therefore, everyone dealing with 
mysterious, wilful natural forces ought to be a skilful master.
It is difficult to find out now what kinds of sacrifices were offered to 
‘evil spirits’ by different craftsmen. However, according to the testimony 
of the miller Grigory Poretsky from the village from the Kholopovichy 
Borisov district (uezd), Minsk province (gubernija), an experienced 
miller always put a piece of lard under a wheel with the coming of the 
first frosts in autumn, when water was covered with thin ice, in order to 
prevent the wheel creaking. When a pig was slaughtered, a miller had 
not contend himself with one piece only, sacrificing for these matters
7 n.B. HleMH, Mamepuanbi dna u3y^eHua 6bima u H3biKa pyccKoso 
HaceneHua Ceeepo-3anadHoao Kpan, v. III, p. 249.
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a good deal of pork. However, it did not guarantee further success in 
the miller’s work. As G. Poretsky described, some millers could limit 
themselves with less substantial gifts, e.g. pork intestines covered with 
fat. Such a miller’s deeds could be explained by the following reasons: 
if a miller did not offer a sacrifice to a water spirit, a miller would not be 
able to keep the wheels in order, and a water spirit would always lick 
the grease from them8.
A forester had to learn how to propitiate his evil spirit, which could 
provoke a dangerous beast that was able to wound or attack him. To 
prevent this, he needed to commit a ritual of sacrifice, offering some 
parts of the forester’s body — cut off the little finger, nails, hair, etc. 
In the 19th century, this custom had already been changed. During 
the Day of Annunciation, a forester went into the wood, where he pro­
nounced spells and left a peace of bread with salt and a lock of his hair. 
Hair could be replaced by nails.9
Belarusians did not regard cases of professional sorcery as rep­
rehensible if they did not exceed certain bounds. On the contrary, the 
majority perceived them as a manifestation of the deepest professional 
knowledge, indispensable for success.10
According to folk beliefs, the desire to charm somebody arose spon­
taneously, involuntarily, unconsciously. A sorcerer started to act when 
‘blood covers his eyes’ and when ‘evil comes into his head’ — these 
were common folk forms to express and to describe the ecstasy of 
a sorcerer. Being in such a state of mind, the sorcerer could charm 
somebody. In such a case, peasants preferred to keep out of his sight.
People usually paid honour to sorcerers, but in most cases, this hon­
our was not sincere. During family celebrations, weddings, baptisms, 
a sorcerer was given the most honourable place; he was paid extreme
8 About professional miller’s witchcraft vide: n.B. HleMH, Mamepuanbi 
dnn u3yneHuz 6bima u n3bKa pyccKo^o HaceneHun Ceeepo-3a^a^Ho^o Kpan, 
v. III, p. 249; A. E. BorgaHOBMH, nepexumKu ^peeHe^o Mupoco3epu,aHun 
y  6enopycoe, pp. 134-136.
9 A. Bogdanoich gives variants of spells that were used by Belarusian for­
esters in the 19 c., A. E. BorgaHOBMH, nepexumKu ^peeHe^o Mupoco3epu,aHun 
y  6enopycoe, pp. 136-139.
10 n.B. HleMH, Mamepuanbi dnn u3yneHun 6bima u n3bKa pyccKo^o 
HaceneHun Ceeepo-3a^a^Ho^o Kpan, v. III, p. 250.
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attention and treated best of all in order not to make him angry, and 
therefore, to not bring harm to the newly married or baby’s happiness. 
A sorcerer received such treatment as natural and well deserved, and 
he easily threatened both hosts and guests. “Why, you’ll remember me! 
I’ll get you in darkness!” — an enraged sorcerer used to say in such 
cases11. In such a situation, everyone present was captured with fear, 
while those who made a sorcerer angry tried to prevent or to destroy his 
magic with the help of another sorcerer.
Such an incident with the Davydkov brothers and Vasily Kovalevsky 
took place in the Rechitsa district in January 186612. Leon Davydkov 
(26 years old) visited Ivan Grebenchuk sister’s wedding and drank “the 
glass of vodka poured from the bottle and unaware of anything ... as 
vodka had a natural colour and taste.”13 This vodka was offered to him 
by Vasily Kovalevsky. Right then, Leon Davydkov felt queasy and was 
so weak that he was not able to go home. Then the host, I. Grebenchuk, 
hauled him up onto a cart and took him home. After the victim had been 
brought home, his relatives found out that the reason for Leon’s poor 
condition was his contact with Kovalevsky, who was known among the 
villagers as a witch man (sorcerer). This is why they decided to appeal 
to Kovalevsky for help14. The behaviour of the sick Leon resembled 
temporary madness: “He ate burning pieces of coal, fought with a wall, 
etc. ”15
When Leon’s relatives came to Kovalevsky, the latter said, “I was al­
most sure I would be called for,” and added that Leon “will suffer a little, 
not more than day and night.”16 Having arrived at the Davydkov house, 
Kovalevsky asked for vodka and consecrated salt. When everything 
was given to him, Kovalevsky poured the vodka into a glass, added salt
11 Ibidem.
12 The case “of accusing Rechitsa citizen V. Kovalevsky in sorcery and 
citizens the Davydkovs in beating him” was examined by Rechitsa court since 
25.01.1866 till 17.03.1867. V.: NHAB, f. 145, un. 2, f. 1203.
13 Ibidem, p. 7.
14 Ibidem.
15 Ibidem, p. 9.
16 Ibidem.
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and whispered something. Then he gave the prepared mixture to Davy- 
dkov, blew at Davydkov three times and said: “Now you’ll recover.” 17
After the treatment, Davydkov felt himself get better immediately. 
Then a reception for the sorcerer was organised. However, during the 
reception, Leon’s brother Grigory started to reproach Kovalevsky about 
the damage he had done to his brother. Whilst hearing this, the sor­
cerer answered: “You shouldn’t reproach me, or I‘ll do to you the same, 
and you’ll perish after that.” During the conversation, Kovalevsky also 
added that the vodka drunk by Davydkov had been prepared for the 
newly married to “make them suffer as he suffered. But since Davydkov 
appeared first before his eyes, it was given to him.”18 The brothers, who, 
as documents relate, had violent characters, couldn’t stand it and beat 
him unmercifully for his words.
The Criminal Chamber found Leon and Grigory Davydenko guilty of 
beating the 53-year-old citizen Vasily Kovalevsky. Kovalevsky himself 
was accused of preparing and giving a drink with a harmful effect to the 
condition of the citizen Leon Davydenko and providing help by means 
of that drink. Such an action was perceived “in the eyes of common 
and gullible people as a kind of sorcery, witchcraft, etc.” The criminal 
statute (article N° 935) provided imprisonment for a term from 7 days to 
3 months for those accused for the first time. If there was evidence that 
“consumption of drinks, mixtures and other means might have a harm­
ful effect on health”, a guilty person could be put into prison for a term 
from 8 months to 1 year and 4 months (article N  50)19. Accused of ac­
tions of “magic”, Kovalevsky was put into prison for 3 months20.
In the 19th century, the ‘zalom’ incantation was widely spread among 
people engaged in land cultivation. ‘zalom’ was regarded as the most 
dangerous manifestation of sorcery. The process of making ‘zalom’ 
consisted of tying rye knots and including the name of the person ‘za- 
lom’ is intended to affect along with enumeration of the sufferings this 
person should undergo or what death he should experience21. ‘zaloms’
17 Ibidem.
18 Ibidem, p. 8.
19 Ibidem, pp. 12-13.
20 Ibidem, p. 13.
21 Cf. A.E. BorflaHOBMH, nepexumKU ̂ peeHe^o Mupoco3epu,aHuz y  öenopycoe, 
p. 170.
90 Olga Gorbatcheva
were made both for people and for domestic animals to bring disease or 
death upon them. If reapers found knots in rye whilst harvesting grain, 
they did not touch them, but carefully reaped around them, protect­
ing themselves from ‘zalom’ spells. It was regarded that only a skilful 
sorcerer or sorceress could destroy the magic power of the ‘zalom’, 
and thus protect people from the impending danger in whose field the 
‘zalom’ was made.
Many examples of spreading the belief about ‘zalom’ within the ter­
ritory of Belarus in the 19th century are left. A. Serzhptuvski described 
some peculiarities of this belief in the Polesye region. Here, people 
thought that a ‘zalom’ was made by a naked sorcerer or witch in a field 
in order to bring evil upon a hostile person. A sorcerer in a “field of that 
person gathers rye wheat or another grain in the sorcerer’s fist, twists 
the ears together, binds them with hair mixed with a coarse or felt thread 
or with tape or with something else, casting all sorts of spells upon the 
heads of a host, hostess or the entire family or house or livestock — 
upon everything he wants to make the ‘zalom’. Then he breaks and 
rumples these ears. In such way, the person for whom it was intended 
would be broken and rumpled. If such a ‘zalom’ or doll are only found 
in a field, the frightened people rush to seek a mighty sorcerer.”22 Peas­
ants thought that only a mightier sorcerer could protect them against 
this witchcraft. It is important to note that peasants appealed to priests 
rarely in such cases. Peasants from Polesye held the opinion that God 
could not help in such a struggle against these dark forces.
At the same time, certain ways of resisting a ‘zalom’ were developed 
by peasants. If a ‘zalom’ was found, it was recommended to do the fol­
lowing: “to put an aspen felled from the east on the ‘zalom’, to surround 
it with some manure and set everything on fire. These means will lead 
you to the field of the person who made that ‘zalom’. You should not 
do anything he asks. You should also keep an eye out as to not let him 
take a handful of ground from the owner’s field, because it may cause 
harm in the future.”23
22 A.K. CepwnyroÿcKi, npbiMxi i 3a6a6oHbi 6enapycay-nanewyKoy, MiHCK 
1998, p. 265
23 n.B. HleMH, Mamepuanbi dna u3yaeHua 6bima u a3biKa pyccKoao 
HaceneHua Ceeepo-3anaöHoao Kpaa, v. III, pp. 485-486.
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A Kopatkevichy volost (Mozyr district, Minsk province) clerk is also 
of great interest within the framework of the given study. “A zalom is 
made in a field with growing grain or grass in the form of a band to 
cause a man’s or animal’s death or disease. A mean person (an enemy 
— sorcerer) makes it. To avoid the threat, the crop or hayfield owner 
usually asks for help from a sorcerer; generally from the peasants. My 
correspondent once fell ill because of a ‘zalom’ made in her family field. 
She told me the following: a sorcerer took a headscarf from her head 
and went to bed, putting it under his head. The next day, early in the 
morning, he said who had made the ‘zalom’. Then he ordered her to 
bring a bottle with water and to pray to icons, holding it in her hands and 
all the time crying in it. After that, he gave her water from that bottle to 
drink and, supposedly, thanks to this, she recovered. The sorcerer also 
pulled out a ‘zalom’ and, having tied it to a stone, threw it into water. 
Quite often, sorcerers put a ‘zalom’ into a coffin. In the first case, the 
person who had made the ‘zalom’ had to drown; in the second one — to 
die of a sudden, natural death.”24
However, sometimes a “zalom’s” existence was doubted. For exam­
ple, the priest Dmitry Pashika from the village of Petrokovo (Mozyr dis­
trict, Minsk province) had the following attitude to this kind of witchcraft: 
“The belief in so-called ‘zaloms’, which are found by peasants in fields 
sown mainly with rye, is widely spread. A ‘zalom’ consists of several 
rye stems put together and skilfully interwoven. It is made by an evil 
person to cause damage to the household of the person he hates and 
to deprive him of prosperity, since common people think that those who 
will reap the ‘zalom’ should inevitably fall ill or die, and an animal which 
will eat the straw from a ‘zalom’ should perish. Everybody knows that 
‘zaloms’ are really found in fields, and it is true that they cause some 
kind of damage. Nevertheless, the evil caused by a ‘zalom’ can be eas­
ily explained: if one neighbour, for example, is furious with another one, 
he goes and makes some ‘zaloms’ on the crops of his foe without any 
sorcerer’s tricks or whispering, only keeping in his head that his enemy, 
by all means, will go to seek a sorcerer. The person that has a ‘zalom’ 
placed on him actually leaves in search of a sorcerer, sometimes for 
dozens of miles, at the time of heavy work in the fields, when a peasant
24 Ibidem, pp. 232-233.
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has no time to spare. The sorcerer then had to be supported for some 
days, plied with vodka and regaled as the dearest guest and paid some 
roubles upon his departure. Of course, all these things are connected 
with heavy losses and wasting of valuable time, so the damage caused 
by a ‘zalom’ is obvious. We should suppose that a ‘zalom’ is made by 
peasants who have no faith in it and in a sorcerer’s power — a kind of 
sceptic25.
From N. Nikoforovsky’s records about the belief in the ‘zalom’ among 
peasants of the Vitebsk province in the last quarter of the 19th century, 
one can see the connection of the ‘zalom’ with an evil spirit and the dev­
il’s tricks. According to local peasant ideas, one should seek a priest’s 
help and not for other sorcerers’ spells to break the magic of the creator 
of the ‘zalom’ (which is called here the villain): “Let’s go to the priest. 
Our priest will break any ‘zalom’. He sticks in sorcerers’ throats.”26 
In the second half of the 19th century, some people had doubts 
about the existence of the belief in the ‘zalom’. However, this tendency 
was still observed in some cases in the peasants’ milieu. There were 
examples when this belief was used by people to earn a living. An in­
vestigation of the sorcerer Fedor Vorobey’s case that took place in the 
Rechitsa provincial court in November 1859 represents a good exam­
ple of this tendency27.
A peasant named Fedor, the son of Sava Vorobey, who lived in 
a state village Glinnaya Sloboda (Rechitsa district, Minsk province), 
practiced sorcery through interpreting the behaviour of snakes, dogs 
and frogs. Evtuch Maloshchenko, a soldier who came home on a short 
leave, found a ‘zalom’ in his rye. “When hearing peasant gossip that 
a ‘zalom’ made in one’s grain is a bad portent for the owner and that it 
mustn’t be pulled out by oneself, as you can cause harm to your health 
or life”28, the soldier invited Fedor Vorobey to break the witchcraft. The 
peasant-sorcerer was offered four “garnets” of rye as a reward29.
Fedor Vorobey went to the field and performed the rite to get rid of 
the ‘zalom’ in the rye. The sorcerer went around that ‘zalom’ 3 times,
25 Ibidem, pp. 231-232.
26 Ibidem, p. 233.
27 NHAB, f. 145, un. 2, f. 685.
28 Ibidem, p. 3.
29 Measure for corn (about 3 quarts).
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pulled it out and crossing it three times with his little finger and bur­
ied it.”30 After that, using his secret knowledge, he accused Katherine 
Danilova, a peasant, of making the ‘zalom’ to bring death to the soldier 
Evtuch Maloshchenko’s family. As he testified during investigation, he 
had come to this conclusion through interpretation of his dream. He 
dreamt that a frog, snake and dog crept from the soldier Evtuch Malosh­
chenko’s yard, and all together they had thrown themselves at Evtuch 
Maloshchenko’s wife Fedora and her child, and they had even bitten 
them. Apparently, this dog and snake were sent by Evtuch’s brother’s 
wife Katherine Maloshchenko.”31
K. Maloshchenko, a peasant, completely denied her guilt, and main­
tained “that she had not made any ‘zalom’ to bring death to the fam­
ily, that she did not know any sorcery and that she had no malice to 
either Evtuch nor to his family, and that the evidence was fabricated 
by the peasant Vorobey.”32 Further examination of the case led to the 
accusation of the sorcerer himself. The process of the examination of 
nine peasants’ evidence revealed the real motives behind F. Vorobey’s 
behaviour. All the peasants spoke of him as a liar, a careless and lazy 
household keeper who makes his living through false sorcery. As a re­
sult, the court sentenced 52-year-old Fedor Vorobey to punishment 
in the form of 50 blows from a birch branch and (to cleanse his con­
science) penance in accordance with the Orthodox faith33.
It is worth mentioning that belief in the ‘zalom’ existed mainly among 
peasants and those engaged in land cultivation. Peasants maintained 
that in cases when an educated person pulled out a ‘zalom’, he would 
not be affected by traditional retaliation. As Bogdanovich points out, 
peasants believed that cultured and educated people were able to re­
sist a sorcerer’s witchcraft. There are some examples when educated 
people were treated as sorcerers34.
Witch doctors, unlike sorcerers, enjoyed sincere honour and respect 
among the common people and held a special place in their life. Attrib-
30 NHAB, f. 145, un. 2, f. 685, p. 3.
31 Ibidem, p. 3.
32 Ibidem, p. 4.
33 Ibidem, p. 6.
34 A. E. BorflaHOBMH, nepexumKu ôpeeHeao Mupoco3epu,aHun y  denopycoe, 
p. 170.
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uting the origins of all diseases to spells or evil eyes, peasants believed 
that it was possible to get rid of them with the help of witch doctors 
rather than medical men. It was considered that all external diseases 
could be treated through casting spells, whilstinternal ones could be 
cured with the help of magic water35. At the same time witch doctors 
possessed some practical skills for treatment of dislocations, broken 
bones, spine curvature, etc36.
Belarusians also perceived clairvoyants as doctors. A. Kirkor de­
scribes one such woman from the Oshmiany district, Vilnya province: 
“Under fits of clairvoyance, she undergoes an intentional or actual strong 
convulsion, and she recognises every visitor with closed eyes, guesses 
his disease, prescribes treatment, which usually includes herbs and 
plants, and what is more, she recommends ordering some liturgies and 
services, imposes fasting and so on. For some, she gives a lecture on 
morality and gives advice to improve morality.”37
Medicine made up of three parts (warmed up wine with clay, chalk, 
pepper and a dash of butter) was the most common treatment pre­
scribed by witch doctors in the Vilnya and Grodno provinces. Herb li­
queurs were another popular treatment. In the process of treatment, 
spells were also used. For example, one young man hurt his hand 
badly in the Lida district. A witch doctors from the village of Stuchiki 
discovered that three different illnesses caused it and started treatment. 
“After sunset, she took some ears of rye, tied them together and put 
them into the hand and began pouring warm water over it, explaining 
that it was meant to pour out the hairy illness38. Then she burnt three 
splinters, and pieces of their coal were divided into three equal parts. 
After that, she took some pieces of coal from one part, brought them to 
a high temperature and started to fiddle with them over the hand, not
35 n.B. HleMH, Mamepuanb dnn u3yneHuz 6bima u n3bKa pyccKo^o 
HaceneHun Ceeepo-3a^a^Ho^o Kpan, v. III, p. 14.
36 This evidences are given by P. Shein on the grounds of A. Bogdanovi­
ch’s manuscripts, which were purchased by Shein in 80-th years of the XIX c. 
n.B. HleMH, Mamepuanb dnn u3yneHun 6bma u n3bKa pyccKo^o HaceneHun 
Ceeepo-3a^a^Ho^o Kpan, v. III, p. 251.
37 A. KupKop, ^mHo^pa$>u^ecKuü e3^nn^ Ha BuneHCKyio ^y6epHUK>, 
p. 164.
38 A disease connected with hair falling out the skin, which led to boil forma­
tion.
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touching it and whispering something. Then she threw them into the 
water and took cold pieces of coal from the second part and then from 
the third one and fiddled with them again and threw them into the water. 
According to her words, this course of treatment was to drive out the 
fiery illness.”39 Later, the woman held an appropriate rite for the third 
disease. After that, she repeated the entire course of treatment twice 
— before dawn and after sunset. As Kirkor reports, after the third rite, 
some liquid ran out of the uncovered wound, and after that, he recov­
ered completely40.
The writings of ethnographers include numerous records of restoring 
health. It must be noticed that in the process of treatment, all sorts of 
natural medicines were used. This was just another approach in healing 
epidemic diseases that caused great mortality.
Among the peasantry, one of the most dangerous diseases was 
considered to be cholera. In order to prevent it, peasants appealed to 
the Church first. If an epidemic occurred, peasants gathered money to 
order a liturgy at the local church. Then they walked across the village 
and fields carrying crosses while the church bells were ringing. If they 
did not manage to walk around the affected territory in one day, they 
resumed the procession the next day. After that, the peasants returned 
to the village, where tables covered with clean cloths with bread and 
salt on them were placed nearby in every yard. The village street was 
covered with white sackcloth, and a priest in vestment trod on it. After 
the end of the religious procession and a public prayer, all went into the 
church41
At the same time, numerous popular beliefs about other ways of 
preventing this mortal disease existed. For example, in the Grodno 
province, people believed that to avoid cholera, one should weave 
a pure flax towel and put it up at the local church before sunrise. In 
addition, consecrated crosses of untreated wood were erected at the 
crossroads.
39 Skin rash.
40 A. KupKop, ^mHo^pa$>uaecKuü e3anad Ha BuneHCKyio ay6epHuK>, 
pp. 164-165.
41 n.B. HleMH, Mamepuanbi dna u3yaeHua 6bima u a3bKa pyccKoao 
HaceneHua Ceeepo-3anaöHoao Kpaa, v. III, pp. 291-292.
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To stop an epidemic, protective circles were created. This custom 
was spread both throughout central Belarus and in Polesye. Two young, 
white oxen were chosen and harnessed to a wooden plough. A furrow 
was ploughed round the village. This procedure should be carried out 
by twins; one of them performing as the ploughman, the other as the 
ox driver. At the same time, according to a local clerk, S. Prokulevich, 
from the village of Moiseevschina (Borisov district, Minsk province), 
there was another version of this custom. It was carried out by women. 
“Young and old women gather outside the village and there, stripped 
bare, take a wooden plough and harness the youngest among them 
to it. Then, all together, singing magic songs and spells to scare off the 
epidemic, they plough a furrow round their village.”42
In addition to the means of protection described above, there were 
some 19th century rituals which could be explained only in the frame­
work of archaic and medieval stereotypes. For example, the Novogrudok 
provincial court examined a case dated August 185543. Luka Man’ko, 
a 70-year-old peasant woman from the village of Okonovichi (Novogru­
dok district, Grodno province) was buried alive together with another 
two villagers who died of cholera44. Peasants carrying people who died 
from cholera to the local cemetery accidentally met L. Man’ko. They 
“forced her to go with them and, having the prejudice that through this 
they could stop cholera, buried her with the bodies mentioned above in 
one pit prepared at the cemetery.”45 A local medical assistant, a peas­
ant named Andrey Kozakevich, was the initiator of this brutal action.
42 Given ways of withstanding cholera spreading are described by P. Shein 
and A. Serzhputovski. V: n.B. HleMH, Mamepuanb dnn u3yneHun 6bima 
u A3biKa pyccKo^o HaceneHun Ceeepo-3a^a^Ho^o Kpan, v. III, pp. 292-293; 
A. K. CepwnyroÿcKi, npbMxi i 3a6a6oHb 6enapycay-nanewyKoy, p. 292.
43 NHAB, f. 145, un. 2, f. 458, The case of accusing peasants of the village 
Okonovichy Novogrudok district in burying alive together with bodies of people 
died of cholera the peasant L. Manko with superstitious mean to stop cholera 
epidemic (1855.08.15— 1864.10.15).
44 Peasants regarded a victim woman as a cholera carrier. As A. Serzhpu­
tovski describes, it was a belief in Polesyr that cholera comes in an appear­
ance of an old woman. V.: A.K. CepwnyroÿcKi, npbMxi i 3a6a6oHb 6enapycay- 
-nanewyKoy, p. 291.
45 NHAB, f. 145, un. 2, f. 458, p. 16.
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He pushed Man’ko into the pit and started filling it up with earth46. His 
behaviour was based on the conviction that in such a way, it would be 
possible to prevent the further spread of the ailment47. In some regions 
of Belarus, in the Borisov district of the Minsk province (village of Moi- 
seevschina) in particular, another variant of this ritual was widely prac­
ticed. People buried a black cock dressed in items of men’s clothing48. 
At the same time, in Polesye, there was a belief that the first man who 
fell ill with cholera had to be buried alive49.
There are records of some more archaic rites in Bealrus. On August 
9, 1848, peasants from Big Zhukhovichy (Novogrudok district, Grodno 
province) hollowed out the grave of the peasant Yustina Yushkova, who 
died of cholera in July, in order to stop the epidemic50. Rubtsov, the lo­
cal retired medical attendant, tried to convince the people that she “who 
died first, being pregnant, and who lived a dissolute life” was the cause 
of spreading the epidemic. He encouraged the peasants to exhume the 
dead woman and to examine the position of her unborn baby and to 
check if her mouth was opened51. Volunteers hollowed out the grave, 
took the body out, cut the belly of the dead woman open with a scythe 
to examine the baby, and after sticking an aspen stake into her open 
mouth, buried her again52. After that, they expected the epidemic to 
cease.
According to Law Code, peasants guilty of exhumation might be de­
prived of all rights, punished by 10-20 lashes from a whip and exiled 
to Siberia53. But instead, taking into account their sincere confession, 
delusions and the medical assistant Rubtsov’s instigations, 90-year-old 
Nikita Gireyko was banished into a monastery for one year, and the 
other 11 peasants were punished with 10-16 lashes54.
46 Ibidem, p. 75.
47 Ibidem, p. 12.
48 n.B. HleMH, Mamepuanbi dnn u3yneHun 6bima u n3bKa pyccKo^o 
HaceneHun Ceeepo-3a^a^Ho^o Kpan, v. III, p. 293.
49 A.K. CepwnyroÿcKi, npbiMxi i 3a6a6oHb 6enapycaÿ-naneuiyKoÿ, p. 292.
50 NHAB, f. 145, un. 2, f. 311, p. 13.
51 Ibidem, p. 15.
52 Ibidem, p. 13, 16.
53 Ibidem, p. 17.
54 Ibidem, pp. 17-19.
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Feasts and celebrations were a very important component of peas­
ant life. These celebrations were closely connected with Christian tradi­
tions. In addition, in spite of growing scepticism towards religious is­
sues in the 19th century, breaking feast rituals was regarded as the 
greatest sin among the peasantry. Annual rituals were a cornerstone 
of the traditional philosophy of life and supported its continuity. Those 
peasants who worked on festive days, especially during Christian cele­
brations, were blamed for breaking the rules. In the Vilnya, Grodno and 
Minsk provinces, beliefs about turning those who worked on holidays 
into stone were widely spread. As one legend says, one can see such 
stones near the Kurzhenets borough by Vileyka, in the Iosifovo estate, 
Lida district, outside the Smorgon borough in the Oshmiany district. In 
a Lozovichy farm near Nesvizh (Slutsk district), there are three giant 
stones. One of them resembles a statue and is perceived as a plough­
man who decided to plough at Christmas, whilst two others represent 
the oxen helping him to do it55.
In the 19th century, some important changes concerning attitudes 
towards Christian churches occurred. Court documents include numer­
ous records of church robberies. These robberies were committed by 
representatives of different social groups (peasants, nobility, clergymen) 
and by different churches (Uniate, Catholic and Orthodox). For exam­
ple, in 1835, Josef Elyashevich, a 27-year-old deacon, was accused 
of the theft of different things from a Uniate church in the Tumilovichy 
borough (Borisov district, Minsk province). Being in the service in this 
church, Elyashevich stole some pieces of fabric from donations. As the 
deacon explained himself, this crime was committed because of com­
plete poverty. I and family for shirts and other household needs” used 
the stolen fabric.56 In 1838, Klementy Bogdanovich, an 18-year-old 
peasant, took nearly five pounds of wax from the Uniate church in the 
village of Podyevichy (Igumen district, Minsk province)57.
Concepts of innocence and virginity played an important role in tra­
ditional peasant life. According to A. Kirkor’s observations, peasants of 
the Vilnya province endowed these qualities with an aura of holiness.
55 A. KupKop, ^mHo^pa$>u^ecKuü e3annd Ha BuneHcKyio aydepHuv, 
pp. 179-180.
56 NHAB, f. 145, un. 2, f. 97, p. 24.
57 NHAB, f. 145, un. 2, f. 143, p. 37.
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They believed that an innocent girl coming into a husband’s house 
brought God’s blessing with herself. Belarusians perceived chastity as 
a token of further prosperity and happiness. Opposite to this, a girl who 
had transgressed before marriage became the object of everybody’s 
condemnation. She received severe treatment from her mother-in-law, 
husband’s sisters and other female kin. Such a wife could not be helped 
by fortune that is more significant or by her husband’s intercession. 
There was a belief that by being a wife, she would not bring happiness 
and peace to the husband’s house. On the contrary, strife and all sorts 
of troubles will come with her to the new family. To a certain degree, 
these circumstances influenced changes of wedding rituals for such 
girls. In particular, it was forbidden to sing many traditional festive songs 
that were the basis of a wedding ceremony at such weddings58.
The perception of morality in the countryside, as well as in urban 
areas, conformed to the norms of Christianity and, to a certain degree, 
with traditional stereotypes. This meant that the Church was a guardian 
of moral norms and values, responsible for due punishment to those 
who broke the norms. A community’s censure also played an important 
role in this context.
Women having illegitimate children were objects of severe hostil­
ity in communities. P. Shein described an incident that happened in 
1847 in Lash (Vilnya province). A local priest put “ ...a wreath plaited 
from pea straw with a tail 21 feet long twisted together” on the head of 
a peasant woman who gave birth to an illegitimate child and “... ordered 
her to walk three times round the church and then to fasten herself to 
a t r e e . ” The girl was kept for three hours in such a position59. The 
ethnographer emphasises that such punishments were widely used by 
priests in the Vilnya region. However, even after punishment, the sinner 
could not regain her lost position.
This attitude to sinners led to serious consequences. Minsk Criminal 
Chamber archives dating from 1831 to 1867 provide solid proof of this. 
From 134 files of a second inventory of the find mentioned above, more 
than 125 files are connected with different forms of the brutal treatment
58 A. KupKop, ^mHo^pa$>u^ecKuü e3^nn^ Ha BuneHCKyio ^y6epHUK>, 
p. 149.
59 n.B. HleMH, Mamepuanb dnn u3yneHun 6bma u n3bKa pyccKo^o 
HaceneHun Ceeepo-3a^a^Ho^o Kpan, v. III, pp. 90-91.
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of those with illegitimate children60. It should be noticed that such an at­
titude to those with illegitimate children did not depend on the woman’s 
social status. One can encounter here cases of average citizens, nobil­
ity and peasants. Women were even not afraid of further punishment 
that provided for this kind of crime whipping followed by exile to hard 
labour61.
There are many examples proving that economic reasons or strict 
legislation were not the major reasons for the severe treatment of the 
illegitimate children, but the fear of losing one’s social status and every­
body’s condemnation. For example, Matryena Karaseva, a 35-year-old 
Orthodox widowed peasant from the village of Karasi (Disna district, 
Minsk province) did not regard her behaviour as something beyond cer­
tain bounds. However, she took up the act of pregnancy and the birth 
of an illegitimate child in an absolutely different manner. As the peasant 
explained herself, “being ashamed of what her neighbours and all the 
members of her family might think”, she gave birth to the baby in a cow­
shed secretly and then hid the baby in straw62.
A feeling of shame and fear of persecution from brother’s side made 
Felitsiana Lunkevich, a 20-year-old noblewoman from the town of Vilei- 
ka (Minsk province) conceal her pregnancy, and, after giving birth to 
a stillborn child, hide him in a cellar63. Eva Martinovich, a Catholic re­
cruit’s wife from Petrovichi (Vileika district, Minsk province) was guided 
by similar motives. Having an extramarital affair with a local peasant, 
she gave birth to a child. But being afraid of everybody’s condemnation, 
she hid him by a riverbank64.
The description of the main spheres of a Belarusian peasant’s life 
in the 19th century presented above, based on ethnographers’ records 
and courts proceedings, shows in what ways people consciously main­
tained patriarchal beliefs. The traditional consciousness of Belarusian 
peasants in the 19th century remained within the bounds of medieval 
stereotypes and beliefs in miracles, omens and symbolism and acted 
as a kind of resistance to the novelties of the surrounding world brought
60 NHAB, f. 145, un. 2.
61 NHAB, f. 145, un. 2, f. 204, pp. 2-3.
62 NHAB, f. 145, un. 2, f. 205, p. 2.
63 This case took place in April 1838. v.: NHAB, f. 145, un. 2, f. 134, p. 83.
64 NHAB, f. 145, un. 2, f. 204, pp. 5-9.
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about by the new epoch. Traditional ways of life and thinking, which had 
been created and maintained by the lower classes throughout the cen­
turies, were based on traditional conventions and served as a shield 
protecting the peasant from the greatest evil that could catch up them.
In the 19th century, peasants’ (especially Orthodox peasants’) per­
ceptions of the world were based on a combination of interweaving 
and confronting pagan and Christian stereotypes. A peasant’s attitude 
towards faith and holiness was ambivalent. On the one hand, a Chris­
tian outlook and values constituted the main moral imperative of a Be­
larusian peasant’s life. On the other hand, one could frequently observe 
cases of a disrespectful attitude towards saints in peasant communi­
ties. The existence of numerous fairy tales where saints were accused 
of theft and other crimes is further proof of this.
Życie codzienne w XIX wieku. Przypadek białoruski
Konsekwencją zmian w historiografii białoruskiej, które dokonały się 
u progu lat 90-tych XX wieku, był wzrost zainteresowania historią życia 
codziennego. W ramach przeżywającej odrodzenie narodowej szkoły 
historycznej, historia codzienności uważana była za jedną z najbardziej 
obiecujących metod badawczych. Tym samym do rangi istotnego za­
gadnienia urósł problem życia chłopów w XIX wieku, w tym wartości 
determinujących jego codzienne wybory, miejsca dziecka we wspólno­
cie czy metod dyscyplinowania i karania. Prezentowany artykuł kon­
centruje się na stosunku chłopów do wiary, świętości i magii, dowodząc 
ambiwalentnego stosunku mieszkańców wsi białoruskich do sacrum. 
Badania takie wymagają znacznego rozszerzenia bazy źródłowej. Au­
torka wykorzystała przede wszystkim archiwalia instytucji sądowych ist­
niejących na Białorusi w XIX wieku, koncentrując swą uwagę na spra­
wach kryminalnych.
Das Alltagsleben im 19. Jahrhundert. Der weißrussische Fall
Die Folge der Veränderungen in der weißrussischen Historiografie, die 
sich an der Schwelle der 90er Jahre des 20. Jahrhunderts vollzogen 
haben, war das steigende Interesse an der Geschichte des Alltagsle­
bens. Im Rahmen der sich wiederbelebenden historischen National­
schule galt die Alltagsgeschichte als eine der vielversprechendsten
Forschungsmethoden. Zu einer bedeutenden Frage wurde somit das 
Leben der Bauern im 19. Jahrhundert und insbesondere die Werte, die 
ihre alltäglichen Entscheidungen determiniert haben, die Stellung der 
Kinder in der Gemeinschaft, die Strafmethoden und die Disziplin. Die 
Autorin dieses Artikels konzentriert sich auf das Verhältnis der Bauern 
zu dem Glauben, der Heiligkeit und der Magie und beweist das ambiva­
lente Verhältnis der Dorfbewohner zum Sacrum. Solche Forschungen 
verlangen eine erhebliche Erweiterung der Quellenbasis. Die Autorin 
benutzte vor allem die Archivalien unterschiedlicher Gerichtsinstitutio­
nen im 19. Jahrhundert in Weißrussland und legt den Fokus auf Krimi­
nalfälle.
Heidi Hein-Kircher
The influence of political myth on historical 
consciousness and identity as factors of mentality
In the 1980s an ‘old’ hero had his ‘revival’ within Polish society: the 
former leader of the authoritarian ‘Sanacja-regime’ in the interwar pe­
riod, Marshal Józef Piłsudski, was used as an instrument of opposition 
by the Solidarność because he was seen not only as the builder of the 
democratic Polish republic after 1918, but also as the hero who defeat­
ed the Soviet-Russian army in 1920. Both interpretations are a result 
of the myth of Piłsudski, which survived in Polish society after World 
War II and which presents even today his way of acting as democratic 
and anti-Russian. After the fall of the communist regime in 1989, it was 
the medium to build up a „new” Polish identity. This is a result of the 
„elastic” way a myth interprets history and influences identity. Therefore 
political myths have impact on mentality.
To show how political myths influence societies, I will firstly define 
mentality, identity, and (historical) memory resp. consciousness. Then 
I can define political myths and show how they are spread and which 
concrete functions they have for a society. These reflections on po­
litical myths, especially on their functions, are based for the most part 
on the theoretical considerations of Benedict Anderson’s „imagined 
communities”1, Eric Hobsbawm’s and Terence Ranger’s „invention of
1 B. Anderson, Die Erfindung der Nation. Zur Karriere eines folgenreichen 
Konzepts, Frankfurt a.M., New York 1996.
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tradition”2 as well as Jan3 and Aleida4 Assmann’s studies on cultural 
memory, whereby the literature about political symbols and rituals as 
well as political cults helps us to consider the forms of communicating 
myths and their forms of expression. Finally I include my own studies on 
political myths5 — especially the Piłsudski-cult6 and the myth of Poland 
as antemurale christianitatis7.
1. Mentality  —  identity  —  (historical) memory  
Mentality is on the one hand defined by the dominating conceived ideas 
and mental structure of an epoch. On the other hand, it includes psy­
chological factors, the unconscious and semi-conscious motives that 
have impacts on social patterns of action and cultural modes of expres­
sion. It is thus a „heterogeneous ensemble of cognitive and intellectual
2 The Invention of Tradition, ed. by E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, Cam­
bridge 2003.
3 J. Assmann, Das kulturelle Gedächtnis. Schrift, Erinnerung und politi­
sche Identität in frühen Hochkulturen, München 1997.
4 A. Assmann, Funktionsgedächtnis und Speichergedächtnis — zwei Modi 
der Erinnerung, in: Generation und Gedächtnis. Erinnerungen und kollektive 
Identitäten, ed. by K. Platt, M. Dabag, Opladen 1995, pp. 169-185.
5 H. Hein-Kircher, Überlegungen zu einer Typologisierung von politischen 
Mythen aus historiographischer Perspektive — ein Versuch, in: Politische 
Mythen. Perspektiven historischer Mythosforschung, ed. H. Henning Hahn, 
H. Hein, Marburg 2006, pp. 407-426; H. Hein, Historische Mythos- und Kult­
forschung. Thesen zur Definition, Vermittlung, Inhalten und Funktionen von 
historischen Mythen und Kulten, „Mythos“ 2 (2006), pp. 30-45; Bibliography: 
H. Hein (with K. Ludwig): Texte zu politischen Mythen in Europa. Eine Bibliogra­
phie zur historisch-politischen Mythosforschung 1994-2004, „Mythos“ 2 (2006), 
pp. 227-230.
6 H. Hein, Der Piłsudki-Kult und seine politische Bedeutung für den pol­
nischen Staat 1926-1939, Marburg 2002; H. Hein, Freiheitsheld und Symbol­
figur: Der Piłsudski-Kult als Mittel nationaler Identitäts- und Bewusstseinsbil­
dung, „Zeitenblicke” 3, 1(2004), http://zeitenblicke.historicum.net/2004/01/hein/ 
index.html (1.10.2006).
7 E.g. H. Hein-Kircher, Antemurale christianitatis. Grenzsituation als 
Selbstverständnis, in: Grenzen. Gesellschaftliche Konstitutionen und Transfi­
gurationen, ed. by Hans Hecker, Essen 2006, pp. 129-148.
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disposals, patterns of thinking (Denkmuster) and ways of feeling, from 
which the partially unconscious collective ideas of a society derive”8.
Human (and by this: social) thinking and perception are „construct­
ed”, i.e. selective and „imprinted”, because each human (and social) 
experience is determined by experiences before, by socialisation etc. 
That means each personal experience is socially influenced and vice 
versa that experiences of a group are influenced by its members.9 
Shortly: The detection of reality, i.e. the interpretation of „reality”, is so­
cially constructed.
Personal identity bases on active psychical synthesising and inte­
grating performances, through which this person tries to ensure conti­
nuity and coherence of his/her life-experiences. In contrast, „collective 
identity” is an image, a metaphor. According to Jan Assmann, collective 
identity is an imaginary magnitude, a social construction, but it belongs 
also to reality. „Collective” or „we”-identity is understood as the image, 
which a group builds up of itself and with which its members identify 
themselves. Therefore, collective identity always bases on the individ­
ual consciousness of social belonging, so that this term describes the 
idea of a person of its own similarity or equality with regard to the other 
members of its group.
One of the most important parts of personal and collective identity 
is historical memory resp. consciousness. Historical consciousness de­
scribes the relations to the past from a selectively interpreted point of 
view, because each form of remembrance doesn’t retrieve definitely 
saved information, but bases on a reconstructive action influenced by 
actual premises.10 Historical consciousness doesn’t reflect the „pure” 
facts, but it shows how a person which is a member of a particular 
society, and its society, interpret historical facts after their needs and 
values. Historical consciousness focuses on that what is said to be im-
8 A. Simonis, Mentalität, in: Metzler Lexikon Literatur- und Kulturtheorie. 
Ansätze — Personen — Grundbegriffe, ed. by A. Nünning, Stuttgart/Weimar 
2001, pp. 422-423.
9 M. Berek, Selbstverständliche Mythen — Das Problem, von wahren oder 
falschen Erinnerungen zu sprechen, „Politische Psychologie“ (in preparation).
10 M. Berek, p. 2.
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portant for the community, for example a founding act of a state, a won 
or lost war. It does not contain only one event, but more occurrences 
whose interpretation is built up to an hierarchical relationship. Both, his­
torical consciousnesses and collective identity are negotiated within the 
group. They are therefore discursive formations, which one can appeal 
to and/or influence. That means, that culture of remembrance (Erin­
nerungskultur) is always politics of remembrance.
2. Political myths
These discursive formations are particularly built up by political myths. 
„Myth” as an analytical category can be seen as a sense-giving narra­
tion, which explains unknown or hardly explicable events or facts by 
things easily understood. Therefore a myth is a cognitive frame of ref­
erence, because mythical thinking bases on an aprioristic premise. By 
this, religious and political myths are similar and differ in regard to the 
claims and range. A religious myth has transcendent aims, while a po­
litical myth should give a society its present orientations.11
Political myths are narrations dealing with political and social events 
or personalities within a society, but they explain present times by re­
course to the past and give them a special connotation. These are 
„mythically read”12 — the events or actions are interpreted in a selec­
tive and stereotypical way. Therefore a particular event is given a spe­
cial significance — some facts are overestimated, while others are ne­
glected. This particular event is thus glorified. The political myth implies 
thus an „exhibition of achievements”, a „show of an excellent perform­
ance” of the society as well as the repertory of myths in a society which 
can be seen as a „gallery of heroic actions” or as a „gallery of heroes”. 
It is a master narrative of a communio.
Therefore one can define a political myth as „an ideologically marked 
narrative which purports to give a true account of a set of past, present,
11 Y. Bizeul, Theorien der politischen Mythen, in: Politische Mythen und 
Rituale in Deutschland, Frankreich und Polen, Berlin 2000, p. 17 and Y Bizeul: 
Politische Mythen, in: Politische Mythen im 19. und 20. Jh. In Mittel- und Osteu­
ropa, ed. by H. Hein-Kircher, H.H. Hahn, Marburg 2006, pp. 3-16.
12 J. Pouillon, Die mythische Funktion, in: Mythos ohne Illusion, ed. by 
Claude Lévi-Strauss u.a., Frankfurt a.M. 1984, pp. 68-83, speaks of a „mythi­
cal version of reality” (p. 69).
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or predicted political events and which is accepted as valid in its essen­
tials by a social group.”13 In other words: „It is a story about occurrences 
of the past which give these occurrences a special meaning for the 
present and thus increase the importance of the ruling people.”14A politi­
cal myth is therefore a product of certain political ideas. It is historical 
and changeable15 through its semantic structure, from which are derived 
different kinds of interpretations, in which a political myth functions.16
This is of importance especially regarding different contexts and 
conditions of a certain society, in which it often changes its function. By 
idealising historical events and/or personalities, a political myth is based 
on an „invented” collective memory. The repertoire of myths within a so­
ciety is therefore the memory of this society, because it only deals with 
that which is of importance for the society. Thus they are special forms 
of lieux de mémoire17. It is build up by emotionally rousing narratives or 
images, which should confess to and which represent the basic values, 
ideas and ideals of the society.
3. Contents o f political myths
If we compare the content of political myths, it is easy to find parallels or 
similarities in motives and narration. Mythical narrations follow certain 
patterns, whose specific content is dependent on the historical, soci­
etal, political and cultural context.
It must be added that a repertoire of myths within a society consists 
of a lot of political myths which could also be composed of „small myths” 
(mythemes). Myths of a society could be narrated alone, but they could 
also complete and enforce themselves. The whole repertoire exists
13 C. Flood, Political Myth. A theoretical Introduction, New York/London 
1996, p. 44.
14 A. Dörner, Politischer Mythos und symbolische Politik. Sinnstiftung durch 
symbolische Formen am Beispiel des Hermannmythos, Opladen 1995, p. 23.
15 H. Blumenberg, Arbeit am Mythos, Frankfurt a.M. 1996.
16 F. Becker, Begriff und Bedeutung des politischen Mythos, in: Was heißt
Kulturgeschichte des Politischen?, ed. by B. Stollberg-Rilinger, Berlin 2005, pp. 
129-148. As to modern theories of political myths see e.g. the anthology: Texte 
zur modernen Mythentheorie, ed. by W. Barner, Stuttgart 2003.
17To the sites of memory: P. Nora, Les lieux de mémoire, 7 vols., Paris
1984-1992.
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mostly virulently and can be activated when it is necessary for a soci­
ety. Often, these myths form a „mosaic”, by which it is possible to find 
different nuances of interpretations and certain functions are stressed. 
Mostly, political myths function complementarily; one myth replenishes 
the other.
Here I must anticipate that myths have as the primary function to 
give orientation and to explain what the members of a society are, from 
where this society comes and so on. Thus a political myth refers to 
political acts, events, institutions or to the order of the society. That is 
why you can describe the contents of political myths according to their 
subjects: there are myth of events, space, time, and last but not least 
of personalities.
A myth of personality deals with heroes and leading persons, with 
collective heroes as the fallen soldiers for the country and also with 
legendary, imagined persons like „Marianne” in France. The most im­
portant form is the myth of living or dead personalities, which personal­
ises history because the worshipped person is meant to „make history”. 
Therefore the personality myth focuses only on this person, the hero: 
no other (competing) person has the chance to be seen as him. By this, 
it creates a historical (mostly fictitious) continuity and tradition, by which 
the past and present are idealised and the historical development is 
sharpened to the worshipped „hero”, which developed — after the myth 
— the society further in the sense of the ruling elites. The idealised per­
sons are mostly interpreted as state-founders or political leaders, they 
are worshipped as leaders, teachers or father of the society — they 
are becoming the ideal of the society or state. Collectives of persons 
are mostly seen when they are helped by a „sacrifice” or martyrdom to 
go further on to ideological goals. In this sense, you can see a myth of 
institution as a myth of a collective, like the myth of the „party” such as 
the NSDAP or the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, which person­
alises the institution.
Generally, each event or act can be mythically interpreted. But in 
particular battles or revolutions as events are subjects of myths, be­
cause they are an „exhibition of an exceptional society’s achievements”. 
These events are seen as historical ruptures or climaxes, with a martial 
and/or heroic character. Mostly, they are connected with hero-myths.
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Myths of space describe and define territories, which are of impor­
tance for the society. You can find them where own territory must be 
defined or where it is claimed, must be justified or defended. The own 
territory is sanctified by them, and the myths of space help to imagine 
it.18 They deal therefore with disputed regions or frontiers and help to 
define the territory of a communio, i.e. as a rule a state. Another but 
less important content is time. Time-myths deal with a „golden age” — 
this epoch is interpreted as constitutive for society and as an especially 
important, intensive and ex post as an ideal development in the sense 
of the „show of achievements”.
Under another perspective you can differentiate the myths by the 
„story”:
Nearly all myths are founding-myths, myths of origin; they are so 
to say, the basic story of a myth. They explain the creation and devel­
opment of the society which uses them. They deal with the origin of 
a society, epoch or territory. There are myths of glory on the one hand, 
on the other myths of sacrifice, of certification19 and of loss, too. But 
they all have in common, they explain what is of importance for society, 
because they all describe an especially interpreted or overestimated 
historical performance. In particular in small nations you can find myths 
of sacrifice: but this sacrifice has to be seen in the way, that the sacrifice 
helps to defend or save not only its own communio.
In another perspective, you can analyse the message of political 
myths. They stage a great success, but can also stage a catharsis or
18 In analogy to Hobsbawm „invention of territory”: P. Haslinger/K. Holz, 
Selbstbild und Territorium. Dimensionen von Identität und Alterität, in: Re­
gionale und nationale Identitäten. Wechselwirkungen und Spannungsfelder 
im Zeitalter moderner Staatlichkeit, ed. by P. Haslinger, K. Holz, Würzburg 
2000, pp. 15-40; H. Hein, Region jako punkt wyjścia do badań nad kwestiami 
narodowymi. Znaczenie mitów, symboli i kultów, in: Górny Slask wyobrażony: 
wokół mitów, symboli i bohaterów dyskursów narodowych/Imaginiertes Ober­
schlesien: Mythen, Symbole und Helden in den nationalen Diskursen, ed. by 
B. Linek, J. Haubold-Stolle, Opole, Marburg 2005, pp. 36-51.
19 D. Langewiesche, Krieg im Mythenarsenal europäischer Nationen und 
der USA. Überlegungen zur Wirkungsmacht politischer Mythen, in: Der Krieg in 
den Gründungsmythen europäischer Nationen und der USA, ed. by N. Busch­
mann, D. Langewiesche, Frankfurt a.M. 2003, pp. 13-22.
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a martyrdom of a society. Negative events are valued positively be­
cause these events enforce society. This perspective shows as well 
as the others that political myths are a „master narration” of a society: 
a myth deals with heroic interpreted events or persons. This includes, 
that a myth can only be „successful” when it deals with the own past 
and that thy myth is anchored in the collective memory. It is thus impor­
tant that the specific „ingredients” of a myth are known by the people
— without this knowledge a myth couldn’t be received. The „functional 
memory” (Funktionsgedächtnis20), which is responsible for (selective) 
perceptions and remembrance, must be constantly renewed by differ­
ent media and forms of communication.
4. Forms o f communication: political rituals —  political symbols
—  political cults
As instruments to mobilise the masses21, it is necessary that the me­
dia of communication are in the hand of the „inventors”, carriers and 
supporters of the myth. Only then can it be communicated and can it 
be granted that the „message” with its intended political aims is com­
municated. The political rulers are therefore the main carriers of it „from 
above”. This shows that myths are an object of politics, that their power 
of definition and of interpretation is used to foreground their kind of ex­
plaining history while others are neglected.
The mythical narration must be communicated, but in a „discrete”, 
subtle way. The audience should not be aware of being told a „story” 
or a „myth”, but the „truth”. Therefore the forms of communication can 
also be seen as forms of expression. Different forms of arts (literature, 
theatre, fine arts) can be used as well as history (historiography) and 
schoolbooks to transport the mythical narration. Moreover, one must 
appeal to the emotions of the „audience” by the myth, because it is also 
important that the myth is „lived”, emotionally experienced, by which the 
audience is more often impressed than by the story itself.
20 A. Assmann, Funktionsgedächtnis und Speichergedächtnis — zwei Modi 
der Erinnerung, in: Generation und Gedächtnis. Erinnerungen und kollektive 
Identitäten, ed. by K. Platt, M. Dabag, Opladen 1995, pp. 169-185.
21 G.L. Mosse, The Nationalisation of the Masses. Political Symbolism and 
Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third 
Reich, Ithaca-London 1996.
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Political myths are communicated through narration, visualisation 
and ritualisation, which guarantee the communicative practice. Com­
monly various media spread the narration, because it must reach all 
groups of society. Without the knowledge about the mythical narration, 
without its anchoring within society, the myth couldn’t be understood. 
Typical media are: historiography, popular-scientific books like biogra­
phies, schoolbooks, as well as other print media, film, theatre, music, 
which tell the story. These media adapt the myth for their „audience”: 
for example a historical book or journal for children adapts the story in 
a different way than a book for adults.
Political symbols a visualisation o f a myth 
The visualisation of a myth is not only reached by the fine arts, but in 
particular by political symbols which represent the dominating topics of 
the cultural remembrance. They paraphrase the myth in a non-verbal 
way and can be seen as „building-bricks of the myth„22, as they ad­
dress people’s emotional level of comprehension. Flags and hymns 
are „classical,, political symbols, but also slogans such as „Unity of the 
working class„, names of towns as Stalingrad, Karl-Marx-Stadt or Wash­
ington and also historical dates and events as „3rd May„ (in Poland) or 
„14th July” (in France). Symbol carriers such as currency and stamps, 
street names, the naming of institutions etc. are of importance for the 
mythical narration. They form a kind of „poly-system„23, i.e. a canon of 
symbols in society, which plays a definite part in the ideological system. 
All political symbols are instruments of propaganda in all political ide­
ologies and regimes, as they have an effect on the broad public and be­
cause they make the prevailing ideology an inherent part of public life.
Monuments and memorials as special forms of political symbols can 
be experienced visually and which play an important role as centres of 
remembrance. A monument dignifies the persons, deeds and events 
connected to the past. It „describes” the mythical narration and its legacy 
is revived through celebrations in front of the memorial. It visualises the 
myth by offering a compressed, symbolic abstraction of interpretations
22 F.W. Doucet, Im Banne des Mythos, Gütersloh 1982, p. 94.
23 M. Azaryahu, Vom Wilhelmplatz zum Thälmannplatz. Politische Symbole 
im öffentlichen Leben der DDR, Gerlingen 1991, p. 43.
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in the sense of the myth. Through its message a monument reveals the 
historical self-conception of society. A monument is therefore a symbol 
constituting an „imagined community,,, a society. It conveys „made-up„, 
„invented,, traditions and immanent principles of organisation, moreover 
it reflects the intention of its creators through its semantic and formal 
design and it demonstrates their political predominance and their ambi­
tion to be the power defining politics.24
Political rituals as a nonverbal glossing over o f a myth 
The myth is however glossed over by political rituals, i.e. political cel­
ebrations25 like anniversaries of historical events, deaths or birthdays 
of important persons, or exceptional rituals like funerals. They replenish 
a myth as symbolic action in a non-verbal form and „paraphrase,,26 it in 
an action, which can be „understood as a story at the same time, which 
explains the rite„27, as rituals depict a factual connection in a very con­
centrated and interpreting, non-verbal way. Political rituals have to be 
experienced in an emotional way because their task is to integrate the 
participants into the communio28.
The public thus has to be integrated by the participation of schools, 
the military, business enterprises and social associations, since mass 
character is an important feature of political celebrations. They have to
24 C. Tacke, Denkmal im sozialen Raum. Nationale Symbole in Deutschland 
und Frankreich im 19. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 1995; Hein, Der Piłsudski-Kult, 
pp. 178-180.
25 H. Hein, Rola kultu Piłsudskiego w kształtowaniu świadomości narodowej 
w Drugiej Rzeczpospoplitej na przykładzie uroczystości pogrzebowych oraz 
obchodów kolejnych rocznic śmierci, in: Naród, Kultura, Tożsamość. Między 
koniecznościa a wyborem, ed. by W. Burszta, K. Jaskułowski,Warszawa 2005, 
pp. 315-332.
26 H. Blumenberg, Wirklichkeitsbegriff und Wirkungspotential des Mythos, 
in: Terror und Spiel. Probleme der Mythenrezeption, ed. by M. Fuhrmann, Mün­
chen 1971, p. 35.
27 S. Behrenbeck, Der Kult um die toten Helden. Nationalsozialistische My­
then, Riten und Symbole, Vierow 1996.
28 See K. Weis, Ritual, in: Grundbegriffe der Soziologie, ed. by Bernhard 
Schäfers, Opladen 1998, pp. 286-290; K.H. Schreiner, Tote — Helden — Ah­
nen. Die rituelle Konstruktion der Nation, „Historische Anthropologie“ 9 (2009), 
pp. 54-77, Hein, Piłsudski-Kult, pp. 214-266.
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be planned very precisely, because they are special moments in the 
live of the public. In order to have a long-lasting effect, the celebrations 
are accompanied by recordings on film, articles in newspapers and 
commemorative publications or similar publications29. The following 
can be observed as characteristics: a great public interest with a high 
demand for mobilisation, a prayer or motto accompanying the celebra­
tion, a speech stating the objectives of the celebration, parades or pro­
cessions respectively, music and singing, guaranteeing a standardised 
course of events. This event takes place mostly all over the country. 
In this way a repetition of rites and traditions is established. Therefore 
political celebrations as mass meetings obtain a characteristical form 
of mobilisation, i.e. a declaration of belief in the group, nation and/or 
state. Loyalties are revealed by participation, consensus is founded on 
a long-termed basis and ritually acclaimed; at the same time the digni­
taries and organisers can communicate their long-term goals and their 
policy towards the population, which helps the leaders to demonstrate 
their claim to leadership. The speeches and other comments are to 
convey a positive outlook on the future and a collective consciousness 
regarding the social affiliation of the participants. Therefore they serve 
as a form of self-assurance and self-identification. If one understands 
a political celebration, which is also a ritual, as a non-verbal paraphrase 
of a myth in a symbolic action, a celebration can be considered as 
„a place of charismatic correlation„30.
29 D. Düding, Einleitung. Politische Öffentlichkeit, politisches Fest, poli­
tische Kultur, in: Öffentliche Festkultur. Politische Feste in Deutschland von 
der Aufklärung bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg, ed. by D. Düding, Hamburg 1998, 
pp. 10-24, here 15.
30 W. Freitag, Der Führermythos im Fest. Festfeuerwerk, NS-Liturgie, Dis­
sens und „100%-KdF-Stimmung„, in: Das Dritte Reich im Fest. Führermythos, 
Feierlaune und Verweigerung in Westfahlen 1933-1945, ed. by W. Freitag, Bie­
lefeld 1997, pp. 11-78, here 6.
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Political cults as social praxis o f a myth31
„Political cult” stands for a politically motivated, secular but strongly ritu­
alised worship of personalities, not so much for the worship of events, 
institutions or objects, whereas the precise form of conveyance and ex­
pression phenomenologically matches religious cults. That is why per­
sonality cults are based on an uncritical overestimation regarding the 
achievements and the role of a personality in history, creating an image 
of the person as the only influential power during his rule.
A political cult can thus be seen as a practical dimension of a myth, 
which has been transformed into an extensive communicative and so­
cial practice,32 in particular because a cult is necessarily institutional­
ised. Therefore it is a typical instrument for mobilisation of the masses. 
And vice versa: the myth is the „basis in regard to the content” of a cult, 
because it interprets the achievements of the cult-object in a very selec­
tive and one-sided way.
The specific effectiveness of a political cult satisfies the emotional 
and social wants of the society, as well as giving that society a form 
of orientation and identity using a pseudo-religious vocabulary. Never­
theless it cannot automatically be seen as a substitute for religion, as 
religion can still play an important role in spite of complex processes of 
secularisation.33
A political cult comprises myths, rituals and symbols, which — acting 
in combination — are elementary components of political cults, both in 
regard to content and function. They are both forms of expression and 
of conveyance at the same time. The degree of their distinction does 
not solely depend on that of the cult, but they depend on each other,
31 H. Hein: Historische Kultforschung, in: Digitales Handbuch zur Geschich­
te und Kultur Russlands und Osteuropas. Themen und Methoden, www.vifaost. 
de/geschichte/handbuch (1.10.2006).
32 See H. Hein, Historische Mythosforschung als Beitrag zur Erforschung 
von Identitäten und Ideologien, in Methoden der Osteuropäischen Geschichte. 
Ein Handbuch, www.vifaost.de/geschichte/handbuch (1.10.2006); K. Meyer, 
Mythos und Monument. Die Sprache der Denkmäler im Gründungsmythos des 
italienischen Nationalstaates 1870-1915, Köln, 2004, pp. 18-25.
33 B. Ennker, Die Anfänge des Leninkultes in der Sowjetunion, Köln et al. 
1997, p. 17.
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too: they build a net-work or a system or interwoven structure of ele­
ments of interpretation which makes up the cult itself.
In all political cults the worshipped character appears as a charis­
matic person. If the person is still living, their governmental power be­
longs, according to Max Weber34, to the three ideal types of legitimate 
rule. The characterisation of a cult from the 1920s is still symptomatic: 
„It depends on how much attention the public spends on the person, 
the public is not led by the Great Man but towards him!”35 That is why 
the image of the leader has to be defined very precisely as one needs 
this kind of image. This can only happen by creating and propagating 
a certain image of the charismatic person, a myth of the worshipped 
person.
It is of importance that this instrument does not only occur once, 
but that it returns on a regular basis and takes influence on the popula­
tion: Political cults are designed to get the population in the right mood 
and to conditionise them on the ideals conveyed by the cult, i.e. by the 
mythical narration which is the basis of the cult. Political cults can thus 
only develop their specific effectiveness if myths, ritual and symbols act 
in combination and if they are repeated and institutionalised.
If worship is to be accepted by society, the precondition is that the 
question of power is clarified, i.e. the promoters and supporters of the 
cult have the adequate means of power to establish the cult in the soci­
ety. In order to be wholly accepted the personality cult has to be totally 
embedded in the tradition of the nation and its society. Therefore a po­
litical cult always follows an „invented political myth„36 which orientates 
itself towards the social group for which it is invented.37 Political cults 
therefore can be seen as a culture of interpretation, as an instrument to 
interpret and to communicate conditions of society.
34 M. Weber, Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft, in: M. Weber, 
Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, Tübingen 1988, pp. 475-488, 
see also T. Biernat, Legitymizacja władzy politycznej. Elementy teorii, Toruń 
1999.
35 T. Geiger, Führer und Genie, „Kölner Vierteljahreshefte für Soziologie“ 6 
(1926/27), p. 244.
36 B. Ennker, Anfänge, p. 8.
37 M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriß der verstehenden So­
ziologie, Tübingen 1980, p. 1.
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5. Functions o f political myth
Foreword: Human predispositions regarding emotions and identity 
don’t differ, which means that all people are in principle susceptible to 
political myths. Thus the basic functions of political myths are the same, 
but they are in different contexts differently strong and effective, while 
the specific content depends on the historical and political context of 
a society. As a result, each society has a repertoire of myths building 
a mosaic, which replenish themselves and rebuild one another.
They are as master narrations of a certain society foremost genera­
tors of sense for it, because they accentuate excellent, heroic perform­
ances and neglect wrong developments.38 Therefore political myths 
are very necessary elements of identity of a social group and thus po­
litical myths are very common. There are political myths in each social 
group, in nations as well as e.g. in regional societies and „socialistically” 
organised societies. They have impact on our historical consciousness 
and therefore on collective and by this on personal identity, because 
they help us to imagine a common past. It leads to the conclusion that 
they are the crystallisation point of historical consciousness and iden­
tity.
The main and most powerful function of a myth for a modern soci­
ety, which often lacks possibilities of orientation and interpretation in 
a secular world, is to compensate the costs of rationalisation by creat­
ing myths. As it deals with climaxes and ruptures of the communio, it 
accounts for its origins and developments and has thus a sense-giving 
function by interpreting history. Last but not least, it has great impact 
on historical consciousness, too, because the myth gives history, i.e. 
historical events or persons, sense and explains the origins of society. 
It gives orientation, as it disentangles complex events and makes them 
easier to understand. It has thus a social-political function.
Secondly, it amalgamates the members of a society to one com­
munio, because not only by the mythical story, but also by the emotions 
aroused through the communication of the myth — through symbols, 
rituals and cults. The mythical narration therefore has influence on val­
38 See H. Hein-Kircher, Überlegungen, S. 420-423; G. Schöpfin, The 
Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths, in: Myth and Nationhood, ed. by 
G. Hosking/G. Schöpflin, London 1997, pp. 19-35.
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ues, world-views and behaviours in favour of the communio. The myth 
and its forms of communication show who belongs to the group, be­
cause it demands loyalty and excludes these people who couldn’t fol­
low the mythical message. Political myths are thus an important form of 
self-description of the society and of disassociation towards the people 
being outside of the group. The myth has a great impact on collective 
(and through this on personal) identity, but on feelings of „alterity” (dis­
tinguishing from another society), too — therefore the myth must reach 
everybody within that society.
Thirdly: As political myths form the people into historically effective 
units, another task is to legitimise the political system and its ideas. 
Myths and their non-verbal paraphrasing through rituals and symbols, 
which are the social practice of myths, can therefore be found as instru­
ments of propaganda in all political ideologies and regimes, because 
they have an effect on the broad public and because they make the 
prevailing ideology an inherent part of public life. Taking part in a ritual 
is a kind of acclamation and from the point of view of the ruling elites 
a kind of plebiscite.
Therefore myths and their forms of communication are key elements 
of political culture, as they make sure that communication and attach­
ment work in complex social structures such as in modern societies.39 
Thus it is a central issue for communication with the masses and for 
„mobilising” them in favour of the ruling elites. These integrative, identity­
-building and legitimising functions show that political myth are particu­
larly of great importance for a group, if it searches for self-awareness 
and self-identification. On the whole, these basic functions have great 
impact on collective identity, values and mentality of a society.
6. Conclusion: Mentality and political myths as a topic o f re­
search
These theoretical reflections on political myths show that political myths 
can be found in every society. They are more or less virulent, but they 
can be activated in times of crisis, of lacking identity or legitimation. Be­
39 K. Mayer, Mythos und Monument. Die Sprache der Denkmäler im Grün­
dungsmythos des italienischen Nationalstaats 1870-1915, Köln 2004, pp. 18, 
25.
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cause they can be activated, they exist in the collective memory, in the 
historical consciousness of a society and form its mentality. Thus, ana­
lysing mentalities of nations, regional societies or other social groups 
like the „socialist society”, it is important to deal with political myths.
Within the analysis of how political myths have an impact on society, 
the question of if/how they are received is the methodologically most 
difficult question, because there aren’t any methodological instruments. 
The only way to see is if you could find them in the collective and cul­
tural memory of a society. If myths are consistent and exist for a long 
period, it is a hint that this interpretation of history is still functioning. 
Therefore it is important to analyse the history of their use. If it is found 
very often over a long period of time, if it is adapted to new realities to 
be understood by its contemporaries, then it is an indication. Another 
possibility is, if you can find counter narratives.
The basic task of historical research on myth is to describe the myths 
not only by re-narrating them, but to analyse the history and reason of 
their development and their specific forms and functions. It is important 
to analyse the „inventors” and promoters of myths and their aims, too, 
because doing this, you can find the specific intentions of a political 
myth.
As political myths are master narrations of a society and help to 
invent traditions and historical continuities, historical research on them 
contribute to study historical consciousness and collective and cultural 
identities of national or other imagined social groups. By this, historical 
research on myths contributes to research on nationalism, regional­
ism etc as well as to the understanding of authoritarian and totalitarian 
systems, where the system of political myths in perfected. Its tasks and 
achievements are not only to find out which role political myths play 
in the formation of mass societies, how they influence ideologies and 
political culture, but also how they work within a society, how they are 
imposed, enforced and consolidated, and by this, how they influence 
mentalities.
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Wpływ mitu politycznego na świadomość historyczną 
i tożsamość jako czynniki kształtujące mentalność
By odpowiedzieć na zasadnicze pytanie badawcze o wpływ mitów 
politycznych na mentalność społeczną, autorka w pierwszej kolejno­
ści wyjaśnia pojęcie mentalności oraz pamięci w kontekście kategorii 
świadomości historycznej. Następnie definiuje czym jest mit polityczny, 
przedstawia drogi jego upowszechniania oraz funkcje, jakie może on 
pełnić w społeczeństwie. Refleksja na temat mitu politycznego powsta­
ła w głównej mierze w oparciu o teoretyczne rozważania Benedykta 
Andersona na temat „wspólnot wyobrażonych”, studia Aleidy Assmann 
o pamięci kulturowej, koncepcję „tradycji wyobrażonej” Eryka Hobs- 
bawma i Terence’a Rangera oraz studia na temat funkcjonowania ry­
tuału i kultu politycznego. Jako przykłady fenomenu mitu politycznego 
posłużyły autorce: kult Józefa Piłsudskiego oraz mit Polski jako przed­
murza chrześcijaństwa.
Der Einfluss des politischen Mythos auf das historische 
Bewusstsein und Identität als mentalitätsbildende Faktoren
Um die Forschungsfrage nach dem Einfluss der politischen Mythen auf 
die gesellschaftliche Mentalität zu beantworten, erklärt die Autorin zu­
erst die Begriffe der Mentalität und des Gedächtnisses im Zusammen­
hang mit der Kategorie des historischen Bewusstseins. Anschließend 
definiert sie den politischen Mythos, stellt seine Verbreitungswege und 
Funktionen dar, die er in einer Gesellschaft erfüllen kann. Die Reflexi­
on über den politischen Mythos entstand aufgrund der theoretischen 
Überlegungen von Benedict Anderson zum Thema der „vorgestellten 
Gemeinschaft”, der Studien von Aleida Assmann über das kulturelle 
Gedächtnis, des Konzeptes „der erfundenen Tradition” von Eric Hobs­
bawm und Terence Ranger sowie der Studien zum Thema der Funktion 
des Rituals und des politischen Kults. Als Bespiele dienen der Autorin 
der Kult von Józef Piłsudski und der Mythos Polens als ein Bollwerk 
des Christentums.

Marcin Radwan
Film as a historical narrative
This article is devoted to the concepts of visual history promoted by Na­
talie Zemon Davis. Her work focuses on researching the early modern 
history of France and the Mediterranean countries. Davis is a retired 
professor at Princeton and Toronto Universities. Her interests comprise 
social and cultural history. After a thorough archival research in 1982 
she became a consultant for the filming of Le retour de Martin Guerre, 
becoming at the same time, the first ‘historian — filmmaker’ who could 
fully influence the screenplay. Davis is a believer in the co-existence of 
the historical truth and fiction rooted in the movie. Currently, she is stud­
ying the history of gender, as well as the history of Jews in Suriname. 
The body of her major works includes: Society and Culture in Early 
Modern France: Eight Essays, The Return of Martin Guerre, Fiction 
in the Archives: Pardon Tales and Their Tellers in Sixteenth Century 
France, Women of the Margins: Three Seventeenth — Century Lives 
and Remaking Imposters: From Martin Guerre to Sommersby.1
The prominent American scholar has for a long time been advocat­
ing the creation of a documentary that would evoke ‘the image of the 
past’. From the outset, however, she was confronted with criticism of 
conservative historians reluctant to the new approches in historogra- 
phy. The history, according to Davis, should focus on ordinary people
1 Society and Culture in Early Modern France: Eight Essays, Stanford 
University Press 1975; The Return of Martin Guerre, Harvard University Press 
1983; Fiction in the Archives: Par don Tales and their Tellers in Sixteenth Cen­
tury France, Stanford University Press 1987; Women of the Margins: Three 
Seventeenth — century Lives, Harvard University Press 1995; Remaking Im­
posters: From Martin Guerre to Sommersby, Royal Holloway Publications Unit 
1997.
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and their everyday life. At the same time, she emphasizes the need 
to ‘visualize’ the realm of past communities’ conflicts. At this point, the 
question arises whether one is able to ‘see history?
The starting point for the discussion should be the famous Davis’ 
statement that „historical films should let the past be past.”2 If so, 
should the movie be breaking one of the historian work dogma stating 
that it recalls and interprets the past for the present?
The history, following Zemon Davis, should depart from „telling his­
tory in prose” as „with patience, imagination, and experimentation his­
torical narration through film could both become more dramatic and 
more faithful to the sources from the past”.3 Historian — director who 
attempts to visualize the history should be based on sources, but also 
possess the knowledge of the likely sensitivity of the people of the past. 
The attempt to visualize the past should, therefore, focus not on the 
surface, or putting on the historical costume, but on the contemplation 
of the interior of the past people.
The historical film or the visualization of the past, contrary to histo­
riography, focuses only on universal truths. The turning of reality into 
fiction in feature films, free from adhering strictly to the source base, 
„can make cogent observation, can make it historical events, relations 
and processes”4, „reveal social structures and social codes in a given 
time and place”.5 The visualization itself, as Gillio Pontecorvo claims, 
makes the past come into life not only through the use of historical cos­
tumes, but mostly thanks to the creation of the impression of intimacy 
of everyday life. To obtain the reality effect the feature film should then 
take the paradocumentary or almost reportage form.
Zemon Davis sees the making of ‘visual history’ as a”thought ex­
periment”, with which one can “try out the past”6. The „experiment” 
defined this way, made by the director with other” movie makers and 
together with the spectators, is meant to pose the question to the past 
what turn would it would it take.
2 N. Zemon Davis, Slaves on Screen. Film and Historical Vision, Harvard 
University Press 2000, p. 136.
3 Ibidem, p.xi.
4 Ibidem, p. 5.
5 Ibidem, p. 6.
6 Ibidem.
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The audiovisual explosion comes with the danger of yielding to the 
temptation of novel reality registration techniques. Historians, contrary 
to regular recipients of the world presented in the movie, are aware of 
constructivist practices. Nevertheless, they should allow the film mak­
er to subjectively create the vision of the world. This leads to the as­
sumption on the need of drawing conclusions without proposing fixed 
opinions of the past. The imagination and speculation become the new 
quality, as they are not falsifying the truth but only present one of the 
possible tales of the past. The film depicts reality through „(...) bringing 
some characters, situations and images closer”7, leading up to almost 
absorbing the viewer in the past, as Zemon Davis claims. The specta­
tors receive the interpretation and not the falsification of the past reality, 
which from now on will be visualized in their minds, through the motion 
picture. The process of visualization does not mean the mechanical 
perception of the film vision, but stirring the discussion around the on­
screen characters.
What is the message from the past contained in movies? Natalie Ze­
mon Davis in her book Slaves on Screen. Film and Historical Vision of 
2000, focused the attempt to answer the question on movies concern­
ing the slave rebellions, as part of a socio-cultural discourse. The film in 
statu nascendi may bring the truth about the past reality closer, through 
the uniqueness of the creation of the presented world, which is close to 
authenticity. For Anglo-Saxon teoreticians even a feature film has the 
same source value, and not only just as a carrier of cultural messages, 
but, what is more important, as a historical testimony. The movie direc­
tors wishing to create a unique vision of the past, create a specific re­
search workshop that allows the past world detail reconstruction. Which 
is not only the staffage costume of the era, but which also utilizes the 
base source.
The motion picture can display suggestions about political culture 
settings of the past realities. Zemon Davis says that “we see or hear 
these factions in a general way in the film”8. The impression of visibility 
and audibility of the film story allows the viewer to identify with what is
7 Revisioning History. Film and the Construction of New Past, ed. by Robert
A. Rosenstone, Princeton, New Jersey 1995, p. 7.
8 N. Zemon Davis, Slave on Screen. F ilm .., p. 28.
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on the screen. The movie, next to the true historical figures, recalls the 
probable attitudes of the people of the past in the everytime present. 
As the screen past contains everytime a present, however many a time 
would it be actualized by the spectator. The visualization of the past 
does not only aim at presenting the public domains of the past world, 
nor does it focus on the semi-private sphere, instead, it arises the 
spectator’s need to imagine the setting of the people entangled in the 
heterogenic community context. By the same token, the viewer makes 
a comparison between the antropocentrically-oriented present with the 
past, visualized by the director. The motion picture can, therefore, be 
the suggestion of solutions, the possible people’s attitudes in specific 
social settings.
The visualizations of the past are not free from stating general truths, 
mostly unrelated to the era in which the movie is set. The process is 
evoked by the specific need of bringing a prominent individual closer 
to the ordinary spectator. Next to it, however, there appear „important 
social processes and critical experiences of the past”.9 The movie can 
then be a substitute of many a historiographical interpretation brought 
together into one imagined vision. The visibility is rooted in the grasping 
of social differences via culture coding of navigating the social sphere, 
such as wearing clothes in a specific color, and finally by the expres­
sion rhetoric emphasizing the status of the human identity. The motion 
picture is therefore, most often, the registry of social sphere aporia that 
calls upon the spectator to take a stand! The individual film frame can 
become a representation of the important past events, but also of an 
everyday life set againts all the intricacies of the social conventions. 
The movie can reconstruct all, for example all the great battles, by de­
picting their true essence.
The film story about the past in crudo treats the probability law as 
a starting point. Additionally, it introduces the element of timelessness 
which has to be congruent with the sensitivity of the viewer who is cur­
rent with the moment of the movie’s creation. The movie, however, is 
very often interpreted as a symbol which bears a great responsibility of 
the movie maker for the created social awareness.
9 Ibidem, p. 36.
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The director — historians always orient their film stories to the his­
torical world, pointing out the complexity of the political setting as well 
as the didactic layer spectrum which deals mostly with the hardships 
of an individual being limited by the rules of the past reality. The movie 
becomes the expression means allowing to create the historical aware­
ness, and also bringing in the possible change in the viewer of the 
piece. The movie maker can then seem as a compassionate observer, 
telling a story “(...) under the dictarorship of truth”, as Gillio Pontecor- 
vo, a prominent promotor of Italian neorealizm, states10. Zemon Davis 
wishes the director presenting the past, depict the complexity of the 
historical processes by the same token.
The movie narrative about the past deconstructs life, together with 
all the procedures that organized the life of past societies. The motion 
picture can then become a microhistory, the testimony of the past, not 
focusing solely on revealing the truth. Finally, it brings about diverse 
interpretations on the typical social attitudes.
On the other side, it bases on stereotypes of possible past people’s 
behavoirs. The viewer sees as „individual persons emerge with their 
own traits”11 that are not seen with such intensity in no other sources 
of information, even in the written historical works. The movie can well 
present the transformation of the human thought into the plain free from 
social assumptions. The fluctuation of the boarders of social and po­
litical hierarchy can, thanks to filming, grow into the historical symbol, 
presenting the shift of human expectations12. The movie may well be 
a herald of the changes coming in turning moments for the old and 
the new world, which will then become an element that uniforms the 
society, rejected by the next mental or opinion revolutions. The motion 
picture brings about the personal empathy for the on-screen heroes.
The transparent subject quantum taken up in the historical film his­
tory is the issue of trauma and its memory, stemming out of the experi­
ence of 20th century. The movies treating this subject shun away from 
the sentimental staffage, they are not mirroring the real events. Making
10 See J.J. Michalczyk, The Italian Political Filmmakers, Rutherford, New 
Jersey 1986
11 N. Zemon Davis, Slave on Screen. F ilm .., p. 64
12 See The Reversible Word: Symbolic Inversion in Art and Society, ed.
B. Babcock , Ithaca 1978
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into fiction makes the film narrative deeper. At times, nevertheless, the 
imagination of the film makers, as Zemon Davis claims, which increase 
the film tension or the drama, seem to be unnecessary and random. 
On the other hand, these processes can lead to the creation of a new 
space, a sort of micro-history of probable parallel world which exists 
right next to the well documented, reliable source.
The film narrative that utilizes the language of symbols, at many 
times, simplifies the historical processes, which is caused by the filming 
time limit. The viewer receives a type of code which then has to be read 
and interpreted. The movie, nevertheless, through pretending to be the 
truth which in fact is only a fantasy, revives specific symptoms, typical 
of the people of the past. The motion picture as a communication sys­
tem attempts to show a possible anthropocentric convention of the past 
collectives, together with its customs and mentality. The spectator is 
presented, by the same token, with and audible and visible speculation 
on the model historical personality.
Zemon Davis traverses the artifact basis of the film history of the 
past as a need to invent everyday life which then becomes a type of 
possible personality. Thanks to this, taking up topics that raise the gen­
eral social discussion, the movie can have a therapeutic function. This, 
in turn, brings on a responsibility for people’s lives, as the depicted 
problems can concern true feelings causing traumatic experiences. 
That is exactly why the film maker should pay special attention to the 
inner state of the on-screen personas. The motion picture becomes 
very often a vision that is based on the richness of the film language or 
the cultural play. By the same understanding, the studying of the inner 
personal experience is reduced to the visualization art.
The strength of the visual history lies in the similarity of the on-screen 
personas and their interactions to the traces of the past that reside in 
the minds of the spectators. The appearance of the epic history, which 
is constantly expanding the movie genre about the past, poses ques­
tions to the past realities. The historical movie reaches a catachresis, 
as it normally refers to the political life, social rebellions, “the interest 
period of political control, foreign investment, trade and labor”13. The 
motion picture normally tires to capture the moment of the shift, which
13 Ibidem, p. 122.
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become the background for the fictitious personal stories which do not 
step into the realm of historical analysis, as Zemon Davis claims. The 
visualization of the past, if it recalls a real life individual, it swaps the 
real personality by the imaginary version of it.
The film tries to portray the cultural nuances, creating a psycho­
social approach to the past. “Telling the truth” by the motion picture 
boils down to the very fact of the filming, which allows the spectators to 
believe in the possible cultural setting. For the movie makers the moti­
vation to create a piece of art using the past comes down to the mere 
curiosity. The director does not often try to deeply understand the his­
torical processes and turns into the representation. An interesting take 
on the fact is presented by Meredith Maran and Anne McGrath which 
say that the events in the visualized past have taken place, but we are 
not sure if that is exactly how it happened. The movie only speculates, 
and it does that in a manner that is distant in timeliness of the story, and 
the feelings of the people of the present and distinct from the heroes 
of the past. That is why the visualization serves the purpose not of the 
knowledge but of the visibility. One should see, not know, the little frag­
ments, which in the end still change the truth, says Davis.
By the same token, the best definition of the film historical tale is 
the assumption that blends the real events with fiction. The movie can 
try to fill out the gaps in history. This is something the historiography 
does not allow. The motion picture can bring the truth closer through 
the thought experiment, according to Zemon Davis. Nevertheless, if 
the directors fracture the source base “they risk [then — M.R.] leading 
to wrong conclusions”14. The meaning of the historical outlook still lies 
with the viewers, as it is them who decide to attribute the paradigm to 
the screen truth. Filling out the gaps transfers the sensitivity to the past 
in the present, and sometimes also into the future. The movie gets at 
the same time the excuse for simplifying the stories which are not prone 
to misunderstanding due to high complexity, as in the case of histori­
ography.
The movie has to respect the historical sources even if that means 
that the dramatization of the story has to be dropped. The testimony, 
the proof of the past can become a matrix from which comes the im-
14 Ibidem, p. 127.
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pression of the past times. Additionally, the historical film does not have 
to be ludic to code the spectator with an easy cultural game, the knowl­
edge of the past does not have to be processed. It is enough to apply 
an appropriate parallel between the present and the past.
Zemon Davis postulates that visualization should be accompanied 
by equivalents that would explain the choices for a particular past frag­
ments, conditioned by the sources by the directors. The professional 
historians have to be safeguarding the truthfulness of the source visu­
alization. The history, however, “is not a locked for new discoveries”15, 
that is why at one point it will open to fictional film stories. There can 
not be a situation in which “history will be given an open form”16, and it 
will not provide answers as to the causes of individual processes. The 
historical movie has to pose questions to the audience about “the evo­
lution of the history and historical knowledge”17. The film as a cultural 
game can well sneak in the new social model which popularizes the 
critical historical thinking, and, sometimes, it can even pose judgments 
of general nature. The rule of not transforming the past in the films be­
comes fully valid. The past does not have to be made more attractive 
for the audience. It is enough to add a human universal element for the 
visualization of the past to make the audience more sensitive to the 
world.
Transferring history through the film
The subject of the historical movie evolves around the concept of repre­
sentation and historicity. In this sense, one has to ask a question about 
the repetition of the historical models which are used in the motion pic­
tures. These issues are raised by an American scholar Ann E. Kaplan, 
the professor of contemporary English film studies at the State Univer­
sity of New York, where she is also the head of Institute of Humanities. 
Her works include: Rocking Around the Clock: Music, Television, Post 
Modernism and Consumer Culture of 1987, Motherhood and Repre­
sentation: The Mother in Popular Culture and Melodrama of 1992.
The distinguished researcher of the gender spheres calls the film 
inspirations a historical formation which is indispensably linked to the
15 Ibidem, p. 133.
16 Ibidem, p. 135.
17 Ibidem, p. 136.
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target audience. She focuses the subject of the history used in the cin­
ema around psychoanalytical projection which, in turn, visualizes the 
metaphor of social relations for the spectator creating new space for 
action. For Kaplan, cinema is a domination tool. Through the work of 
the camera, one creates a distanced outlook upon the world which of­
tentimes is far from the truth:
The camera becomes the ethnographic tool through which cultures 
are ‘otherized’ and brought to Western populations without their 
needing to move physically from their cinema.18
The psychoanalytical transmission of history is inextricably linked to the 
visualization, thanks to adaptation, and normalization of the specific 
cultural play. Many a time, the subject raised by the cinema opens up 
a new space of occurrences, previously unknown to the wider audi­
ence. The motion picture always refers to a hypothetical viewer which 
possesses specific sensitivity.
The spectator is encouraged to comply through complex mobilizing 
o f unconscious libidinal desires via the narrative.19
One has to emphasize the role of the historical spectator, one con­
temporary to the moment of film creation. The current viewer fits into 
the current discourse practice in a different way than the viewer which 
looks at the movie from a time distance. The concepts based on Michel 
Foucault’s theory proposed in L ‘orde du discours of 1971, concludes 
that there is no way to define a unique spectator model which is identi­
cal to each time period. That is why Kaplan limits the history-loaded film 
definition, just like N. Zemon Davis, to the thought experiment which 
should lead the way for the human mind.
The spectator identification is normally linked to the unconscious de­
scription of the social group which updated the historical film, very often 
at the cost of other viewers representation. As Kaplan claims, the movie 
can deny the flux of members of certain social group through the multi­
plication of the well-grounded stereotypes. The cinema should build the 
consciousness which would unify the human thought, and not become
18 A.E. Kaplan, Film and History: Spectatorship, Transference and Race, in: 
History and... Histories within the Human Sciences, ed. by Ralph Cohen and 
Michael S. Roth, Virginia 1995, p. 180.
19 Ibidem, p. 182.
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an institution that fixes the authority of a specific human representation. 
This typical feminological approach shows the conventionality of the 
screen story which is always supported by a certain goal, brought about 
by the need of visual expression in historically relevant moment.
The motion picture that uses the past can also be called a “film’s 
framing narrative“20 to which the viewer becomes standardized, and 
which most often creates a distance to the screen narrative. Very of­
ten the viewer, thanks to the psychoanalytical representation, starts 
to feel empathy for the on-screen anthropocentrically oriented reality. 
The viewer’s imaginations are visualized which tame the unconscious 
parts of life. The movie, on one side, tames, and on the other inten­
tionally shapes the consciousness of the viewers by normalizing the 
interpersonal relations. Cultural codes and norms signaling are used 
for that purpose, which are appropriate for the human collectiveness, 
which transfers the public debate to the sphere of „individual psychic 
conflict”21.
The movie maker assumes implicite that the viewer will sympathize 
with the screen characters, even though not much is known about them. 
That is why the viewer can intentionally actualize the film telling the sto­
ry which so far has been unknown. The discourse practice brings closer 
the representation whose formation requires visualizing for a wider so­
cial group. The movie “raises in the fact, some of the cultural and racial 
issues that would have interested [the hypothetical viewer — M. R]”22. 
The spectator encounters the ready-made intertextual historical situa­
tions whose elusiveness testifies only about the imagination of the pos­
sible historical world. The illusion, thanks to contexts, links the present 
with the fantasies or the recorded reality. In spite of the fact that the cin­
ema shapes the consciousness and identity, it achieves this by „techno­
logical manipulation”23. On the other hand, though, the history rooted in 
the film can arouse empathy of the viewers for a specific problem.
The past framed in a screen is by Kaplan called the visibility of histo­
ry, which leads the viewer to interact in the screen story. The spectator, 
thanks to the illusion of anthropological similarity, will be able to identify
20 Ibidem, p. 190.
21 Ibidem, p. 192.
22 Ibidem, p. 195.
23 Ibidem, p. 198.
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with the simulated cultural reality. The most important process of film 
history transition is coding, which, with cinema strategies, shapes not 
only consciousness but also the historical knowledge of human col­
lectiveness.
Movie historical revisions: within the circle o f American history  
and film theory discourse
Robert A. Rosenstone in his preface to Re-visioning History. Film and 
Construction o f a New Past of 1995 announces the domination of the 
visual age. At the same time, he calls upon for the visual carries got 
the full privilege in creating, and telling the story through “represent­
ing, interpreting (...) the traces of the past”24 What he means by that 
is definitely not the documentaries nor costume films but what is called 
the new historical movie, which „deals with the relation of the past to the 
present”25. The movie in the cultural dawn of audiovisual explosion is 
the best carrier of history as it reaches such a wide range of audience.
In the course of evolution of film theory, the historical movie has 
been treated as a mirror for socio-political tendencies of a given period. 
The new historical film is now supposed to help historians immersed 
in the traditional research methods clarifying the historical processes. 
The history in the movie is strictly conventionalized, and that is why it 
is possible to compare between the written and visual history version. 
The most important is to set out from a question about what codes and 
strategies are used by the new historical movie to get to the absent past 
unreachable for the traditional historiography?
Rosenstone introduces the concept of a new historical movie as op­
posed to the Hollywood productions created at the time of great interest 
in the past, which was nevertheless only considered quite shallowly. At 
the time, the costume drama became well defined which treated the 
past as the staffage for a romantic or adventure tale. In parallel, there 
became to appear the continental movies, especially common in the 
totalitarian countries which have much earlier than the academic his­
tory brought in the facts of everyday life. Nevertheless, these movies 
have not been created to raise the historical awareness of the society,
24 Revisioning History. Film and Con struction of a New Past, ed. by Robert 
A. Rosenstone, Princeton, New Jersey 1995, p. 3.
25 Ibidem.
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but for the sake of catachresis of the cultural play. The motion picture 
expressis verbis was focusing on transmitting the emotions caused by 
the social dissonance around the trauma of the past. The picture of the 
past is then different than the written word conceptualization.
The historical film is a visualization game that is also a fictionalized 
interpretation. Documentary presents another case which in statu na­
scendi is closer to the fact. These two film genres for the Anglo-Saxon 
researchers should consist the picture of the past.26 The movie via vis­
ualization presents how emotions and feelings influence an individual 
both in the past, through simulation, and presently. The motion picture 
becomes a close-up version of the past.
The history cannot shun away from abstraction, neither can film which 
on top of that requires generalizations, as it is sui generis a recording of 
a specific perception of the history course. The motion picture is, at the 
same time, a concrete example, which can contest the historical truth 
or constructively framed historical knowledge. Rosenstone focuses the 
visual history around the inner life of people entangles in the historical 
process. The history undergoing the modern Anglo-Saxon criticism is, 
in this case, a linear, analytical and finally scientific discourse. The new 
historical movie, contrary to the history, comprises the vision of the past 
which includes grand events as well as abstract processes. Finally, the 
visualization of the past is complimented by “the artificiality of the his­
torical categories”27.
An important aspect is the revision of history, which refers to the 
reinvention of the world understanding which is possible when the ontic 
status is assigned to the creations of historiography. The film screen in 
a metaphorical sense becomes „a window through which we observe 
a world”28 thanks to which the movie makers speak on behalf of the 
past.
The Anglo-Saxon discussion around the historical film is opened 
by the Michigan University professor, Geoff Eley. A prominent analyst 
of German 19th and 20th century history. The author of the following 
works: Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Politi­
26 Ibidem, p. 6.
27 Ibidem, p. 10.
28 Ibidem, p. 11.
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cal Change after Bismarck. London and New Haven (Yale University 
Press, 1980), From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German 
Past (London Routledge, 1986), A Crooked Line: From Cultural His­
tory to the History of Society (University of Michigan Press, 2005). In 
his essay Distant Voices, Still Lives. The Family is a Dangerous Place: 
Memory, Gender, and the Image of Working Class of 1995, Eley began 
a new chapter of hist studies — on visual history.
Eley takes an assumption that the movie and photography are the 
representations of history. The motion picture is rooted on the guaran­
tee of social sense of storytelling on essential issues of human collec­
tiveness, most often of a specific group. The movie is par excellence 
a cultural expression which emphasizes the belonging to a specif­
ic social group. The visualizations of the past should then construct 
anthropologically-oriented statements, which additionally define the na­
tional essence and the typicality of the group. The problem arises when 
the movie can be confronted with the collective memory. In that case, 
there can be discrepancies on how things are visualized.
The movie as a visualization of the past can have an auxiliary role 
for the scientific discourse thanks to its base archetypes, similarities in 
people’s characters. This can sometimes be a very partial depiction. 
Eley stresses the fact that only starting with the New Wave in British 
movie one can observe the emergence of films which build a parallel 
between the movie and the ordinary men who is being observed and 
not created. The social environment is then defined through the lan­
guage aspects which constitute the discourse of a given collectiveness. 
The movie makers should, therefore, take to the screens the social 
problem29 depicted in the moment of historical change.
Eley believes in the possibility of film representation delivered by 
means of movie conventions, the outlook of the reality with no ontic 
sense. The old historical cinema was immersed in the costume con­
ventionalization, and only the changes of the movie narrations have, 
as Isabel Quigly claims, brought about the departure from the fakeness
29 G. Eley, Distant Voices, Still Lives. The Family is a Dan ge rous Place: 
Memory, Gender, and the Image of Working Class, in: Re-Visioning History. 
Film and the Construction..., p. 19.
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and the acceptance of the real experience of a specific social group.30 
It should be mentioned that this is an individual experience of a movie 
maker which fits in well in a questioning cultural approach. Hence, in 
the film social representation there can be a rejection of a romantic or 
nostalgic approach to the constructive past changes.
The difficulty lies in the orientation of historical formation, under 
which implicite is the partial opinion of a social group together with its 
structure and identity. Eric Hobsbawm says that in the observation one 
should reach the outlook on the home environment, work place, life 
style, and the past time activities31. The movie can well become not 
only the fantasy on the national norms which shaped the quantum of 
traits belonging to a specific collective. The motion picture secures, 
by the same token, the expectation or the social identity. The director, 
Terence Davies, goes even further and claims that the movie creates 
a unique mosaic of memory32. The closest to the truth of visualiza­
tion can be the naturalist formalism of the family life. In this case, it is 
the smallest social unit that focuses the historical fluctuations. There is 
nothing more accurate than the household that allows us to observe 
simulations of the past people.
The movie creator by imagination lets the viewer to consolidate, or 
to create redefinition of the past abstraction. Here one can get close 
to Davies statements, or go even further stating that the visualization 
of the past is the model definition of how memory rooted in the movies 
should be shaped. Expressis verbis the motion picture is reconstruc­
tion of the reality33. More attention is devoted to the artifacts of the 
micro-history of everyday life than to the observation of the main politi­
cal stream. For Eley, the movie is a specific recollection that is based 
oftentimes on the work of academic discourse. It is not a question that 
is analyzed based on truth but on the memory of the creator, which is 
a visual and emotional relation from memorizing. The creator via history 
expresses who we are.
30 See R. Hewison, In Anger: British Culture in Cold War, 1945-60, Oxford 
1981.
31 Cf. E. Hobsbawm, Workers: Worlds of Labor, New York 1984.
32 Cf. T. Davies, A Modest Pageant: Six Screenplays with an Introduction, 
London 1992.
33 G. Eley, Distant Voices, Still Lives. The Family is a Dangerous., p. 28.
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The movie can be a sign that indicates a dissonance between the 
past and present. The semantic sign that corresponds with the popular 
memory about the past reality can tame it by reminding which becomes 
a rotating gallery, as expressed by Roger Bromley34. The visualization 
can then be a stylistic or iconographic code or finally ‘cultural medi­
ation’35 with the inner, everyday world. Similarly, for Eley the movie 
about the past becomes a re-visioning of the historical social contexts.
Another point of view is offered by Michael S. Roth, the humanist 
professor of the Hartley Burr Alexander institute in Scripps College, and 
the head of the European Studies in Claremont Graduate School.
For Roth, the movie about the past is a construct that brings about 
the knowledge about reality. The problem is posed when one should 
decide whether history is a science or an art? What constitutes the 
need to recall the past? The starting point is the stale memory models 
which shape the film. The motion picture should create the viewpoint 
on the trauma of the past reality though several warnings against the 
oppressive culture and politics. The movie, in this way, means the re­
membrance of the past which is carried inside the witnesses of the his­
tory. This has nothing to do with the need to create a monument for the 
times that passed but the warning signs, especially after the 20th cen­
tury trauma. The motion picture „does not capture the past, but it can 
provoke u sinto an awarness of present dangers”36. The film memory 
becomes a confrontation with the absence of the past reality.
The visualization of the past can become an understanding of the 
forgotten. That is also why the historical movie does not always have 
to be a representation. The motion picture contains the traces of the 
past. Roth does not mean here a simulation of the abstract past reality. 
The past is always unreachable. The film story builds on the individual 
and collective memory which allows to face the force of forgetting37. 
Stephen Heath speaks even about the narratization of the memory in 
the film through the feeling as though the viewers have remembered
34 Cf. R. Bromley, Lost Narratives: Popular Fictions, Politics, and Recent 
History, London 1988.
35 Ibidem, p. 5.
36 M.S. Roth, Hiroshima Mon Amour. You must remember this, in: Revision­
ing History. Film and.., p. 93.
37 Ibidem, p. 98.
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the past events themselves, and they were coming back thanks to the 
illusion of participation38. The movie can finally have a therapeutic role 
bringing about the vision of the trauma, taming it, and making it, there­
fore, into a question mark but not necessarily rejecting the memory.
Why should one recall history using the picture? The time always has 
the upper hand and there is no other way to the past than the written 
word, but also the motion picture which constitutes the memory of the 
society, experiencing the imagination of the past reality, makes it visible. 
For Roth the movie constitutes the narrative memory „which assimilates 
(...) the past into a form that can be ‘interated’ into the present”39. The 
constructive approach to the motion picture sets the starting point the 
transformation of the past to make sure it is being preserved.
Another voice in the debate of historical and film theory is the essay 
The Home and the World. The Invention o f Modernity in Colonial India 
by the anthropology and history professor of Michigan University Nicho­
las B. Dirks. One of the most prominent work of the analyst of colonial 
and post-colonial history of India is The Hollow Crown: Ethnohistory of 
an Indian Kingdom of 1987. The movie for Dirks is very often an alle­
gory of antinomy, which emphasizes the differences between domina­
tion spheres of one social group over the other. The motion picture is 
best in reflecting the space which defines the people of the past. It is an 
evident division into the public and private life sphere.
The visualizations of the past depict the transversion between 
spheres that organize past reality. The most often tamed is regaining 
freedom by disadvantaged social groups or of genderism in women, 
a freedom that has so far belonged to the privileged few. The film can 
then become “intervention for the current debate”40 of socio-cultural 
and political nature through emphasizing unresolved social issues. The 
motion picture can also take up the discourse against the cultural tradi­
tions. It is constantly alive by actualization, differently than the written 
word. The movie can show also the fluctuation of the history and the 
possible comparison between different cultures and societies.
38 Cf. S. Heath, Questions of Cinema, Bloomington 1981.
39 M.S. Roth, Hiroshima Mon Amour.., p. 100.
40 N.B. Dirks, The Home and the World. The Invention of Modernity in Co­
lonial India, in: Re-Visioning History. Film a n d .,  p. 53.
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The cinema uses the set of signs thanks to which the difference 
between the old and the new, the tradition and the modernity is shown. 
The historical simulations are mostly focused on the inner world of the 
past people which constitutes the own creative version of the history. 
Dirks even claims that the modern world can be subject to revision by 
the sensitivity of the movie makers.
The Oberlin College history professor, Clayton R. Kopopes in his 
essay Radio Bikini. Making and Unmaking Nuclear Mythology of 1995 
takes on an interesting subject of mythologization by historical movies. 
The film documents allow us to show the repainting of the official history 
especially by the politics of a country. The danger that goes together 
with the motion picture used for the propaganda purposes or the inten­
tions of the authority does not let historians stay impartial. The movie 
creator taking up discourse with the historical discrepancies can evoke 
a re-estimation of the biased factual information. By the same token, 
thanks to the reportage processes and truth seeking, one can discover 
the falsifications of the history.
Koppes brings the visualization of the past down to the montage 
movie which should combine the inherent archive material and the cur­
rent reportage narrative. Thanks to that, a specific piece of history is 
shown but in different time frame and having different origin. That is 
why the director demythologizes the past with the picture. The creator 
discovers ‘unnaturality’ of the screen reality41 that is brought about by 
the film archives pertaining to be the explanatory myth for each specific 
political decision and not only in the totalitarian countries. The motion 
picture can also herald civilization contrasts by assigning them a mythi­
cal quality. By the same token, the movie maker, on one side, demythol­
ogizes in his edit the reality of the movie chronicles, and on the other, 
tames the myths which arose around unexplained or falsified aspects 
of the past.
Can there be a picture which seeks new scientific truth or will it al­
ways remain a mythologizing work of art? The creator can shape the 
narrative using the means typical for mythologization, but with time it 
always aims at the truth. In the montage movie the intertextual signs
41 C.R. Koppes, Radio Bikini. Making and Unmaking Nuclear Mythology, in: 
Re-Visioning History. Film a n d .,  p. 129.
138 Marcin Radwan
are the power which veils the unnaturality of the movie model. Very 
often the following pairs are established: consequence with smooth as­
surances, harmlessness of the authority or of some other power. The 
film can then serve history against the creators of the visual discourse 
who use the mass medium of expression to create the official version 
of the truth.
Daniel Sipe, the history professor of the Moore College of Art and 
Design in Philadelphia cooperated as a consultant in many prominent 
documentaries, including Small Happiness of 1985. In his essay From 
the Pole to the Equator. A Vision of a Wordless Past of 1995 he elabo­
rates on the concept of western civilization attached to the written word 
which is fiercely opposed by the motion picture. For the professional 
historians, only the word paradigm can bring in a useful interpretation of 
the past. The movie can become a popular means of spreading the his­
tory42. Sipe believes that it is possible to create a visualization that does 
not have to be accompanied with words. Only the vision would remain 
and ‘real time’43, which will bring the viewer straight to the screen past. 
The silent documentaries can present the real time as long as they 
abandon the standards of movie narratives.
The creation of the experimental documentary is only possible after 
doing the archiving work for a potential film. One should then dig out all 
the fragments that have not made it to the final cut, at the same time 
creating a new quality of a documentary dealing with the past. Once 
again, the reflection of the creator’s consciousness is emphasized, who 
by leading the silent narration and the selection of the material is still 
present. The movie maker who „re-directs” has to keep the integrity 
of the picture, as the montage documentary cannot diverge from the 
original.
The motion picture with no words causes the viewer to focus on the 
visuals only. The Anglo-Saxon discourse based on the Freudian theory 
draws a parallel between the dream and the movie, both of which can 
influence the human in a similar way. The spectator has to face and al­
ternative history which leads to the critical approach to the movie mate­
42 D. Sipe, From the Pole to the Equator. A Vision of a Wordless Past, in: 
Re-Visioning History. Film a n d .,  p. 174.
43 Ibidem, p. 176.
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rial.44 The viewer can judge the behavior of the characters but also their 
way of life. The silent document allows for a personal interpretation, the 
viewer becomes at the same time „an analytic, an active interrogator 
rather than a passive spectator”45. The camera registers reality and not 
faking it very often controls but never influences the screen situation as 
it is idiopathic.
The problem arises when the weight point is shifted to the cultural 
communication system, as the movie has to build a set of signs. When 
it would be deprived of the code catalogue, the movie would not be con­
gruent with the cultural games. That is why Sipe hints on the fast that 
the most important process in the documentary montage is generating 
a historical proof through the message. The historians do not want to 
document the historical traits using the film, as the world is dominated 
by the written word paradigm.
The movie, contrary to a documentary, is based on ludicism. Even 
if it recalls the past, it does so for a market reason. The feature films 
can be used to analyze the social mentality which reflects the interest 
in the specific past or anthropologically oriented problem. This inher­
entness leads the movie to be deprived of history testimony status. 
The movie is not a historical source but only a registration of the social 
consciousness. A slightly different example is presented by the praxis of 
collectiveness, tuned to the audiovisual channel which is characterized 
by inertia. At the same time, the motion pictures can become a histori­
cal testimony. The technological progress can bring about change in 
the approach to the cinema which similarly to the written word will gain 
a status of proof. The modern technologies of film making sub specie 
semioticae, which are supposed to make information widely available 
lead in reality the specific social or political movement to the commer­
cialized promotion actions.
Sipe claims that it is exactly the film that is the best possible medium 
to register abstract inter-actionism of oral history. The movie can grasp 
“the impact of the interlocutor, the setting of the interview and the dy­
namics of the interviewer and the interviewee”46. The motion pictures
44 Cf. C. Musser, The Emergence of Cinema, New York 1990.
45 D. Sipe, From the Pole to the Equator. A V is ion ., p. 179.
46 Cf. Idem, The Future of Oral History and Moving Images, „Oral History 
Review”, 1991, no. 1-2.
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can, by the same token, provide a historical proof, as they register de­
tails of the past. That is why the movie can really project reality, letting 
the man „to control the time and the space”.47 The motion picture cre­
ates a visual memory which allows for recalling thoughts and emotions. 
Hayden White suggested in the concept of historiophoty that it is pos­
sible to create a cinema discourse that would be a historic representa­
tion of the human thoughts framed as visual pictures.48
The impression of experiencing real time is only a convention, 
a montage illusion. The time in the film registry is subject to creative ma­
nipulation. This assumption becomes the starting point for the essays 
of Vermont University professor, Denise J. Youngblood. The prominent 
analyst of the Russian popular and political culture in her work Repent­
ance. Stalinist Terror and the Realism of Surrealism of 1995 takes on 
the subject of the movie substitute of the political power. The movie 
as a means of shaping the historical knowledge does not have any 
creative side which creates and interprets the facts. The motion picture 
should aspire to the status of era representatives, even if it were to 
employ a surrealistic convention. There is nothing more than the veiled 
“accurateness” of the facts that brings the exact interpretation of the 
past whose symptoms would not be able to be portrayed directly.
The movie creator building his picture narrative can revive the men­
tality of the past realities. Even if the historical parallel would not be 
obvious, it directly affects the social experiencing of the past era.49 
The film directors very often choose methods created by structuralism 
as their narration ways. The movie picture of the past can become the 
registration of the artifacts expressed by the surreal modeling which al­
lows for alleviating the pain of the past. The viewer can with the movie 
„experience the real sense of relief”50, as the trauma of the past be­
47 D. Sipe, From the Pole to the Equator. A V is ion ., p. 184.
48 Cf. H. White, Historiography and Historiophoty, „American Historical Re­
view”, 1988, no 93.
49 Cf. A. Bitov, The Courage of an Artist, in: The Russians Are Doming: Rus­
sian Critics on the End of Sowiet Cinema, ed. Michael Brashinsky and Andrew 
S. Horton, Cambridge 1984-1990.
50 D.J. Youngblood, Repentance. Stalinist Terror and the Realism of Sur­
realism, in: Revisioning History. Film a n d .,  p. 149.
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comes more sensitive through elephantiasis of the retrospective form 
impersonating history.
The film stories of the past are not only the representations creat­
ing the history of individuals, but also “a modeled [registration — M.R.] 
resembling the tale that touches every human”51. The history has a role 
of spiritus movens for the visualizing of the universal truths. Through 
reconstruction of the course of events, a historical situation is recalled 
which takes on an imperative tone, to “not only remember [the past — 
M.R.], but also tell it so that it cannot be forgotten”52.
Within the Anglo-Saxon discourse Thomas Keirstead and Deidre 
Lynch in their essay Eijanaika. Japanese Modernization and the Carni­
val of Time of 1995 have committed an extremely offensive interpreta­
tion of the historical movie. The authors of the essay judge very severe­
ly the possibilities of the movie which very often does not let recognize 
the past events. The motion picture can only hint on the past events, 
as it implies that the spectators already have some historical knowl­
edge rooted in a specific culture. The researchers from Buffalo are only 
able to accommodate for the visualization of ordinary people’s histories 
which are an abstract and an essence of the past. The movie can then 
bring only „a conventional morality”53 and the probable behavior of the 
past people.
Rudy Koshar, the researcher of ‘national memory’ in the 20th cen­
tury Germany has proposed an interesting take on the visualization of 
the past in his essay Hitler: A Film from Germany. Cinema, History, and 
Structures of 1995. The starting point is the attempt to create a histori­
cal imagination which could shape popular culture. The visual projecting 
should become the social construct of the past which evokes the imagi­
nation of the average spectator of the movie. Just as Hayden White, 
Koshar suggests that the concept of historiophoty can be recognized 
as a form of historical tale equivalent to historiography. For the majority 
of the researchers the motion picture is only a substitute, recognized 
under the category of the archived material which still requires an inter-
51 Ibidem, p. 151.
52 Ibidem, p. 154.
53 T. Keirstead, D. Lynch, Eijanaika. Japanese Modernization and the Car­
nival of Time, in: Revisioning History. Film a n d .,  p. 67.
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pretation. In crudo, however, the film can get the status of representa­
tion which creates the past54.
The art of cinema, in the opinion of conservative scholars, can lead 
to the ‘end of history’ of scientific nature, as it departs from the tale 
discourse, and fluctuates toward the performance which assumes 
a perspective contamination in its approach to the past. The movie cre­
ators by marginalizing the historiography attached to the facts show 
the diversity of the contexts that shape the past. The historic truth is 
abandoned for the simulation of the act. Can the movie then become 
congruent to understanding, explaining of the past or the explanation 
of the modern history which grew within the process of the times? The 
motion picture according to Koshar becomes dangerous only when it 
causes the warp in the meta-historical issues and not when it distorts 
the historical register55.
The cinema is the place where one can discuss contradictory in­
terpretations of the past. Can the movie come in handy as a heuristic 
tool? As the picture of the post-lumiere past is shaped by the cinema 
machinery building the impression of reality in a wide audience it can 
additionally manipulate the wide consciousness.
The revision o f the past in the non-American discourse.
The attempt to operationalize the paradigm of memory shaped by the 
motion picture was taken by a prominent scholar from Latin America, 
John Mraz, the author of the essay Memories of Underdevelopment. 
Bourgeois Consciousness /  Revolutionary Context of 1995. The his­
torical film vision influences the individual and social consciousness. 
The memory which becomes the starting point of the film history allows 
for collecting the experience of the collectiveness56. Going further, it 
leads to internalization of the outside realities. The historical fiction in 
the movie very often leads to the humanization of the society by which 
we understand the drafting of the model of „an ordinary hero”57 of the
54 R. Koshar, Hitler: A Film from Germany. Cinema, History, and Structures, 
in: Re-Visioning History. Film a n d .,  p. 155.
55 Ibidem, p. 157.
56 J. Mraz, Memories of Underdevelopment. Bourgeois Consciousness /  
Revolutionary Context, in: Re-Visioning History. Film a n d .,  p. 102.
57 Ibidem, p. 105.
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past. The man of the past is entangled in an oppressive reality to which 
he is in opposition. The movie makers contribute to the solidifying of the 
vision rules which control the heterogenic societies.
Visualizing of the lives of prominent historical figures presents an­
other story. The facts from their lives are usually trivialized. More at­
tention is paid to the subjective factors that influence the past people’s 
actions and not to the actual events. The movie maker takes advantage 
of the black and white reflection on reality, letting the audience have 
a critical approach to what they are seeing. That is why we can easily 
answer the Sumiko Higashi question about the dead point in history 
which was not developed by the author. The prominent gender scholar 
in her essay Walker and Mississippi Burning. Postomdernism Versus 
Illu sionist Narrative rejects the “end of history” heralded by the media 
domination.
For Higashi even Fernand Braudel uses the language of film mon­
tage to re-conceptualize the historic time, defining the space and visu­
alization of the historical processes58. For historiography the conjunc­
tion of synchrony and diachrony poses a huge problem, contrary to the 
case of illusionistic film representations59. ‘The visual history’ gives the 
impression of being viewed from a time distance. In the other hand with 
the use of cinema illusion one can create a parallel between the past 
and the present. Between the past time and the nonexistent present 
there is a disjunction which discovers the continuity of some historical 
processes. The historical film takes on a role of amalgam of the criticism 
of social relations usually based on the postcolonial discourse canvas.
„Are we then to assume that the film as postmodernist narrative 
reconceptualizes history?”60.. Linda Hutcheon points out that the film 
is a historiographical meta-fiction which creates the consciousness 
through transforming the forms and content of the past61. The traditional 
conceptualization of history is still dominant with objectification which
58 Cf. L. Hunt, French History in the Last Twenty Years: The Rise and Fall of 
the Annales Paradigm, „Journal of Contemporary History”, 21, 1986.
59 S. Higashi, Walker and Mississippi Burning. Postmodernism Versus Il­
lusionist Narrative, in: Revisioning History. Film a n d .,  p. 189.
60 Ibidem, p. 194.
61 Cf. L. Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction, 
New York 1988.
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represents the past reality, transparent to the truth carried on by the 
past time. The traditional historical science which is the basis of mod­
ernism does not want to allow the film structure, reduced only to a tex­
tual forgery. That is why the possibility of coexistence of interdisciplinary 
dialog between the picture and the historiography is still speculated.
Min Soo Kang in the 1995 essay The Moderns. Art, Forgery, and 
a Postmodern Narrative of Modernism is concerned with the histori­
cal events translation done by „the cinematic narrative”62. The problem 
here is the operationalization of the historical experience spread out in 
space of long lasting, and presented in few hour movie. The viewer of 
the movie is transported directly into the middle of the historical event. 
The postmodern movement is based on the historical representation 
concept which makes it possible to reach the past by creating a contin­
uum between ‘now’ and ‘then’. The movie creators very often leave out 
facts and go for representation of the mood of the era’s problems. Such 
a process is achieved by the use of artifacts which signal the cinema 
space of the historical story. The historical reality becomes a frame for 
the fictional screen story.
The movie characters only parrot the real people. The theoreticians 
have always been wondering whether the movie is based on an origi­
nal or only creates a fake symbol. The paradox of the cinema art lies 
in the fact of evoking the spectator’s experience of possible historical 
story which is a simulation of the past. This is the very basis of the work 
of afore mentioned Pierre Sorlin, the author of the essay The Night of 
the Shooting Stars. Fascism, Resistance, and the Liberation of Italy of 
1995. The famous sociology professor notices the difference between 
the traditional historical movie containing archival materials and a staff­
age movie about the past which only creates a fictional narrative.
The feature film is based usually on a stereotypical presentation 
of the characters which uses the myths and the resides of the soci­
ety’s memory. The past is not used as staffage but for “elegant, artistic 
pictures”63. Sorlin is not too emphatic when he says that the cinema 
more than the written text is able to communicate a wide range of infor-
62 M. Soo Kang, The Moderns. Art, Forgery, and a Postmodern Narrative of 
Modernism, in: Revisioning History. Film a n d .,  p. 116.
63 P. Sorlin, The Night of the Shooting Stars. Fascism, Resistance, and the 
Liberation of Italy, in: Revisioning History. Film a n d .,  p. 78.
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mation, both accurate facts and [hardly defined — M.R.] impressions of 
the tamed past 64. The movie can then become a potential exploitation 
of the actual situation. The motion picture can at the same time take 
a role of interpretation for the common vision of the past. In this way, 
cinema holds the role of an experiment in the history.
Film jako historyczne opowiadanie
Niniejszy artykuł poświęcony jest amerykańskim koncepcjom „his­
torii wizualnej”, która została rozpowszechniona przez Natalie Zemon 
Davis, wybitną badaczkę m.in. wczesnonowożytnych dziejów Francji 
i krajów basenu Morza Śródziemnego. Po przeprowadzeniu kwerendy 
źródłowej, w 1982 r. została ona konsultantem podczas realizacji filmu 
Le retour de Martin Guerre, stając się tym samym pierwszym „his­
torykiem — filmowcem”, który mógł w pełni ingerować w scenariusz 
filmowy. Autor prezentuje jej koncepcję filmu historycznego jako „ek­
sperymentu myślowego” oraz odnosi się do jej wizji otwarcia histori­
ografii na „fabularyzowane opowieści filmowe”. Schematyczności his­
torycznych modeli filmowych autor przygląda się z kolei przez pryzmat 
propozycji Ann Kaplan, która szczególną rolę przypisuje docelowemu 
odbiorcy dzieła filmowego, jako nośnika wizualnej metafory stosunków 
społecznych. Wreszcie, prezentuje debatę wokół „historii wizualnej” 
zapoczątkowaną przez wybitnego teoretyka „nowego filmu historyc­
znego” Roberta A. Rosenstone’a.
Der Film als historische Erzählung
Der letzte Beitrag handelt von der amerikanischen Konzeption „der vi­
suellen Geschichte”, die von Natalie Zemon Davis, einer hervorragen­
den Forscherin der Frühneuzeit in Frankreich und im Mittelmeerraum, 
veröffentlicht wurde. Nachdem sie die Quellensuche durchgeführt hatte, 
wurde sie 1982 Konsultantin bei der Filmproduktion Le retour de Martin 
Guerre und zugleich die erste Historikerin — Filmemacherin, die völlig 
in das Drehbuch eingreifen konnte. Der Autor dieses Artikels präsentiert 
ihre Konzeption des Geschichtsfilms als des „Denkexperiments“ und 
bezieht sich auf ihre Vision, die Historiografie auf „Filmerzählungen“ zu
64 Ibidem, p. 80.
öffnen. Vom Standpunkt des Vorschlags von Ann Kaplan aus betrachtet 
der Autor die Schematizität historischer Filmmodelle, die eine besonde­
re Rolle dem Zuschauer zuweist, weil er als Träger der visuellen Me­
tapher der gesellschaftlichen Beziehungen betrachtet wird. Schließlich 
präsentiert der Autor die Debatte um „die visuelle Geschichte”, die von 
dem hervorragenden Theoretiker „des neuen Geschichtsfilms” Robert 
A. Rosenstone eingeleitet wurde.
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